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The Image of God, Greek Medicine and Trinitarian Polemic In Gregory of Nyssa's *De Hominis Opificio*

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The Image of God, Greek Medicine and Trinitarian Polemic
In Gregory of Nyssa's *De Hominis Opificio*

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This dissertation traces the influence of ancient Greek medical theory upon the development of early Christian anthropology, scriptural exegesis, and theology and culminates in an examination of Gregory of Nyssa's treatise *De Hominis Opificio* (*Hom. opif.*). My research demonstrates that Christian reflection on Gn 1.26f. ("Let us make man in our image..."), particularly in the Alexandrian exegetical tradition, is greatly indebted to prior Greek medical and philosophical discussions of the relationship between the *hegemonikon,* or "ruling principle" of the human soul, and the divine ruler of the universe. Against this backdrop, I further argue that *Hom. opif.* must be understood in relation to the polemical agenda that Gregory inherited from his elder brother Basil, namely that of the Eunomian controversy. I argue that in *Hom. opif.* Gregory uses anthropological inquiry to substantiate a theological argument against Eunomius, and that polemical considerations determine in large part both the distinctive anthropology of the treatise and Gregory's manner of appropriating Greek medical material. Because the Alexandrian hermeneutic tradition, as represented by Philo, Clement, Origen, Athanasius, and Basil, had identified the *hegemonikon* with the image of God in man as described at Gn 1.26f., Gregory appeals to medical theories of its nature and location to support a particular understanding of the image and, consequently, of the God reflected therein. Thus, in *Hom. opif.* ancient Greek medical philosophy becomes for Gregory a potent weapon against theological heresy.

This dissertation by Brent Douglas Gilbert fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Greek and Latin approved by William McCarthy, Ph.D., as Director, and by Susan Wessel, Ph.D, and Philip Rousseau, D.Phil., as Readers.

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William McCarthy, Ph.D., Director

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Susan Wessel, Ph.D., Reader

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Philip Rousseau, D.Phil., Reader

To Rachel

Σαρκὸς μὲν τῷ ἡγεμόνι νῷ τὰ σκιρτήματα,
τῷ Παμβασιλεῖ δὲ τὸν νοῦν ὑπέταξας·
ὅθεν, ἀπροσκόπτως τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ἐντολῶν ἀνύσας,
σὺ τῆς Τριάδος ἐνδιαίτημα γέγονας εἰκότως, Γρηγόριε.

The Monk John (perhaps Damascene or Mauropous)
Canon for St. Gregory of Nyssa
(*Menaion,* 10 January, Ode 3, Sticheron 1)

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ABBREVIATIONS

BIBLICAL BOOKS

OT	Old Testament
Gn	Genesis
Ex	Exodus
Lv	Leviticus
Nm	Numbers
Dt	Deuteronomy
Jos	Joshua
Ps(s)	Psalms
Prv	Proverbs
Eccl	Ecclesiastes
Song	Song of Songs
Wis	Wisdom of Solomon
Is	Isaiah
Jer	Jeremiah
Jl	Joel
NT	New Testament
Mt	Matthew
Mk	Mark

Lk	Luke
Jn	John
Acts	Acts
Rom	The Epistle to the Romans
1-2Cor	The first and second Epistles to the Corinthians
Gal	The Epistle to the Galatians
Eph	The Epistle to the Ephesians
Phil	The Epistle to the Philippians
Col	The Epistle to the Colossians
1Thes	The first Epistle to the Thessalonians
Phlm	The Epistle to Philemon
Heb	The Epistle to the Hebrews
1Jn	The first Epistle of St. John

Ancient Authors and Works

AA	Gal., *de Anatomicis administrationibus*
Aët.	Aëtius of Antioch
Aët. Dox.	Aëtius the Doxographer
Affect.	Thdt., *Graecarum affectionum curatio*
Agr.	Ph., *de Agricultura*
Alex. Aphr.	Alexander of Aphrodisias

Anat.	Ruf., *de Anatomia partium hominis*
Anim. et res.	Gr. Nyss., *de Anima et resurrectione*
Anon. Ar.	Anonymous Arian
Anon. Par.	Anonymus Parisinus
Apol.	Eun., *Liber apologeticus*
Apol. apol.	Eun., *Apologia apologiae*
Apoll.	Gr. Nyss., *Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarem*
Ar. Sabel. dial.	Vig. Th., *Contra Arianos Sabellianos, Photinianos dialogus*
Arist.	Aristotle
Ast. Soph.	Asterius the Sophist
Ath.	Athanasius of Alexanria
Athen.	Athenaeus of Naucratis
Att.	Bas., *Homilia in illud: Attende tibi ipsi*
Aug.	Augustine of Hippo
Bas.	Basil of Caesarea
Beat.	Gr. Nyss., *Orationes de Beatitudinibus*
Bibl.	Phot., *Bibliothecae codices*
Cant.	Or., *In Canticum Canticorum*
Carm. dogm.	Gr. Naz., *Carmina dogmatica*
Cels.	Or., *Contra Celsum*
Cher.	Ph., *de Cherubim*

Clem.	Clement of Alexandria
Coll. Max.	*Collatio cum Maximino*
Coll. med.	Orib., *Collectiones medicae*
Comm. in Ex.	Or., *Fragmentum ex commentariis in Exodum* (apud *Philoc.* 27)
Comm. in I Cor.	Or., *Fragmenta ex commentariis in I Cor.*
Comm. in Jo.	Or., *Commentarii in Johannem*
Comm. in Ti.	Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum*
Conf.	Ph. *de Confusione linguarum*
Cong.	Ph., *de Congressu eruditionis gratia*
Cyr.	Cyril of Alexandria
Det.	Ph., *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat*
D.L.	Diogenes Laërtius
de An.	*de Anima*
Decr.	Ath., *de Decretis Nicaenae synodi*
Deip.	Athen., *Deipnosophistae*
Dial.	Just., *Dialogus cum Triphone Judaeo*; Or., *Disputatio cum Heracleida*
EN	Arist., *Ethica Nicomachea*
ep(p).	*epistula(e)*
ep. Amun.	Ath., *epistula ad Amun*

ep. Serap.	Ath., *epistula ad Serapionem*
Epiph.	Epiphanius of Salamis
Eun.	Eunomius of Cyzicus
Eun.	*Contra Eunomium*
Eus.	Eusebius of Caesarea
Exp. fid.	Eun., *Expositio fidei*
Exp. Ps.	Ps.-Ath., *Expositiones in Psalmos*
Fam.	Bas., *Homila dicta in tempore Famis et Siccitatis*
Fat.	Alex. Aphr., *de Fato*
fr(r).	fragment(s)
Fr. in Luc.	Or., *Fragmenta in Lucam*
Fug.	Ph., *de Fuga et inventione*
GA	Arist., *de Generatione Animalium*
Gal.	Galen
Gent.	Ath., *Contra Gentes*
Grat.	Bas., *Homilia de Gratiarum Actione*
Gr. Naz.	Gregory of Nazianzus
Gr. Nyss.	Gregory of Nyssa
Gr. Pal.	Gregory Palamas
Haer.	Iren., *Adversus Haereses*
Her.	Ph., *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*

Hex.	Bas., *Hexaëmeron*; Gr. Nyss., *Apologia in Hexaëmeron*
H.e.	*Historia ecclesiastica*
HNH	Gal., *In Hippocratis de Natura Hominis*
Hom. in Gen.	Or., *Homiliae in Genesim*
Hom. in Eccl.	Gr. Nyss., *Homiliae in Ecclesiasten*
Hom. in Jer.	Or., *Homiliae in Jeremiam*
Hom. in Jos.	Or., *Homiliae in Josue*
Hom. in Luc.	Or., *Homiliae in Lucam*
Hom. in Ps.	Bas., *Homiliae in Psalmos*
Hom. opif.	Gr. Nyss., *de Hominis opificio*
Imag.	Jo. D., *de Sacris imaginibus orationes*
Inc.	Ath., *de Incarnatione*
Inst.	Gr. Nyss., *de Instituto Christiano*
Iren.	Irenaeus of Lyons
Job	Anon. Ar., *Commentarius in Job*
Jo. D.	John of Damascus
Jos.	Proc. G., *Commentarii in Josue*
Jud.	Anon. Ar., *Contra Judaeos qui sunt secundum litteram Judaei non secundum spiritum*
Just.	Justin Martyr
Juv.	Arist., *de Juventute*

Lac.	Bas., *Homilia dicta in Lacizis*
Leg. all.	Ph., *Legum allegoriae*
Lib. prop.	Gal., *de Libris propriis*
Lg.	Pl., *Leges*
Maced.	Gr. Nyss., *de Spiritu Sancto contra Macedonianos*
Mal.	Bas., *Quod Deus non est auctor malorum*
Mart.	Or., *Exhortatio ad martyrium*
Marcell.	Marcellus of Ancyra
Marcell.	Eus., *Contra Marcellum*
Mem.	Xen., *Memorabilia*
Men.	Pl., *Meno*
Migr.	Ph., *de Migratione Abrahami*
Nat. hom.	*de Natura hominis*
Nemes.	Nemesius of Emesa
Onom.	Poll., *Onomasticon*
Opif.	Ph., *de Opificio mundi secundum Moysen*
Or.	Origen of Alexandria
Or.	Or., *de Oratione*
Or. catech.	Gr. Nyss., *Oratio catechetica*
Orib.	Oribasius Medicus
or(r).	*oratio(nes)*

PA	Arist., *de Partibus animalium*
Paed.	Clem., *Paedagogus*
Pan.	Epiph., *Panarion*
P. bibl. univ. Giss. 17	Graue, “Ein Bruchstück des Origenes über Genesis 1,28”
P.e.	Eus., *Praeparatio evangelica*
Ph.	Philo of Alexandria
Philoc.	Or., *Philocalia*
Phlb.	Pl., *Philebus*
Phld.	Philodemus
Phot.	Photius of Constantinople
PHP	Gal., *de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*
Piet.	Phld., *de Pietate*
Pl.	Plato
Plant.	Ph., *de Plantatione*
Plat. Tim.	Gal., *In Platonis Timaeum*
Poll.	Pollux Grammaticus
Post.	Ph., *de Posteritate Caini*
Praen.	Gal., *de Praenotatione ad Epigenem*
Prin.	Bas., *Homilia in illud: In principio erat Verbum*
Princ.	Or., *de Principiis*
Proc. G.	Procopius of Gaza

Procl.	Proclus
Prop. plac.	Gal., *de Propriis placitis*
Prot.	Clem., *Protrepticus*
Ps.-Ath.	Pseudo-Athanasius
Ps.-Didym.	Pseudo-Didymus
Q.G.	Ph., *Quaestiones in Genesim*
Ref. Eun.	Gr. Nyss., *Refutatio confessionis Eunomii*
Ruf.	Rufus of Ephesus
Sab.	Bas., *Contra Sabellianos et Arium et Anomœos*
Sacr.	Ph., *de Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini*
SMT	Gal., *de Simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus*
Socr.	Socrates Scholasticus
Spec.	Ph., *de Specialibus legibus*
Somn.	Ph., *de Somniis*
Spir.	Bas., *de Spiritu Sancto*
Str.	Clem., *Stromates*
Struct. hom.	Bas., *de Stuctura hominis* (= *Hex.* 10f.)
Syn.	Ath., *epistula de Synodis Arimini et Seleuciae*; Orib., *Synopsis ad Eustathium filium*
Synt.	Aët., *Syntagmation*

Tert.	Tertullian
Thdt.	Theodoret of Cyrrhus
Thes.	Cyr., *Thesaurus de Trinitate*
Thphl.	Gr. Nyss., *ad Theophilum adversus Apollinaristas*
Ti.	Pl., *Timaeus*
Tri.	Gr. Pal., *Pro Hesychastis* (*vulgo Triades*)
Trin.	Gr. Nyss., *ad Eustathium de Trinitate*; Ps.-Didym., *de Trinitate*
UP	Gal., *de Usu partium*
Ut. Resp.	Gal., *de Utilitate respirationis*
Vig. Th.	Vigilius of Thapsus
Virg.	Gr. Nyss., *de Virginitate*
Virt.	Ph., *de Virtutibus*
Xen.	Xenophon

Modern Works, Editions & Series

AClass	*Acta Classica*
ANRW	*Aufstieg und niedergang der römischen Welt*
BHS	*Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia*
Biblia Patristica	J. Allenbach *et al., Biblia Patristica*
BHM	*Bulletin of the History of Medicine*
ByzZ	*Byzantinische Zeitschrift*

CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
ChHist	*Church History*
Cohn	L. Cohn, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*
CMG	Corpus Medicorum Graecorum
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
DG	H.A. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*
DK	H.A. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*
DomSt	*Dominican Studies*
DOP	*Dumbarton Oaks Papers*
DSAM	*Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique, doctrine et historie*
Faith Philos.	*Faith and Philosophy*
GCS	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte
GNO	W.W. Jaeger, ed., Gregorii Nysseni Opera
GOTR	*Greek Orthodox Theological Review*
HeyJ	*Heythrop Journal*
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
JECS	*Journal of Early Christian Studies*
JHM	*Journal of the History of Medicine*
JSJ	*Journal for the Study of Judaism*

JTS (ns)	*Journal of Theological Studies* (new series)
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LSJ	Liddel, Scott, Jones, *A Greek Lexicon,* 9th ed.
LXX	Septuagint
MAAR	*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*
MH	*Museum Helveticum*
MS	*Mediaeval Studies*
MT	Masoretic Text
MT&P	*Medieval Theology and Philosophy*
NPNF	Nicene & Post-Nicene Fathers
ParPass	*Parola del Pasato*
PG	Migne, Patrologia Graeca
PL	Migne, Patrologia Latina
PLRE	A.H.M. Jones *et al., The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*
PTS	Patristische Texte und Studien
Rahlfs	A. Rahlfs, *Septuaginta*
RAM	*Revue d'ascétique et de mystique*
REJ	*Revue des études juives*
RevSR	*Revue des sciences religeuses*
RhM	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*

RSLR	*Rivista di Storia e Letteratura Religiosa*
RSV	Revised Standard Version
SC	Sources Chrétiennes
Schol	*Scholastik*
ScrTheol	*Scripta Theologica*
SP	*Studia Patristica*
SSL	Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense
StAnselm	Studia Anselmiana
SVF	H.F.A. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterorum Fragmenta*
TDNT	Kittel & Friedrich, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*
TDOT	Botterweck et al., *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*
TLG	Thesaurus Linguae Graecae
VChr	*Vigiliae Christianae*
VChrSupp	Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae*
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentlische Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*

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INTRODUCTION

It has become commonplace to describe patristic theology as fundamentally anthropological and patristic anthropology fundamentally theological. While this is may be true, most often such statements are, at heart, less observations about the relationship between divine and human nature than attempts to erode further the anachronistic distinction between economic and ontological trinitarian theology that previous generations of scholars have superimposed on early Christian texts. That is to say, "anthropology" is often a cipher for the Incarnation. Thus, in a recent monograph, one author, who proposes to investigate "theology as anthropology," produces an otherwise fine treatise on incarnational theology in several of the fathers.[1] Although the doctrine of the Incarnation rightly holds pride of place in explaining early Christian understandings of man's relationship to God and the world, it nonetheless leaves unanswered many of the most basic questions about human nature itself. If the neologism "anthropology" is to correspond to any notion in antiquity, such that one might speak of "patristic anthropology," surely it must first and foremost correspond to the ancient preoccupation with the question of what man is and how he is composed. Whether in the Hippocratic *de Natura Hominis,* Plato's "likely account" of man's creation in the *Timaeus,* Aristotle's *de Anima,* or a host of other treatises, philosophers (in the broadest sense of the word) attempted to describe the human organism both physically and psychically. With few exceptions, these anthropologies also explore the correlation between the human constitution and the god and/or gods. Anthropology,

[1] Steenberg, *Of God and Man*

it would seem, was fundamentally theological long before the patristic, or even Christian, era. Moreover, Christians themselves took up many of the same questions as they tried to salvage those elements of the classical tradition that were useful to, and consonant with, Christian thought.

This study is an attempt to elucidate one of the most fully developed examples of such a Christian anthropology in late antiquity: Gregory of Nyssa's treatise *de Hominis opificio*. The goal is not only to analyze the content of Gregory's treatise, but also to plot its relationship to previous anthropological and theological traditions, both pre-Christian and Christian, and to the polemical context in which Gregory wrote, namely that of the Eunomian controversy. It is my conviction that Gregory, far from the detached mystic and speculative theologian he is sometimes portrayed to be, is highly aware of the theological and exegetical tradition that he inherits. My reading of *Hom. opif.* also convinces me that already in this, his first treatise after Basil's death, Gregory has taken up the mantle of anti-Eunomian polemicist. I will argue that Gregory's departures from this inherited tradition are largely motivated by his arguments against Eunomius. Polemical demands, I will further argue, also account for his treatment of certain medical questions, which otherwise appear to be somewhat unrelated to the purposes of Gregory's treatise.

Because *Hom. opif.* is ostensibly an exposition of Gn 1.26f. ("Let us make man in our image," *etc.*), so, too, is this study in a sense a history of the exegesis of these verses, particularly in the Alexandrian tradition. But there is no shortage of works that trace the notion of likeness to God or, more specifically, the image of God from classical authors through Gregory and

beyond,[2] and I make no attempt to recreate such efforts. Rather, taking a cue from *Hom. opif.,* where much of Gregory's argument is concerned with the nature and location of the *hegemonikon* (*i.e.* the *nous* in its role as the ruling principle of the human soul), I focus on one thread of that history that has been neglected until now: the identification of the *hegemonikon* with the image of God described in Gn 1.27. This exegetical choice, first made by Philo, is a prime distinctive of the Alexandrian tradition of theological anthropology.

Necessarily, then, this study is, in another sense, a history of patristic reflection on the *hegemonikon.* The anatomical location of the *hegemonikon* was one of the great philosophical and scientific questions of antiquity. Although none of the church fathers considered the issue and its implications as thoroughly as does Gregory in *Hom. opif.,* those discussed in this study still regarded the debate that was taking place outside the church as relevant to Christian teaching, especially to the extent that the scriptures (or, at least, their interpretation thereof) corroborated or disproved any given argument. As I detail in ch. 2, the Alexandrian tradition parted with the growing medical consensus that the *hegemonikon* is located in the brain. Origen, who marks a turn in so many other aspects of early Christian thought, rejected the encephalocentrism endorsed by his Alexandrian predecessors Philo and Clement on the grounds that the scriptures themselves teach cardiocentrism. He thus brought the Alexandrian tradition decisively into the cardiocentric camp at a time when Galen had all but proved the validity of the encephalocentric theory. By the time Gregory wrote *Hom. opif.,* cardiocentrism and the scriptural exegesis used to support it had been accepted doctrine in the Alexandrian tradition for

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[2] *V.,* to name but a few, Leys, *L'image de dieu*; Merki, Ὡμοίωσις θεῷ; Hamman, *L'image de dieu*.

a century and a half. As I show in ch. 4, even Gregory himself had rehashed the Alexandrian cardiocentric position in his earlier writings.

I trace these two historical threads, however, in order to gauge just how closely this style of anthropology correlates to theology proper. The identification of the *hegemonikon*/*nous* with the image of God is not simply a statement about man's nature, but also implies a great deal about the God whose image is reflected therein. Even before Philo made such an interpretation of Gn 1.26f., Greek philosophers had likened the position of the *hegemonikon* among the senses to that of the supreme god reigning over the universe. Such ruminations are also a persistent theme in early Christian anthropology. Perhaps the greatest testimony to the theological import of early Christian anthropology is that patristic exegesis treats Gn 1.26f. primarily as trinitarian verses. This is due not only to the "divine plural" of Gn 1.26 ("Let us make…") and the characteristic Alexandrian identification of the *Logos* as the image proper, as distinguished from the secondary reflection that man possesses ("that which is according to *the* Image" to use the Alexandrian circumlocution), but also to the condensed interpretation of Gn 1.27 to mean "God made man in the image of God." This third element, which, to my knowledge, I am the first to note, appears already in Philo, is a constant of the Alexandrian tradition through Gregory, and proves to be of paramount importance in the arguments of *Hom. opif.*

It is these arguments that are the *stochos,* if not the continual focus, of this study. *Hom. opif.* is a rather enigmatic treatise from a theological perspective. The long discussions of human physiology can all too easily be dismissed as mere displays of erudition unrelated to the reflection on Gn 1.26f. To be sure, there is some truth in this; Gregory is quite prone to

digression. But I argue that much of the medical material, particularly the discussion of the nature and location of the *hegemonikon,* is part of a larger theological argument premised on the inseparability of anthropology from theology. While the iconic relationship between God and man is most often used as a way to attribute certain characteristics to man, the equation can be run backwards, as it were, to argue for a particular conception of God based on observed human characteristics. That is to say, anthropology *stricto sensu* can be used as an argument for theology, even trinitarian theology. Gregory expresses the general idea in his later *Oratio catechetica,* where he claims that one might convince a pagan to admit the hypostatic distinction between God and his *Logos* on the basis of his understanding of the human *logos*:

> Not even those outside the faith suppose that the Divinity (τὸ Θεῖον) is without *logos* (ἄλογον). This fact, which they admit, is sufficient to articulate our own argument (λόγος). For, if anyone admits that God is not deprived of *logos*, he will also necessarily agree that a human who is not irrational (ἄλογος) has *logos.* Indeed, even the human *logos* is called by the same name [as the divine]. Therefore, if he should say that he supposes the *Logos* of God to be like [the *logos*] that is in us, he will be brought to the loftier opinion (*i.e.* that *logos* accords with a particular nature, and, therefore, divinity is not undifferentiated unity, but rather admits of hypostatic distinctions; *Or. catech.* 1).[3]

In ch. 4, I detail how, in *Hom. opif.,* Gregory constructs, in similar fashion and on a larger scale, an anthropology that corroborates his theological arguments against Eunomius. To do so, Gregory must manipulate, at times even overturn, prior theological, exegetical, and medical traditions; the extended survey of those traditions in chh. 1-3 of my study are, therefore, the necessary *prolegomenon* to explicating the components of his argument.

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[3] All translations are, unless otherwise stated, my own and are based on the edition listed for each respective work in the bibliography.

The analysis of these arguments accounts for many of the particularities in Gregory's thought. It has long been noted that Gregory, unlike Basil and the Alexandrian tradition in general, does not distinguish between image and likeness, nor does he interpret the image as a title of Christ, but rather attributes it directly to man. Far from mere personal preferences or differences of opinion, such idiosyncrasies are, by my reading, functions of the argument that Gregory must make against Eunomius. In the polemical context, Gregory realizes that the traditional Alexandrian interpretation of the Son as the image is too prone to subordinationism and thus supports Eunomius' position. Indeed, in order to free the Son of all association with the image, Gregory makes the novel choice to invert the traditionally accepted order of creation in Gn 1.27: rather than the Father creating man according to his own image, *i.e.* the Son, the Son creates man directly in the image of the Father. Furthermore, because Gregory's arguments hinge upon the identification of the image as the *hegemonikon* ruling over the lower faculties of the soul and body, the likeness is not an eschatological expectation, but rather is realized whenever the *hegemonikon* properly fulfills its function. So, too, does Gregory reject not only Alexandrian cardiocentrism, but even Galen's scientifically accepted encephalocentrism, for polemical reasons. The primary objection of Eunomius' Nicene opponents was that he confined God to the limits of human reason. In *Hom. opif.,* Gregory rejects even the possibility of locating the *hegemonikon* on the grounds that, as the image of the uncircumscribable God, it, too, must be uncircumscribable and, therefore, not locatable.

Ideas formed in the heat of theological battle may often have long-lasting and unexpected consequences. Transmitted as an appendix to Basil's *Hexaëmeron, Hom. opif.* was one of the

seminal Byzantine texts on the theological and scientific meaning of creation and a prime example of the reconciliation of Christian and Hellenic thought. *Hom. opif.* stands as a clear example that, in some instances, attempts at such reconciliation were driven as much by internal motivations as external: Gregory must appeal to current medical science in order to settle a dispute within the Church, not to appease detractors without. The example of *Hom. opif.* also serves as a warning that it may be necessary to treat patristic ideas, not as discrete elements that, when assembled, constitute a given writer's thought, but rather as part of a larger argument. Gregory himself, for example, defies categorization; despite his firm argument in *Hom. opif.,* he returns to the traditional Alexandrian cardiocentrism of his youth in one of his last writings. Of the three Cappodocian fathers, Gregory is, for want of biographical detail, the most obscure to us. I hope that, by placing *Hom. opif.* in a definite historical context and intellectual tradition, this study clarifies some of the details of his intellectual development and brings his portrait into greater focus.

CHAPTER 1: THE *HEGEMONIKON* AND THE MAKING OF PHILONIC ANTHROPOLOGY

When Gregory of Nyssa wrote wrote his treatise *On the Creation of Man*, he already stood at the culmination of a long exegetical tradition that interpreted Gn 1.26f. and 2.7 in the light of philosophical speculation and medical inquiry regarding the location and nature of a "ruling principle" of the soul. This particular tradition had its origins in the exegetical treatises of Philo of Alexandria, who, in addition to being the first to interpret the Jewish scriptures through the lens of Platonic philosophy, was the first to make the identification of the *hegemonikon* with the image of God in Gn, an identification that undergirds Gregory's arguments in *Hom. opif.* Philo's interpretations of these verses established the *hegemonikon* as a theological and anthropological category for the Alexandrian Christian exegetical tradition that would follow him and, more importantly, ensured that in this tradition the *hegemonikon* served as the focal point for relating anthropology to theology proper, *i.e.* to discussions of the nature of God, and hence enabled Gregory in *Hom. opif.* to mount a trinitarian argument on the basis of anthropological evidence. This chapter explains the origins of, and ancient debate over, the *hegemonikon* and its location, and how the *hegemonikon* came to be an essential element of Philo's theological anthropology.

THE *HEGEMONIKON*

Perhaps because the question has been decisively settled for so long, or because of the advanced state of modern neuroscience relative to the anatomical knowledge of antiquity, it is nowadays often hard to imagine that the location of the human control-center was so disputed by many of

the ablest minds of antiquity. Yet long before, and even long after, the Alexandrian physicians Herophilus and Erasistratus would discover the nerves and their connection to the brain, various philosophers proposed different locations for what came to be known as the *hegemonikon* (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν),[1] the "ruling principle": the blood (Empedocles), the head and/or brain (Alcmaeon, the Hippocratic author of *On the Sacred Disease,* Plato and his followers), the heart (Aristotle, Diocles, Praxagoras, and the Stoics), the diaphragm (various medical authors), or diffused among the senses and therefore located nowhere specific (Asclepiades). Indeed, by the early third century AD, Tertullian could list no fewer than ten proposed locations of the *hegemonikon.*[2] Although the term "*hegemonikon*" itself is most likely a Stoic coinage,[3] it derives from the language of Plato, particularly that of *Ti.,* and the broader search for some center of the true man that controls the actions of the body long predates Plato himself. The near universal presumption

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[1] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy, p. 150." The most thorough treatment of the *hegemonikon* is found in Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* pp. 18-47, in the chapter titled, "The Development of the Hegemonic Concept: the Medical and Philosophical Background." *V.* also Kobusch, *Hegemonikon.*

[2] *Anim.* 15

[3] Adorno, "Sul significato del termine ἡγεμονικόν," pp. 32f., demonstrates that Cleanthes' use of the term, given his fidelity to his master, makes it likely that Zeno himself had used it, though perhaps not in the technical sense elaborated by his successors. Schneider, "Πνεῦμα ἡγεμονικόν," p. 65, notes that the term in the older Stoic doctrine included the drives, but that later Stoics reduced the term to an equivalent for the *nous.*

of these authors was that the *hegemonikon* was the intellect or seat of reason (variously νοῦς, λογισμός, λογιστικόν, *etc.*), as well as the central faculty of perception (αἰσθητικόν).[4]

Prior to Plato, both head and heart had been suggested as possible locations for a central, controlling organ, but a lack of evidence precludes any direct association of his encephalocentric position with that of Alcmaeon or the author of *On the Sacred Disease*.[5] Plato's *Ti.,* the main source for his teaching on the ruling faculty, provides therefore the philosophical foundation of most later encephalocentric theory and, more importantly for the purposes of this study, is the treatise that most directly influences Philo and, through him, Gregory's Christian predecessors. Although Plato never uses the term ἡγεμονικόν, he does employ several cognate and synonymous terms to describe the functions of the *nous,* and thereby establishes the vocabulary from which later philosophers will develop the term proper. Thus, at *Ti.* 41c Plato refers to an element placed in the newly created humans that is "called divine and rules supreme (θεῖον λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν τε) in those who are willing always to follow justice and you [the lesser immortals]." Similarly, Plato describes the head, the location of this ruling element, as that "which is most divine and rules over all things within us" (ὃ θειότατον τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν

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[4] Schneider, "Πνεῦμα ἡγεμονικόν," p. 64, n. 7, points out the political connotations of the adjective ἡγεμονικός and its usage in connection with, and as a synonym for, terms such as τυραννικός, στρατηγός, ἐξουστιαστικός, βασιλικός. Adorno, "Sul significato del termine ἡγεμονικόν," p. 28, sees the ἡγεμονία of Athens as the principal city within the federation of Greek *poleis* as the original metaphor implicit in the term ἡγεμονικόν. While this is plausible enough, Adorno presses the metaphor so far as to insist that ἡγεμονικόν (in a non-technical use) should be distinguished from ἀρχικόν and concludes that the concept of a ruling element of the soul is only the product of later Stoicism. Even less satisfying are his attempts, pp. 30, 33, to distinguish the νοῦς from λογισμός and ἡγεμονικόν and to attribute their conflation to late Stoicism, even when the clear meaning of the texts that he cites as evidence indicate otherwise. This is especially egregious at p. 30, where Adorno misinterprets a passage from Julius Pollux's *Onomasticon* as proof of this distinction: μέρη [δὲ ψυχῆς] νοῦς, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός. καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς καὶ λογισμός καὶ ἡγεμονικόν (2.226; the larger passage makes it clear that the second of these sentences is nominal in structure and should therefore be translated, "the *nous* is both the reasoning faculty and the ruling principle.")

[5] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 160, can only speak of "a noteworthy point of agreement."

πάντων δεσποτοῦν, 44d). Later Plato describes "all organs of sense" (πᾶν ὅσον αἰσθητικόν) as deferring to "the best part" of the soul so as to allow it to rule over all (καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς πᾶσιν ἡγεμονεῖν ἐᾷ, 70b-c).[6] Besides these lexical precedents, Plato's description of the human constitution leaves no doubt that he regards the rational portion of the soul as the ruler of the lesser parts of the soul and, through them, of the body, and that this rational portion of the soul resides in the head.

Plato's *Ti.* is important to this study not only for its role in the development of the hegemonic principle, but also more specifically because it is the most direct and relevant precedent for Philo's *de Opificio Mundi*[7] and, consequently, for the development of the early Christian interpretation of the creation of man. Although it is far from obvious that Plato's concept of the intellect should be identified with the image of Gn 1.26f or the breath of life of Gn 2.7, several elements of Plato's account of the creation of man readily lend themselves to Philo's Platonic interpretation of these verses. First, the ruling element, by whatever name, is for Plato the divine element in man.[8] In addition to the passages mentioned above, Plato also describes

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[6] Kobusch, "Hegemonikon," n. 1, cites *Men.* 88c and *Lg.* 963a as other precedents of the term, but these passages provide only lexical coincidences and are not concerned with the concept of a ruling principle of the human constitution. In *Men.* 88c Plato describes prudence (φρόνησις) as leading (ἡγουμένη), but in a metaphorical sense: "prudence leads to happiness (εὐδαιμονία), but foolishness, to its opposite." At *Lg.* 963a, Plato describes *nous* as the *hegemon* of the virtues, but here he uses νοῦς to mean reason rather than a particular faculty of the soul: virtue consists of reason (νοῦς), temperance, justice and courage, and *nous* is the *hegemon* of the other three.

[7] The particular relevance of *Ti.* on *Opif.* has been amply demonstrated in Runia's study, *Philo of Alexandria and the* Timaeus.

[8] In this regard Plato may have developed an element of his psychology inherited from Socrates. Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.3.13f., ascribes to Socrates the teaching of a functional similarity between the gods, the sun, and the human soul: all are invisible (in the case of the visible sun, its strength does not allow man to look upon it), yet all are known through their actions. Particularly noteworthy is that Socrates here combines the divine aspect of the soul and its hegemonic function: "Indeed, it is clear that even the human soul, which, more than any other part of the human constitution, partakes of the divine (τοῦ θείου μετέχει), rules in us (βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν), but even it remains unseen."

the *nous* as "the most divine and most holy part" (τοῦ θειοτάτου καὶ ἱερωτάτου, 45a), "the divine part" (τὸ θείον, 69d), "the divine seed" (τὸ θεῖον σπέρμα, 73c), "the divine element within us" (τὸ… ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, 90c). The common nature of the human *nous* and the divine is furthermore underscored by the fact that in *Ti.* the Demiurge itself is, or at least has, *nous,* especially at 47e-48a, where the Demiurge is described as the *nous* that creates the world by persuading Necessity to bring most things into being.[9] It is this divine nature of the *nous* in its role as the ruling principle of the human soul that will later determine Philo's interpretation of the creation of man, particularly of Gn 1.26f. and 2.7, since Philo, in attempting a Platonic reading of the Hebrew scriptures, must find some Platonic correlate to the divine image and the breath of life. Plato's divine element, moreover, suggests itself as an equivalent to the divine image, and even more so to the breath of life, by the fact that Plato describes it as being sown like a seed in man. At 41c, Plato's Demiurge, speaking to the lesser, created divinities, describes how he will implant the *nous* in man: "I myself shall begin the creation and sow in them the part that is called divine and rules sovereign in those who wish always to follow you and justice; then I shall hand over [the newly created human] to you" (σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάμενος ἐγὼ παραδώσω). The same metaphor is operative at 73c, where Plato describes the Demiurge preparing a special portion of the human marrow to serve as a field that will receive the divine seed (τὴν… τὸ θεῖον σπέρμα οἷον ἄρουραν μέλλουσαν ἔξειν ἐν αὑτῇ).

The congruence between the Platonic and Biblical creations, however, derives particularly from the fact that Plato's demiurge plants this divine seed in the head, an easy

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[9] Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism,* p. 605. Cherniss also cites as evidence *Ti.* 51e; *Phil.* 28c-e, 26e-27b, 30c-d, 37e; and *Lg.* 875c7-d2, 966e2-4, 897d-898c.

correlate to Gn 2.7, where God breathes the breath of life into Adam's face. At 44d Plato describes how the gods placed the two divine revolutions (περιόδους)[10] in a spherical body, the head, in imitation of the spherical form of the universe; it is in this context that Plato refers to the head as that "which is most divine and rules over all things within us" in order to emphasize the iconic relationship between the divine soul of the universe and the human intellect.[11] As Plato further explains, God crafted the human body "to bear atop our persons the dwelling-place of our most divine and holy part" (τὴν τοῦ θειοτάτου καὶ ἱερωτάτου φέρον οἴκησιν ἐπάνωθεν ἡμῶν, 45a). This same passage also facilitates a Platonic reading of the "breath of life" breathed into man's face at Gn 2.7 in that the gods add a face to the head and order it to be "the ruling part" (τὸ μετέχον ἡγεμονίας, 45b).[12] Similarly, Plato later returns to the metaphor of the sown seed, this time with more anatomical specificity. At 73c-d, where Plato describes the aforementioned "field … that will receive the divine seed," the God has in fact fashioned the spherical brain (ἐγκέφαλον) as that field. Thus, Plato provides the first reasoned argument for an encephalocentric position of the ruling element, and herein lie the origins of the debate, to be conducted over the following centuries, concerning the anatomical location of the *hegemonikon*.

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[10] Referring to "Same" and "Other," *i.e.* the fixed stars and the planets, respectively. Later commentators on Plato's *Timaeus* attempted to correlate these two revolutions with specific aspects of the human soul. *E.g.,* Proclus, *Comm. in Ti.* on 44A (Diehl, vol. 3, pp. 343-48), identifies Other with sense and Same with intellect.

[11] *Cf.* also *Ti.* 90c-d: τῷ δ' ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί. Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu,* pp. 103-06, rightly points out that for Plato, the term εἰκών, "image," describes the relationship between sensible objects and their ideal models, while the similarity between God and the universe and, in turn, the universe and man, is termed συγγένεια, "kinship." In a more general sense, however, Plato here presents the construction of the human body as reflective of its relationship to God and the universe and therefore iconic, an idea which will be essential to the anthropology of both Philo and Gregory.

[12] Thus, Philo describes to the face as the *hegemonikon* of the body at *Leg. All.* 1.39f., discussed below.

Plato argues that this physical arrangement, whereby the divine element of the soul is housed in the head, keeps the divine element of the soul free from pollution ([sc. θεοὶ] σεβόμενοι μιαίνειν τὸ θεῖον, 69d), while allowing the loftier element of the mortal soul, namely "that which partakes of courage and spirit" (τὸ μετέχον … τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ θυμοῦ, 70α), to interact with the divine element and, in obedience to reason (τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον, *ibid.*), to subdue the lower part of the mortal soul, the seat of desires (τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, *ibid.*) whenever it should refuse to obey the command sent down from the citadel (ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τῷ ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ, *ibid.*).[13] Plato further develops this metaphor by casting the heart as the "dwelling of the bodyguard" (τὴν δορυφορικὴν οἴκησιν, 70b)[14] that suppresses the uprisings of the lower element of the soul so that the body and the senses may follow the orders of the reason and "thus allow the best part to rule in them all" (τὸ βέλτιστον οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς πᾶσιν ἡγεμονεῖν ἐᾷ, 70b-c). That is to say, the heart's protection allows the reason to function as the *hegemonikon*. At 91e, Plato will imply that this arrangement is also constitutive of proper humanity itself, since, he argues, land animals are derived from men who have inverted it:

> The wild class [of animals] that goes on foot derives from men who make no use of philosophy and do not observe anything concerning the nature of the heavens, because they no longer make use of the revolutions in their head, but rather follow the parts of the soul [located] round their chest as their leaders (διὰ τὸ … τοῖς περὶ τὰ στήθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόσιν ἕπεσθαι μέρεσιν).

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[13] Anonymus Parisinus (fr. 1) attributes to Hippocrates the idea of the *nous* ruling in the brain as in a citadel: ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης τὸν μὲν νοῦν φησὶν ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τετάχθαι καθάπερ τι ἱερὸν ἄγαλμα ἐν ἀκροπόλει τοῦ σώματος. There is, however, no evidence of such an idea in the Hippocratic corpus, although Wellmann, *Fragmente,* p. 19, optimistically suggests that this might reflect a lost Hippocratic treatise. It is more likely the projection of a later age upon Hippocrates; *v.* Harris, *The Heart and the Vascular System,* p. 33. Philo will later exploit this metaphor more fully to show the brain as the locus of the *hegemonikon.*

[14] Contrast this to Philo, for whom the senses, are as a rule, the bodyguards of the *nous; v., e.g., Leg. all.* 3.115; *Somn.* 1.32, both discussed below.

Brute animals, therefore, derive from men who have chosen the hegemony of they lower, irrational soul, rather than that of the reason, which reflects the divine revolutions of the heavens. Plato goes on to say that these men reflected this inverted orientation towards the irrational parts of the soul in their posture, as their arms and head were "drawn towards the earth because of their kinship with it" (ὑπὸ συγγενείας, *ibid.*). From this point the devolution continued, such that their heads were elongated because the revolutions in their head atrophied; some were so drawn to the earth that they needed four feet, and yet others so much so that they lost their feet entirely and were reduced to serpents (91e-92a). Thus, the human constitution and posture reflects his possession of the reason that is the bond of his kinship with the soul of the Universe.[15]

Plato's understanding of the brain as a hegemonic faculty is based entirely upon philosophical argument and is, as Timaeus himself frequently claims in his cosmological exposition, but "a likely account,"[16] rather than the product of any scientific investigation; indeed, by the time Plato took up the question in *Ti.,* he had already formed his epistemology and doctrine of the soul in other contexts with no reference to physiology.[17] Aristotle, by contrast, made the first attempt to determine the human center of control by means of empirical observation, particularly by means of animal dissection.[18] Aristotle's examinations of various animals led him to the conclusion that the heart is the central organ of the human, indeed the

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[15] At greater length and in a very different way, Gregory, *Hom. opif.* 7-9, will explain how the possession of *logos* has necessarily determined man's posture and physical characteristics.

[16] ὁ εἰκὼς μύθος or λόγος, *e.g.* 29d, 30b, 48d, 53d, 56a, 68d, and elsewhere.

[17] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 159.

[18] Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* p. 28.

ἀρχή of blooded animals in the sense that it is the first organ to be formed in the embryo and the last organ from which life departs,[19] and that it serves as the common *sensorium* necessary to animal life. Briefly stated, the main reasons for Aristotle's conclusion were that the heart is located at the center of the human and is demonstrably the origin of the blood vessels, which circulate the blood and heat necessary for sensation; the brain, by contrast, seems to the naked eye to be bloodless, and therefore insensate, a conclusion supported by the insensitivity of the brain to handling or wounding.[20] Although Aristotle argues that the heart is the central organ and common *sensorium* of animals, he does not attribute to it the functions and faculties that would make it the seat of a *hegemonikon,* nor of the soul more generally. Rather, in his hylomorphic analysis Aristotle contrasts the sense faculty, which is centered upon the heart, with the mind, which has no specific location: "For the faculty of sense is not separate from the body, but [the mind] is separable" (τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ [νοῦς] χωριστός, *de An.* iii.4, 429b5). For Aristotle, the mind is dependent upon sensory perception and, consequently, interacts with the heart, but remains an epiphenomenon of the relationship between the body and its form, the soul.[21]

Perhaps Aristotle's most lasting legacy to the question of the *hegemonikon* is that he lent his authority to the theory, derived from Empedocles and the tradition of the Sicilian physicians, that "connate *pneuma*" (σύμφυτον πνεῦμα), naturally produced by the action of vital heat upon

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[19] *GA* 741b: Γίγνεται δὲ πρῶτον ἡ ἀρχή. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ καρδία τοῖς ἐναίμοις… καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίγνεται πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελευτήν· ἀπολείπει γὰρ τὸ ζῆν ἐντεῦθεν τελευταῖον.

[20] Aristotle's arguments are especially found at *PA* 647a3-23, 666a19-23. *V.* Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* pp. 29f.; Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy,* VI, pp. 296-98; Modrak, *Aristotle,* pp. 71-76.

[21] Van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy,* p. 130.

the blood,[22] is the means of interaction between heart and limbs, and, it would seem, the senses as well.[23] Aristotle's limiting of the blood to a nutritive role and promotion of *pneuma* as the primary messenger influenced later psychology, not only for the Stoics, who would posit *pneuma* as the actual material of the soul, but also for later physicians who, upon distinguishing arteries from veins and discovering the nerves, would assume that these were in fact conduits for *pneuma*.

Despite their differences in describing the location of the *nous,* Aristotle nonetheless shares with Plato the image of the hegemonic faculty as the king of the soul. At *EN* 1113a Aristotle describes the role of the hegemonic faculty in deliberation and choice:

> The object of deliberation (βουλευτόν) and the object of choice (προαιρετόν) are one in the same, except that the object of choice is now already determined, since choice is that which has been selected by deliberation (ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς). For each man stops searching for how he will act once he has traced the source [of his actions] (τὴν ἀρχήν) back to himself and to his governing faculty (τὸ ἡγούμενον), since it is this faculty that chooses (τὸ προαιρούμενον).

When Aristotle offers an analogy to explain the role of this governing faculty in choice, he looks to the kings from Homeric poetry: "This is clear even from the ancient forms of government (πολιτειῶν) that Homer described, since the kings there used to announce to the people what they had chosen." This king releasing his edicts to his subjects is strikingly reminiscent of Plato's king in his citadel with the exception that Aristotle is unwilling to correlate this image to man's

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[22] *E.g., GA* 742a, 744a, 781a. *V.* Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 174 and n. 32, and Freudenthal, *Aristotle's Theory,* p. 120. Freudenthal, *ibid.,* describes the production of connate *pneuma* as "essentially the same as the formation of vapour through boiling," as Aristotle, *Juv.* 479b, describes boiling as the "pneumatization" of fluid by heat.

[23] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," pp. 176f., notes that, while Aristotle establishes the clear role of *pneuma* in movement and reproduction (*i.e.* messages from the heart to the extremities), its role in sensory perception (*i.e.* messages from the sensory organs to the heart) is less evidenced and "clearly still in its embryonic stage."

physical constitution. Plato intends the analogy of the acropolis as not only functional, but also visual; therefore, the head, the highest and most inaccessible part of the body is the obvious citadel where the king, the *nous,* is enthroned and whence he rules. Aristotle, by contrast, remains content to use the image only to explain the role of the hegemonic faculty.[24]

Similarly, Aristotle still describes the *nous* as the divine element in man and regards it as the point of likeness between god and man. This is most clearly expressed in a famous passage at *EN* 10.7, where Aristotle defines happiness (εὐδαιμονία) as the contemplative activity of the best part of man (τὸ ἄριστον), "whether this is the *nous* or something else that seems naturally (κατὰ φύσιν) to rule and guide (ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι)[25] and to have a conception of good and divine things (ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων), whether it is itself divine (θεῖον) or the most divine of our parts" (τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, 1177α).[26] From the wording of this last phrase it is clear that Aristotle here refers to Plato, *Ti.* 44d, 73a, 88b, and his ambivalence of how to designate the divine aspect of the *nous* reflects Plato's variable terminology in that treatise. Following Plato, Aristotle associates the divine aspect of the *nous* with its hegemonic function, and it is this divine aspect that enables it to contemplate divine reality and, consequently, enables

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[24] In another passage, however, Aristotle employs the analogy of the acropolis with a more visual emphasis on the fortifications of a citadel. The heart, writes Aristotle, is a vital organ because it is the source of heat (τὴν τῆς θερμότητος ἀρχήν), "for there must be a hearth, as it were, in which the kindling fire of the nature will reside, and this must be well guarded, since it is, so to speak, the citadel of the body" (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τινα οἷον ἑστίαν, ἐν ᾗ κείσεται τῆς φύσεως τὸ ζωπυροῦν, καὶ τοῦτο εὐφύλακτον, ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολις οὖσα τοῦ σώματος, *PA* 670a) This reformulation of the analogy, likely a commentary on that of Plato, indicates that, in the absence of a specifically locatable soul, the heart becomes the most important organ because the vital heat that it produces heats the blood and thereby creates the *pneuma* by which the soul interacts with the body.

[25] Kobusch, "Hegemonikon," neglects this passage in listing the elements in Plato and Aristotle that presage the Stoic coinage of the term ἡγεμονικόν.

[26] *C.f.* Pl., *Ti.* 41c, 73c, 90a.

man to lead a divine life, as Aristotle explains in the conclusion to the passage: "Such a life would be greater than one lived at the human level. For he will attain this life, not in so far as he is human, but in so far as there exists something divine (θεῖόν τι) in him.… Since, indeed, the *nous* is something divine in comparison to man, so also is the intellectual life (ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον [*sc.* νοῦν] βίος) divine in comparison to the human life" (1177b). As Aristotle explains at *PA* 4.10, the divine aspect of the *nous* even accounts for man's upright posture: "[Man], alone among the animals, is upright because his nature (φύσιν) and his essence (οὐσίαν) are divine, and the activity (ἔργον) of his most divine part is contemplation and thought" (τὸ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν, 686a). The weight of a large upper body, continues Aristotle, impedes thought (διάνοια) and sensory perception (τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν) and thus separates humans from brute animals (*ibid.*). Aristotle attributes this effect to the dampening of the heart, the font of the soul and source of vital heat:

> The reason [that dwarves[27] are less intelligent]… is that the source of the soul [ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχή] is corporeal and less agile. And if the elevating heat (τῆς αἰρούσης θερμότητος) is lessened and the earthly portion increased, the bodies of the animals are both decreased in size and increased in the number of feet, until finally they become footless and extended to the ground (686b).

This passage is especially noteworthy, as Aristotle explains human posture as a function of the vital heat produced by the heart.[28] Without locating the *nous* in the heart, he nonetheless identifies the heart as the cause of intellection and of the divine aspect of human nature.

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[27] In this passage, Aristotle has defined "dwarf" (νάνος) as any animal that has a larger upper body relative to the lower part of the body used for walking. Thus, he regards all animals other than humans as dwarves, as he does all children. Aristotle here describes the hierarchy of animals from upright humans, through animals with dwarfish proportions, down to the lowest forms of animals, which are footless and consist only of the upper body.

[28] This is largely due to the innate tendency of vital heat to rise. *V.* Freudenthal, *Aristotle's Theory,* pp. 56-58.

Aristotle is thus able to maintain Plato's teaching whereby human posture reflects a divine nature, but recasts such a teaching to cohere with his understanding of the heart as the central organ.

Although Aristotle, because he does not assign a specific location to the soul or its ruling faculty, cannot properly be categorized as a cardiocentrist, his arguments for the heart as the common *sensorium* were the most scientifically advanced in his day and easily lent themselves to a fully cardiocentric interpretation. Aristotle's reputation, moreover, ensured that the cardiocentric position became the dominant, scientifically accepted location of the mind for approximately the half-century from the 330's to the 280's BC. The dominance of Aristotle's theories is evident in the work of the two most prominent physicians of this era: Diocles of Carystus, perhaps a contemporary of Aristotle,[29] and Praxagoras of Cos, a younger contemporary, both of whom adhere to a cardiocentric position and attribute to psychic *pneuma* the execution of intellectual and perceptive functions.[30] Diocles designated the heart as the seat of the soul, although he ascribed to the brain an important role in sensory perception and regarded the psychic *pneuma* as the means of interaction between the two, as well as the means of transmitting sensory and motor signals throughout the body.[31] The interaction between the heart and brain is evident in one passage in which Diocles describes headache, which he explains as a blockage of the veins around the heart, as a potentially dangerous condition, "if it causes as

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[29] Von Staden, *Herophilus,* pp. 44-46, discusses the controversy regarding the dates of Diocles' life.

[30] Regarding the psychic functions of *pneuma,* Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 178 notes that, in the wake of Aristotle, "Philosophical and medical authorities vied with one another in availing themselves of its semimiraculous potentialities."

[31] Van der Eijk, *Medicine and Philosophy,* p. 129.

sympathetic effect (συνδιαθῇ)" — presumably from the back up of the blockage — "on the heart, the commander of the body (τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ σώματος), from which proceeds the psychic *pneuma* of the body."[32] Praxagoras, who is largely indebted to Diocles and who has traditionally been regarded as the first to distinguish between arteries and veins, thought that only veins carried blood, while arteries carried the psychic *pneuma* which distributed the heart's motor commands to the body.[33] By identifying these *pneuma*-carrying arteries and observing that some arteries at their ends eventually become so extenuated as to collapse into opaque filaments that he called "tendons" (νεῦρα, whence "nerves"), Praxagoras influenced later physicians, upon discovering the nerves proper, to assume that these were in fact the vessels of the *pneuma*.[34] Later adherents of the cardiocentric position would invoke Praxagoras' testimony that the nerves, or at least what he regarded as the nerves, originate in the heart, even after this had been clearly disproved by the Alexandrian physicians. A testimony to Praxagoras' lasting influence is that Galen still felt the need to refute his theories, along with those of Aristotle, in the second century AD.[35]

In the first half of the third century BC, however, advances in anatomy undermined any scientific basis that the cardiocentric position might have had, and, quite unexpectedly, scientific and philosophic consensus embraced the encephalocentric position, which had been largely the province of the Platonists and was previously affirmed only on a non-empirical, philosophical

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[32] Van der Eijk, *Diocles,* fr. 80. *V.* also his commentary in *Diocles,* vol. 2, pp. 165f.

[33] Steckerl, *The Fragments of Praxagoras,* frr. 9, 11, 75, 85. *V.* also Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 179.

[34] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 180.

[35] Galen, *Plac.* I.6.13-7.25, 8.1 (=Steckerl, fr. 11).

basis. Within the Alexandrian intellectual milieu fostered under Ptolemy I and II, Herophilus, a student of Praxagoras, acquired an unprecedented knowledge of human anatomy, particularly of the nervous system, through animal and human dissection and even human vivisection.[36] It seems that Herophilus emerged from a group of Praxagoras' pupils who had developed an interest in the brain and the spinal cord,[37] although Herophilus' investigations far outstripped those of his predecessors and established a detailed understanding of the anatomy of the brain, as well as a nomenclature that is more or less still used today. Herophilus discovered the nerves, both sensory and motor,[38] and, according to Rufus of Ephesus, demonstrated that the motor nerves (προαιρετικὰ/κινητικὰ [νεῦρα]) originated in the brain and the spinal marrow,[39] a discovery which secured the association of the *hegemonikon* with the brain. In his investigations of the brain itself, Herophilus gave particular attention to the cavities, or ventricles, inside the brain, and settled upon the fourth ventricle, located inside the cerebellum, as the most controlling (κυριωτέρα)[40] and, therefore, the locus of the *hegemonikon,* possibly because of its proximity to the origin of the spinal marrow.[41]

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[36] Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria,* vol. 1, pp. 348-50 shows that there is good reason to believe ancient testimony regarding Herophilus' vivisection of condemned criminals, although he also argues, pp. 350-51, that certain errors in his anatomy indicate that Herophilus probably did not have a constant supply of criminals, or even of human cadavers, to examine and so is reliant in many ways upon his animal dissections.

[37] Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* p. 34, on the basis of Gal., *UP* 8.12 (= Steckerl, fr. 15).

[38] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 185.

[39] Von Staden, *Herophilus,* T81 (=Ruf. *Anat.* 71-75).

[40] Von Staden, *Herophilus,* T78 (=Gal., *UP* 8.11).

[41] Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* p. 37.

Although there is no direct evidence either for or against the position, it is nearly certain that Herophilus identified *pneuma* as the means of interaction between the brain and the motor nerves. Since the days of Aristotle, *pneuma* had come to be regarded as the primary instrument by which the soul functioned, and the weight of the previous philosophical tradition predisposed Herophilus to make such a conclusion.[42] Herophilus' younger contemporary and fellow anatomist, Erasistratus, made this idea explicit and, according to Galen, identified the brain as the source of "psychic *pneuma*" and the heart, of vital (ζωτικόν) *pneuma.*"[43] Although Erasistratus early in his career identified the meninx covering the brain as the locus of the *hegemonikon,* Galen testifies that Erasistratus in his old age conducted dissections of the human brain that led him to conclude that the nerves were in fact not extensions of this covering, but rather outgrowths (ἀποφύσεις) of the inner matter of the brain, and that the element that accounts for man's intellectual superiority (τῷ διανοεῖσθαι περίεστι) over the animals is the convoluted cerebellum (ἐπεγκρανίς).[44] Thus, in the early third century BC, the two leading physicians, whose legacy was to be especially long-lived, agreed on the basis of empirical observation that the central controlling organ of the human body was the brain and, guided by philosophical predispositions,[45] identified the cerebellum or, in the case of Herophilus, the ventricle located

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[42] *V.* Solmsen, "Greek Philosophers," pp. 185-88.

[43] *Plac.* 2.8.38: Ἐρασίστρατος γοῦν… ἐκ μὲν τῆς κεφαλῆς φησι τὸ ψυχικόν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς καρδίας τὸ ζωτικὸν ὁρμᾶσθαι πνεῦμα.

[44] Galen, *Plac.* 7.3.6-14. Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," pp. 188-90, conclusively demonstrates that this much debated text cannot support the claim that Erasistratus abandoned his belief that psychic *pneuma* was distributed from the brain to the nerves. Rather the point of the passage excerpted from Erasistratus' own writings is simply the origins of the nerves themselves, which he still regarded as disseminating *pneuma*. Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* p. 40, provides a brief resume of the debate.

[45] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 193, doubts that either physician would have conceived the idea of a central controlling organ without the momentum of the previous philosophical tradition.

therein, as the seat of the soul, which commanded the body by means of psychic *pneuma* that emanated from the brain and circulated though the nerves, which also originated from the brain.

These new discoveries resulted in a quick retreat of the cardiocentric theory to the minority position, albeit a minority that remained vocal for several centuries to come. Almost immediately the newly dominant encephalocentric theory elicited reactions from those philosophers and physicians who were entrenched in the cardiocentric position, namely from the Peripatetic and Stoic schools.[46] Although Zeno and Cleanthes appear not to have addressed the emerging encephalocentric theory, Chrysippus mounted an attempt to restore the cardiocentric position, largely by appealing to the authority of Praxagoras and dismissing the new findings, which by Chrysippus' day were nearly half a century old.[47] Defending the older teaching on *a priori* grounds, often with etymological appeals to the ancient poets,[48] Chrysippus established the cardiocentric position as Stoic orthodoxy. It seems that the prominence that the founders of Stoicism enjoyed within the school led their successors to cling tenaciously to the cardiocentric position, even in the face of an otherwise unified scientific and philosophical consensus. Chrysippus thus initiated the fierce debate, which would last at least until the time of Galen in the second century AD, between the encephalocentrists and the cardiocentrists.

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[46] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," pp. 194f.

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 195. *V. SVF* 2.246: Ἐρασίστρατος μὲν γὰρ ζωτικοῦ πνεύματος, Χρύσιππος δὲ τοῦ ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος πλήρη φασίν εἶναι τὴν κοιλίαν ταύτην [sc. τὴν ἀριστερὰν τῆς καρδίας].… Χρύσιππος ἐμνημόνευσε τἀνδρός [sc. τοῦ Πραξαγόρου], ἀντιθεὶς [αὐτὸν] τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἄρχεσθαι τὰ νεῦρα νομίζουσιν.

[48] *V.* Galen's testimony in *PHP* (*e.g. SVF* 2.883, 890, 904-06, 911; *v.* Solmsen, p. 195).

The Stoics, perhaps even Zeno himself, seem to have coined the term "*hegemonikon,*"[49] which they defined as the highest part of the soul and identified as the reasoning faculty (variously λογισμός, λογιστικόν, διάνοια, διανοητικόν).[50] From Aristotle the Stoics inherited a focus on the heart as the central organ and common *sensorium* of the human, but, like many of Aristotle's successors, named the heart itself as the actual seat of the soul and, consequently, of the *hegemonikon,* since the materialism of Stoic philosophy demanded that the soul and its various faculties not be so intangible as Aristotle would have it. The Stoic *hegemonikon* combines the functions of a *sensorium* and a commanding faculty that is responsible for "imaginations, sensations and assents to them (συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις), and impulses."[51] Diogenes Laërtius, when describing Chrysippus' second book of *Physics,* reports: "The *hegemonikon* is the principal element (τὸ κυριώτατον) of the soul, in which originate imaginations and impulses and from which rational speech is send forth. And this is in the heart" (7.159=*SVF* 2.837). Aëtius further relates that the cardiocentric theory of the *hegemonikon*, whether understood as the pericardium (τῷ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν πνεύματι) or the heart proper, was universally held by the Stoics (*Plac.* 4.5f.=*SVF* 2.838), no doubt under the influence of Chrysippus.

Although the Stoic position was increasingly isolated as the discoveries of the Alexandrian physicians gained broader acceptance, several elements of Stoic psychology

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[49] *V.* Long and Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers,* vol. 2, p. 313.

[50] Aët. Dox., *Plac.* 4.21 (=*SVF* 2.836), who regards ἡγεμονικόν as a Stoic term, although he does not explicitly claim that it is their coinage. *V.* also *SVF* 1.202; 2.828, 836, 839; 3.306, 459.

[51] *ibid.*

nonetheless received a much broader dissemination and became important elements in later anthropology, including that of Philo, Galen, and Gregory. In keeping with a materialistic view of all things and developing the Peripatetic understanding, the Stoics argued that the constituent element of the soul, and therefore of the *hegemonikon,* was *pneuma,* which humans inhale from the atmosphere and refine into a form that can be circulated through the cardiovascular system. More importantly, the Stoics made the distinctive contribution of identifying this *pneuma* with the *pneuma* of the deity that permeates the Universe.[52] Although later philosophers would modify this view to accord with an encephalocentric understanding of the *hegemonikon,* the basic premise that the *hegemonikon* of the soul, and not simply the central organ of the body, functions by some means of circulation through various passageways (πόροι), whether through blood vessels or nerves, becomes so accepted as to be taken for granted, even for those who reject a materialistic soul. Similarly, the Stoic view of the *hegemonikon* as both *sensorium* and reasoning/ruling faculty becomes nearly universal, though its location was hotly debated, and many accepted the Stoic description of the *hegemonikon* in relation to the constituent parts of the irrational soul. According to Nemesius, Zeno himself had established the paradigm of an eightfold soul in which the *hegemonikon* rules over an irrational soul comprised of the five senses, the faculty of speech (τὸ φωνητικόν) and the faculty of reproduction (τὸ σπερματικόν).[53] For the Stoics, the means of interaction between the ruling *hegemonikon,* (ὁ ἄρχων), and the ruled faculties of the soul (τὰ ἀρχόμενα),[54] is *pneuma,* such that five senses (αἰσθήσεις) are

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[52] Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy," p. 181.

[53] Nemes., *Nat. hom.* 15.212 (=*SVF* 1.143)

[54] The terms are Porphyry's, *SVF* 2.830

defined as *pneuma* that extends from the *hegemonikon* to a particular sense organ (αἰσθητήριον), and the reproductive and verbal faculties (σπέρμα, φωνή) are similarly regarded as extensions of *pneuma* from the *hegemonikon* to the testicles (παραστάται) and the throat and tongue, respectively.[55] This teaching marks a development beyond the Peripatetic tradition, in which *pneuma* served as the means for the central organ to control the parts of the body, rather than for one portion of the soul to rule the others, although the distinction between soul and body is somewhat blurred by the Stoics' identification of the sensory, reproductive, and verbal organs as parts of the soul.

According to Aëtius, the eight-fold view of the human soul is microcosmic, in that it likens the *hegemonikon* amidst its subordinate faculties to the sun at the center of the cosmos.[56] As the Stoics regarded the universe as an animate and rational being, it was natural for them to see a correspondence of the human psyche to that larger intellect, and they are generally agreed that both the World-Soul and the human soul must each have their *hegemonikon,* though individual Stoics differed on the location and nature of the *hegemonikon,* whether human or universal.[57] Chrysippus seems to be the source of the Stoic adherence to the cardiocentric position,[58] which may have been intended as a corrective to Zeno's position. According to

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[55] Aët. Dox., *Plac.* 4.21=*SVF* 2.836

[56] *ibid.,* following Diels' emendation of the text: αὐτὸ δὲ το ἡγεμονικὸν ὥσπερ ἐν κόσμῳ <ἥλιος> κατοικεῖ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σφαιροειδεῖ κεφαλῇ (*DG* 411). Even if Diels conjecture of ἥλιος is incorrect, the image of the microcosm remains clear enough. Note that, according to Plutarch's epitome of Aëtius, Zeno held that the *hegemonikon* dwells in a spherical head (*cf.* Plato, *Ti.* 44d), a position incongruous with the general Stoic position of later centuries (as Aëtius himself describes at *Plac.* 4.5f=*SVF* 2.838).

[57] Conger, *Theories of Macrocosms and Microcosms,* pp. 12f.

[58] *V.* Phld., *Piet.* 16 (=*SVF* 2.910): τινὰς δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν φάσκειν, ὅτι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ·… Χρύσιππον δὲ ἐν τῷ στήθει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι. *v.* also Diogenes Laertius, 7.159 (=*SVF* 2.837).

Diogenes Laërtius' testimony, Chrysippus variously named the heavens and the most refined portion of the ether (τὸ καθαρώτατον τοῦ αἰθέρος) as the *hegemonikon* of the universe (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου), whereas Cleanthes proposed the sun.[59] The correlation, moreover, between these two *hegemonika* was not left as an implicit, functional similarity: Philodemus reports that Diogenes of Babylon taught that "the universe bears the same relationship to Zeus, or rather contains Zeus, just as does a man his soul."[60] Diogenes' analogy, though perhaps not a position that can be generalized to other Stoics, presages what will become an increasingly common way of speaking of the human *hegemonikon*: as a preeminent form of god to be distinguished from other, perhaps lesser, gods. Thus, in a Greek context, the *hegemonikon* may be likened to Zeus, inasmuch as he represents a singular, universal god, while the other functions of the soul, which are regarded as in some way divine, may be likened to lesser divinities that do Zeus' bidding; for Philo, and for his Christian successors, the natural correlate to the *hegemonikon* will be the one God, while his *Logos* and powers correspond to the faculties of the soul.

Philo of Alexandria

The development of the hegemonic principle took one of its most remarkable turns in the exegetical treatises of Philo of Alexandria, the first exegete -- at least the first whose writings are

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[59] D. L. 7.139 (=*SVF* 2.644)

[60] Phld., *Piet.* 15, following Diel's reconstruction, *DG* 548f. (=*SVF* 3.2.33): Δ(ι)ογένης δ' ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τ(ὸ)ν κ(όσ)μον γράφει τῷ Δ(ιὶ τ)ὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρ(χει)ν ἢ περιέχε(ιν τὸ)ν Δία κ(αθ)άπε(ρ) ἄνθρωπ(ον ψ)υχήν.

preserved -- who attempts to explain the creation story in Gn with reference to Greek, particularly Platonic, philosophy. Just as Aristotle's theories and the influence of the Peripatetic tradition had predisposed the anatomists to explain the function of the newly-discovered nerves on the basis of *pneuma,* so also the authority of Plato, as corroborated by the anatomists' discoveries and supplemented by Stoic tenets regarding the function and nature of the soul, predisposed Philo to identify the image of God as described in Gn 1.26f., as well as the breath of God from Gn 2.7, with an encephalocentric *hegemonikon* that exercised control over the lower parts of the soul by means of *pneuma.* While the larger endeavor of reconciling the Jewish scriptures with philosophy was to have many repercussions in later, Christian exegesis, this one particular exegetical choice was to determine the direction and character of a great deal of later interpretation and indeed would become the necessary premise for many later theological disputes.

Philo's treatises are especially relevant to Gregory's *Hom. opif.,* not only because Philo lies at the beginning of an exegetical tradition that leads to Gregory, but also because Gregory was directly familiar with Philo's work, in particular *Opif.*[61] Although Philo's identification of *nous, hegemonikon* and image becomes a much more widespread theological tenet in later centuries, through the fourth century this interpretation of Gn is associated with a more specific, Philonic tradition of exegesis that extends through Clement, Origen, Athanasius, Basil and, finally, Gregory, and it is largely through their efforts and prominence that the Philonic interpretation of Gn 1.26f. and 2.7 gains wider currency. The influence of Philo in this regard is

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[61] *V.* Danielou, "Philon et Grégoire de Nysse," p. 336

truly foundational, since it is not a foregone conclusion -- however much it may seem so in retrospect -- that the image of Gn 1.26f. would be the *nous.* Under the influence of this Philonic tradition, countless theologians in the past two millennia have come to regard this as the self-evident meaning of the text of Gn, yet less familiar to later theologians is the further identification of the image with the *nous* in its role as the *hegemonikon,* an idea which is fundamental to the anthropology of Philo and his Christian successors at least through Gregory. More importantly, it is precisely the hegemonic activity of the *nous,* and not simply a general notion of rationality, that constitutes the similarity of the image to God, a similarity which Philo locates in the symmetry between God, the great *hegemon* of the universe, and the *nous,* the *hegemonikon* of man's soul and body. The sections that follow will attempt to show how Philo constructs the relationship between *nous/hegemonikon* and the divine image, as well as that of the image with the *Logos,* which will take on a new importance in the Christian context, and finally where Philo locates the *hegemonikon* in the human anatomy.

De Opificio Mundi

Both as Philo's most extensive reflection on the anthropology of Gn and as a very likely direct source for Gregory's own exegesis of Gn 1.26f., *Opif.* warrants a more detailed investigation into Philo's understanding of the correlation between *nous, hegemonikon* and image. As soon as Philo, at *Opif.* 69, embarks upon his most extensive interpretation of man's creation according to Gn 1.26f., his immediate concern is to establish a correlation between these three ideas. This concern lies behind Philo's argument that the image has no relation to the human body, since

neither does God have human form, nor the human body a divine form. For Philo, the image has been located "in the mind, which is the ruler of the soul" (κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόνα νοῦν).[62] Immediately thereafter Philo explains the symmetrical relationship between God's role as ruler of the universe and the *nous* as the ruler of the individual man:

> The *nous* which is in each individual has been modeled (ἀπεικονίσθη) on that One [sc. *nous*] of the Universe, since [the individual *nous*] is in a certain sense a god[63] for that which bears it about and houses it as a god in its temple (ἀγαλματοφοροῦντος αὐτόν);[64] for the great ruler (ὁ μέγας ἡγεμών) has the same position (λόγος) in the entire universe as does the human *nous*, it would seem, in man (§69).

Thus, even though the image of God in man is in no way bodily, neither does Philo reduce it to a simple correlation between the human *nous* and God as *nous*; rather Philo exploits the term εἰκών so as to produce an iconic correlation between the archetypal ruler and the mind as the ruler of man as a whole. The likeness between the two inheres in the function of each in

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[62] Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation,* p. 226, objects to Colson and Whittaker's LCL translation of this phrase as the "sovereign element" on the grounds that this would more properly translate the Stoic concept of τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς; the choice, however, of ἡγεμών over ἡγεμονικόν is more determined by Philo's extended comparison between God, the ruler of the universe, and the *nous,* the ruler of the soul. Certainly Philo implies the concept of the ἡγεμονικόν with the personified ἡγεμών, and Colson and Whittaker are perfectly justified in making this more explicit in their translation.

[63] According to Runia, "God and Man," p. 64f., this is the only passage in the Philonic corpus where Philo refers to an aspect of man as god "outside a strictly allegorical context." Although such an idea is not unprecedented in a Platonic context, since Plato himself often refers to the *nous* as θεῖον or τὸ θεῖον, Runia suspects that behind this statement lies Philo's allegory of Ex 7.1, found in several passages, *e.g. Det.* 39f., *Migr.* 81-84, in which he interprets Moses as the *nous*, Aaron as the *logos endiathetos* and Pharaoh as the irrational soul.

[64] On ἀγαλματοφορέω, *v.* Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation,* p. 141, with reff. to several studies of the term.

relationship to its universe: God's functional relationship to the cosmos and that of the *nous* to the microcosm, *i.e.* man in totality.[65]

The understanding of God as *hegemon* also lies behind Philo's explanation of the plural ποιήσωμεν of Gn 1.26. At *Opif.* 74f. Philo explains that God, who cannot be the author of evil, spoke in the plural to invite some vaguely defined "assistants" (σύνεργοι) to create that portion of man, *i.e.* the irrational soul and the body, which is prone to evil and would likely oppose him at some time. By this arrangement, says Philo, man's failures would be attributed to the lesser powers who created him, while his virtues and successes would be attributed to God, the ruler of all (θεὸς, ὁ πάντων ἡγεμών), who created that portion of him that accounts for virtue, namely the *nous*. At Conf. 33-35, Philo elaborates this scheme more fully and identifies these assistants as the powers (δυνάμεις) through which he creates the intelligible and incorporeal world, as well as the visible world modeled upon it. They are, then, equivalent to the *Logos,* the perfect expression of God as immanent to, and active in, the world. Thus, in *Opif.* 74f., there is implicit a correlation between God as *hegemon*, active in the world through his *Logos*/powers, and the *nous* as *hegemonikon,* which, though it rules over the whole of man, employs the lesser parts of the soul to effect its governance of the body.

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[65] A. Méasson, *Du char ailé a Zeus,* pp. 372f., traces the two basic themes of this passage, that the "true" or "inner" man is defined as his intellect and that the intellect is in some way divine, to Plato, specifically to *Rep.* 588b-589b, *1 Alc.* 133c, *Ti.* 90a4, 90c4f. Méasson further argues that the Philo's expression ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμών νοῦς is a conflation of two Platonic phrases: ὁ ἡγεμὼν νοῦς (*Lg.* 1.631d5, 12. 963a8) and ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης … νοῦς (*Phaedr.* 247c7f.); Philo has then, under the constraints of exegeting Gn 1.26, established the correspondence between ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμὼν νοῦς and another Platonic term, ὁ μέγας ἡγεμών (*Phaedr.* 246e4), despite his usual reticence to admit an analogy between God and the human intellect (pp. 373f.).

At *Opif.* 77-88, Philo meditates upon the question of why God brought man into existence last of all the creatures.[66] Philo offers four answers, of which the fourth is most directly relevant to the present study: 1) so that man might enter a world perfectly suited to himself; 2) so that later generations might learn that they, like their ancestor, will live without toils and in abundance if they keep irrational pleasures from ruling the soul; 3) so that a balance might be maintained in the correlation between the earth, the first creation and most perfect of incorruptible entities, and man, the last creation and most perfect of corruptible entities; and 4) so that man's sudden appearance might shock the animals into worshiping (προσκυνεῖν) him "as their natural ruler and lord" (ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα φύσει καὶ δεσπότην, §83). Philo adds at §84 that God created man as a "creature naturally suited for rule" (ἡγεμονικὸν φύσει ζῷον), and that by divine command man has been established as "king of all things beneath the moon" (τῶν ὑπὸ σελήνην ἁπάντων βασιλέα). Philo here enumerates the various ways in which man exercises hegemony over the animals; in one example, sheep offer their wool to man, as does a city its yearly tribute to their natural king (τῷ φύσει βασιλεῖ, §85). Philo's repetition -- three times in this passage -- of the term φύσει (above translated adverbially as "naturally," but literally, "by nature") in relation to man's hegemony begs a question: what is the nature by virtue of which man exercises his hegemony? Later, Christian, interpreters will answer the question directly,[67] but already here, where this passage is still part of an extended excursus on the significance of

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[66] Gregory considers the same question in *Hom. opif.* 2, a passage that Danielou, "Philon et Grégoire de Nysse," p. 336, shows conclusively on the basis of shared vocabulary and the order of ideas expressed, to be directly dependent upon this passage in *Opif.*

[67] Most notably Bas., *Struct. hom.* 1.8-10, and Gr. Nyss., *Hom. opif.* 7.

Gn 1.26f., Philo appears to hint that man has been created to exercise hegemony by virtue of his *nous,* the *hegemonikon,* which is in fact the image of God, who is in turn the *hegemon* of the universe. This balanced scheme is confirmed by Philo's closing to the passage: "The Maker created (ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδημιούργει) man after the rest of creation as a kind of charioteer and helmsman so that he might rein and steer things on earth by assuming the oversight of animals and plants as a governor ruling in place of the first and great king" (ὕπαρχος τοῦ πρώτου καὶ μεγάλου βασιλέως, §88).[68] Philo's mixed metaphors of the charioteer and the helmsman derive from Plato's *Phaedr.,* where, amidst the longer exposition of the allegory of the charioteer, Plato describes the supercelestial realm as "visible only to the *nous,* which is the helmsman of the soul" (ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ, 247c). Philo has applied these two images, which Plato used to describe the *nous* in its role as *hegemonikon* of the soul, to man's hegemonic role *vis-à-vis* the animals and thereby implies that it is by virtue of the former that man exercises the latter. Man, moreover, in his control over the natural world iconically represents God's stance towards

[68] Philo will elsewhere use ὕπαρχος to refer to the *Logos* in relationship to God, *e.g. Agr.* 51, *Somn.* 1.242.

the entire cosmos.[69] Though Philo does not regard man's hegemony as the image, *per se,* he very clearly makes it a function and manifestation of the image, the *hegemonikon.*[70]

Philo's schema, however, is complicated by the fact, revealed only later in *Opif.,* that he has been discussing not the creation of man as he now exists on earth, but rather "a kind of form, a type, or a seal that is intelligible, bodiless, neither male nor female, and incorruptible in his nature" (ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὔτ᾽ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἄφθαρτος φύσει, §134). This is Philo's "man in the image," which he distinguishes from the "molded man" of Gn 2.7: "God took clay from the earth, molded the man (ἔπλασεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον), and breathed into his face a breath (πνοήν) of life." This molded man differs from the "man in the image" primarily in that he partakes of quality (μετέχων ποιότητος) and, accordingly, displays a set of characteristics opposite to those of his predecessor: rather than intelligible, the molded man is sensible (αἰσθητός); rather than bodiless, he is the compound of body and soul; rather than

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[69] Given that one strain of patristic interpretation of this passage, particularly in the Antiochene tradition, regards man's hegemony itself as the very image of God of Gn 1.26f., it is tempting to speculate as to whether Philo already has some acquaintance with a similar exegetical tradition to which he here alludes. The Antiochene interpretation of the image as man's hegemony over creation is based on Gn 1.26, in which God, after saying "Let us make man according to our image and likeness," immediately continues "and let him rule over the fish of the sea." This second part of the verse was understood to explain the significance of the term εἰκών. *V., e.g.,* Basil's exegesis of the verse in *Struct. hom.* 1.6 and below, ch. 3, n. 64.

[70] Kannengieser, "Philon et les pères, pp. 284f., argues that God places the newly created man at the junction of the sensible and intelligible worlds, and that man's intellect reflects the "Grand Hègémôn" in its hegemony over both the body and the created world: "La correspondance entre les rôles respectifs du 'Guide suprême' de l'univers et de notre intellect dans le corps humain, évoquée par *Opif.* 69, ne relève pas d'une simple analogie de proportion, valable au seul niveau des activités de Dieu et de l'homme, mais elle suppose une réelle analogie de similitude au niveau de leur être intime."

sexually undifferentiated, he is either man or woman;[71] rather than incorruptible, he is by nature mortal (φύσει θνητός, *ibid.*). The man created in Gn 2.7 is, moreover, not only the compound of the material and spiritual, but is also the product of two creators, or at least two modes of creation, that correspond to his two natures: a "Craftsman" (τεχνίτης) fashioned the human form out of earth, while the soul originates "from the father and ruler of all things" (ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἡγεμόνος τῶν πάντων, §135).[72]

As with his interpretation of the creation at Gn 1.26f., Philo here establishes a direct connection between God as *hegemon* and the immortal, intelligible aspect of man. Moreover, Philo has chosen in his exegesis to conflate three closely related, though not necessarily identical, terms; Philo interprets the divine animation of the molded man with the breath (πνοή, §134) of life to indicate that man is the compound of body and soul (ψυχή, *ibid.*), and then states explicitly that "that which [God] inbreathed was nothing other than divine *pneuma"* (§135). By

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[71] Based on the distinction between the first creation narrative at Gn 1.27, where God is said to create man "male *and* female," which Philo interprets to mean a single man which encompasses male and female, and the second account, in which the creation of the molded man at Gn 2.7 is later followed by the creation of woman. Tobin, *The Creation of Man,* pp. 109f., argues that Philo's understanding of sexual differentiation in Gn 1.27 and 2.7 depends on the fact that in the second creation narrative man is created as the compound of divine breath and molded earth, whereas the first account hints at no composition. The non-composite creation of Gn 1.27 provides Philo with the further impetus to see in the verse a sexually non-differentiated man, rather than an androgyne, and easily leads him to the conclusion that it refers to a first creation of man in the noetic realm, rather than in the sensible realm, as at Gn 2.7.

[72] Kannengieser, "Philon et les pères," p. 283f., notes that the terms ποιητής, δημιουργός, and τεχνίτης are synonymous and refer to God's role as creator of the physical world, while ἡγεμών, to that of the creator of the intelligible world. What Philo implies, however, by the term τεχνίτης is not entirely clear, although Gn 2.7 explicitly states that it was God who fashioned man; it would seem that Philo envisions an arrangement similar to that at §74f., where God's powers, perhaps to be identified with his *Logos,* create those parts of man that are prone to evil. In his commentary on *Opif.,* Runia, p. 326, objects to Fossum's argument ("Gen. 1,26 and 2,7," p. 207) that Philo describes a lesser creator of the body akin to the Demiurge of later Christian gnostic sects or angels in other traditions. Runia locates the difference between the Craftsman and the Father in their respective functions of fashioning and inbreathing. Since, however, it is a common theme in Philo that God's *Logos* and/or Powers are not separate entities, but rather God himself as immanent to, and active in, the world, there is compelling reason to suspect a like scenario here.

asserting the identity of the biblical πνοή and πνεῦμα, Philo has not simply taken license with cognate terms, but has rather introduced a term that in his day could not be extricated from its philosophical and physiological associations. These imply one of two basic understandings of *pneuma*: for the Peripatetic and medical traditions, *pneuma* as the means by which the soul controls the body, whereas for the Stoics, as the basic element of the soul, which is a portion of the *pneuma* that pervades the universe in the form of the World Soul.[73] Philo here implies the Stoic notion, which he will elsewhere make explicit,[74] of the soul as a fragment of the divine soul, but tempers this idea by eschewing the materialism of Stoic psychology and attempting to reconcile Stoic *pneuma* with the immaterial, Platonic *nous.* The reconciliation of these ideas is seen, for example, at *Det.* 83, where Philo argues that the breath which comes from God is "not moving air, but an impression (τύπος) and representation of the divine power, which Moses gives the appropriate name "image" (εἰκών).[75]

In his exegesis of Gn 2.7, however, Philo has introduced the idea of *pneuma* not because of any sympathy he may have for Stoic materialism, but because, both implicitly in Aristotle and explicitly in the Peripatetic, the medical, and the Stoic traditions, *pneuma* is directly connected to the soul's exercise of hegemony, that is to say, to the *hegemonikon*. As an exegete, Philo must explain the πνοὴ ζωῆς of Gn 2.7, which he also identifies with the *hegemonikon.* Philo's purposes become clearer at *Opif.* 139, where he reconciles Gn 1.27 and 2.7 by writing that God,

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[73] Runia, *Philo: On the Creation,* p. 326.

[74] *E.g.* §146: πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὠκείωται λόγῳ θείῳ, τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς.

[75] Runia, *Philo: On the Creation,* pp. 226, 326.

here creating man in the image of his own *Logos,* has made man his image and likeness by breathing into his face (ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμημα γεγενῆσθαι τούτου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐμπνευσθέντα εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον).[76] More importantly, Philo argues that God has placed his image here because this is "the seat of the senses (αἰσθήσεων ὁ τόπος) by which the creator (δημιουργός) ensouled the body" and that he has "enthroned the king, that is reason, in the *hegemonikon"* (τὸν δὲ βασιλέα λογισμὸν ἐνιδρυσάμενος τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ) so that from that central position it may be attended (δορυφορεῖσθαι) by the senses which bring to it all sensory perceptions. Underlying this image is Philo's argument, seen at *Leg. All.* 1.39f., that God has breathed his image into the face because the face is the *hegemonikon* of the body. Despite the fact that Philo has reinterpreted *pneuma* as an immaterial image of God, he has retained the term itself because of its affinity with the text of Gn 2.7 and its philosophical associations with the *hegemonikon.* The term *pneuma* also offers Philo a way to link the two accounts of creation. Already Philo has established that the image of Gn 1.27 is the *nous,* the *hegemonikon,* which constitutes the image of God, that great *hegemon* of the universe; now Philo interprets the inbreathing of the spirit at Gn 2.7 as the moment in which God places his image, the reason (λογισμός), in the *hegemonikon* to rule over man's body as a king amidst his attendants.[77] Philo has established the identity of image, *nous, hegemonikon,* and *pneuma,* and the central role of *pneuma* in the relationship between man and God is underscored at §144, where Philo states that *pneuma* is in fact the

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[76] The harmony between Gn 1.27 and 2.7, the identity of the image of God and the divine breath, is made explicit at *Plant.* 19: *ἐνέπνευσε,* γάρ φησιν, *ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς,* ὥστε ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὸν ἐκπέμποντα τὸν δεχόμενον ἀπεικονίσθαι· διὸ καὶ λέγεται κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγενῆσθαι; as well as at *Her.* 56: *ἐνεφύσησε* γάρ φησιν *ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*, ᾗ καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ποιητοῦ λόγος ἔχει τυπωθῆναι. *V.* the larger discussions of these passages below.

[77] *V.* below the discussion of Philo's understanding of the location of the *hegemonikon.*

source of man's likeness to the *hegemon*: "Since [the newly created man] was related and closely akin to the *hegemon,* inasmuch as a great deal of the divine *pneuma* had flowed into him, he eagerly undertook to say and do all things so as to please his father and king."

As Philo continues his exegesis of Gn 2, he reiterates the theme of man as God's visible image within the cosmos, a role, Philo repeatedly stresses, that is a function of man's reason. This theme is particularly evident in Philo's exegesis of the naming of the animals (Gn 2.19f.). According to Philo, it is very fitting that man was entrusted with naming the animals, "since this is a task that demands both wisdom and royalty" (σοφίας γὰρ καὶ βασιλείας τὸ ἔργον); man constitutes the perfect candidate because "he was wise, instinctively and inherently learned (αὐτομαθὴς καὶ αὐτοδίδακτος), created by the hands of God, and, moreover, a king; and it is fitting for a ruler (ἡγεμόνι) to name each of his subjects" (§148). The innate wisdom of man's *nous* allows man to exercise his hegemony over the world and, particularly in this passage, the animals. Philo regards this as a rightful consequence of man's creation: "Rightfully so did such great power of authority adhere to that first man, whom God carefully formed and deemed worthy of second rank (δευτερείων) and placed [in the world] as a governor subordinate to himself (ὕπαρχον αὐτοῦ),[78] but a ruler (ἡγεμόνα) of all other creatures" (*ibid.*). The connection between hegemony and reason is further underscored as Philo explains why God brings the animals to the man[79] to be named: since the man's reasoning nature (λογικῆς φύσεως) remained pure from any illness or injury, he was able immediately to comprehend the nature of the animals

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[78] On ὕπαρχος, *v.* n. 68 above.

[79] Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation,* p. 351, points out that at §149 Cohn chooses the reading of ms. M, πρὸς τὸν Ἀδάμ, against all other mss., and that Philo nowhere in his exposition of the Law uses the name "Adam."

brought before him, their natures were simultaneously named and understood (ὡς ἅμα λεχθῆναί τε καὶ νοηθῆναι τὰς φύσεις αὐτῶν, §150). Thus, the exercise of this hegemonic act depends entirely upon the purely logical nature in man's soul, upon the proper functioning of his *hegemonikon*.

At §153 Philo enters upon an allegorical interpretation of the planting of the garden (Gn 2.8f.), a passage which he regards as purely allegorical, since "never have trees of life or understanding appeared on earth, nor is it likely that they ever will" (§154). To Philo it seems more likely that the garden represents "the *hegemonikon* of the soul," since various plants of the garden correspond to the countless opinions (δόξαι) that fill the soul, while the trees represent, respectively, "reverence for God, the greatest of the virtues," and "moderate wisdom (φρόνησιν τὴν μέσην), by which one distinguishes things that are opposite in nature" (*ibid.*). Philo continues to allegorize the events narrated in Gn 2, which he regards "not [as] the fabrications of myth (οὐ μύθου πλάσματα), … but rather typological indications that invite us to allegorize in order to explain concealed notions" (δείγματα τύπων ἐπ' ἀλληγορίαν παρακαλοῦντα κατὰ τὰς δι' ὑπονοιῶν ἀποδόσεις, *ibid.*). After a discourse upon the true meaning of the serpent in the garden (§§157-64), Philo applies this hermeneutic to the relationship between the man and the woman. Pleasure, says Philo, does not dare to attempt to deceive the man directly, but only through the woman, since the man and woman are not historical personages, but rather an allegorization of human psychology: "For in us the *nous* corresponds to the man, but the senses (αἰσθήσεις), to the woman; pleasure first meets and interacts with the senses, through which she also deceives the ruling intellect (τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν, §165)." As Philo proceeds to explain, the proper ordering of

man's soul is for the *nous* to retain its ruling position over the subservient senses, which "like maidservants receive the gifts [of pleasure] and bring them to their master, as it were, the reasoning faculty" (οἷα δεσπότῃ τῷ λογισμῷ). With the help of Persuasion, "he [the man/*nous*] is immediately ensnared and becomes a subject instead of a ruler (ὑπήκοος ἀνθ'ἡγεμόνος), a slave instead of a master (δοῦλος ἀντὶ δεσπότου), an exile instead of a citizen, mortal instead of immortal" (*ibid.*). In other words, Philo here presents the pleasure-loving soul as being a corruption of the image of God: the *nous* no longer fulfills its proper role as *hegemonikon,* but has rather enslaved itself to the lower senses and, as a result, has lost the benefits that accrue with the image of God, namely closeness to God and immortality.

PHILO ON THE *LOGOS* AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

As has been seen in the analysis of *Opif.,* Philo's teaching of the image is complicated by his seeming inconsistency regarding the question of whether man is created directly in the image of God or in the image of God's *Logos,* a distinction which in *Opif.* correlates to the two creation accounts at Gn 1.26f. and 2.7.[80] Although Philo it seems that Philo regards these two accounts as compatible in some sense, he provides no systematic harmonization, nor does he attempt to integrate the scheme by which the image is the *Logos* with that which lacks the *Logos*. The passages, however, in which Philo argues that the image of God is the *Logos* are especially

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[80] Tobin, *The Creation of Man*, has argued that Philo has appropriated and fused, though not harmonized, two separate exegetical traditions that account for the presence of the *Logos* in his explanation of Gn 2.7, but not in that of Gn 1.26f. *Contra* this view, Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation,* p. 225, argues that there is no need to presume that *Opif.* 69 constitutes a different exegetical stratum, since the description of man created in the image of God is not at odds with that of man created in the image of the *Logos*: "we should never forget that in Philo's theology the name God itself indicates the supreme Being in relation to the world, *i.e.* at the level of the *Logos*."

relevant to the present study, since the Christian tradition in general, beginning with the prologue of John's gospel, identifies the *Logos* as Jesus Christ himself, and the Alexandrine exegetical tradition in particular appropriates Philo's interpretation that the κατ' εἰκόνα of Gn 1.26f. refers to the *Logos*.[81] Most importantly, Philo already exhibits many of the interpretations which will be essential to Gregory's argument in *Hom. opif.*

Philo's understanding that man has been created in the image, not directly of God, but of the *Logos,* and only indirectly of God, rests upon his desire to account for the preposition κατά in the phrase κατ' εἰκόνα of Gn 1.26f. Philo explains this most clearly at *Her.* 230-33. Offering an allegorical interpretation of Gn 15.10, where Abram does not divide the birds in his sacrifice, he clarifies the distinction between two *logoi*, that which is an archetype beyond us and that which exists as an image (μίμημα) in us:

> Moses calls [the *logos*] which is beyond us an image of God (εἰκόνα θεοῦ), but the *logos* which is in us, an impress of the image (τῆς εἰκόνος ἐκμαγεῖον). For he says, "God made the man," not an image of God, but "according to the image" (οὐχὶ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ "κατ' εἰκόνα"). Thus, the intellect (νοῦς) that is in each of us, which is in fact the true and proper man, is the third type from the creator (τρίτον εἶναι τύπον ἀπὸ τοῦ πεποιηκότος), since that intermediary [*logos*] is the model (παράδειγμα) for the one, but an image (ἀπεικόνισμα) of the other. And our intellect (νοῦς) is by nature indivisible. For while the creator (δημιουργός) divided the irrational portion of the soul six times and thus fashioned seven portions, namely the senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch, as well as the voice and the reproductive faculty (γόνιμον), he left the rational portion (τὸ λογικόν), which indeed was given the name "intellect" (νοῦς), undivided (ἄσχιστον) in imitation of the entire heavens (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὁμοιότητα οὐρανοῦ, §231-33).

The emphasis that Philo here places on the preposition κατά as indicating an intermediary image, the *Logos,* will become commonplace in the patristic tradition, particularly the Alexandrian strain

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[81] *V.* the discussions of Clement, Origen, Athanasius and Basil below.

of that tradition. As Philo concludes his exegesis of Gn 15.10, the birds represent the two *logoi*, which each remain indivisible amidst the multiplicity of the universe: the divine *Logos* divides all entities within nature, while "our intellect (νοῦς), inasmuch as it intellectually apprehends physical objects (παραλάβῃ νοητῶς πράγματά τε καὶ σώματα), divides them infinitely into infinite portions and never ceases dividing" (§235).

With this passage Philo leaves no doubt that the *logos* that is in man, the point of likeness between man and the *Logos,* is in fact the *nous,* which he has already identified as the image, the *hegemonikon,* the "true man"; at §236, Philo will even use the terms interchangeably, so that he refers to the two *logoi* as "the *nous* which is in us and that which is beyond us" (νοῦς τε ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς). The identification of the *logos* with the *nous* and *hegemonikon* corresponds to *Opif.* 139, discussed above, where Philo describes God placing *logismos* in the *hegemonikon* in order to rule over the senses. Moreover, the functional likeness between the two *logoi,* namely the function of noetic division, is effected by virtue of the *nous* in its role as *hegemonikon,* since the qualification that *nous* "noetically apprehends physical objects" corresponds to the aforementioned Stoic division of the soul: the *hegemonikon*/*logikon* constitutes the rational soul and rules over the irrational soul, which contains the five senses that bring sensory perceptions to the *logos* for proper sorting. Thus, for Philo, that man is created in the image of the *Logos,* rather than of God directly, in no way diminishes that man's hegemonic likeness to God, since the the *Logos* itself constitutes God's expression of hegemony within the cosmos. Therefore Philo concludes that both *logoi* exercise their role of dividing the cosmos "because of their

likeness to the creator and father of the universe" (διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐμφέρειαν, *ibid.*).

At *Leg. All.* 3.95-106 Philo allegorizes the relationship between Moses and Beseleel, the architect and builder of the tabernacle, in a way that further illuminates the role of the *Logos* as an intermediary image between God and man. Noting that the name Beseleel means "in the shadow of God,"[82] Philo interprets the "shadow of God" to be the *Logos* that God used in creation. Philo continues:

> and this shadow is also, as it were, an archetypal image (ἀπεικόνισμα … ἀρχέτυπον) for others; for just as God is the model for the image, which he has just now called a "shadow," so also the image (εἰκών) becomes the model for others, just as he made clear at the beginning of the law when he said, "and God made the man according to the image of God" (καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ) since the image was modeled on God (κατὰ τὸν Θεόν), while the man was modeled on the image (κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα), which in turn took on the function of a prototype (λαβοῦσαν δύναμιν παραδείγματος, §96).

Besides clarifying the reciprocal relationship between man created "according to the image" and the image created "according to God," a distinction which will become common among later Christian exegetes, this passage is particularly noteworthy for the way in which Philo interprets Gn 1.27. Modern editors and translators regard the somewhat redundant clauses of the verse as simply an example of Hebrew parallelism: "And God created the man, in the image of God He created him" (καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν).[83] Philo,

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[82] Traditionally called Bezalel in English. Philo is more or less correct in his interpretation, since Hebrew *Bəṣal'ēl* means "in the shelter/shade of God," although he characteristically allegorizes the shade; *v.* W.H.C. Propp, *Exodus,* p. 486.

[83] Rahlfs' text punctuates with a comma between ἄνθρωπον and κατ' εἰκόνα. *BHS* does not introduce any punctuation, but most English translations based upon the Hebrew, *e.g.* the RSV, punctuate as does Rahlfs' LXX.

however, presuming that no idle word has been included in the Scriptures, observes that the subject of the verb ἐποίησεν in its second iteration must be the same as in the first, namely "God," with the result that the phrase "in the image of God" introduces a second entity identified as "God": God, who creates, and his image, also identified as God and according to which He creates man. Thus, Philo condenses the verse so as to read, "God created man in the image of God." Philo's reading of Gn 1.27 is particularly noteworthy because it will become in the Alexandrine tradition a common way of interpreting the verse, and more importantly, will serve as the exegetical basis of Gregory's refutation of Eunomius in *Hom. opif.*[84]

Philo's paraphrase of Gn 1.27 is probably influenced by the phrasing of Gn 9.6: "I have made man in the image of God" (ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ); indeed, Philo himself ponders the verse at *Q.G.* 2.62: "Why does He say, as though concerning another god, 'I have made the man in the image of God,' but not [in] his own [image]?" (ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ).[85] Answering his own question Philo offers perhaps his clearest distinction between God and the *Logos*: "Nothing mortal (θνητόν) could be made in the image of the highest father of the universe (ἀπεικονισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων), but rather [it was made in the image] of the second god (πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεόν), who is his *Logos*." Philo explains this by appealing to God's utter transcendence: the *Logos* is the source of man's rationality because "the God who is prior to the

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[84] *V., e.g.,* Or., *Hom. 1 in Gen.* §13; Bas., *Bapt.* 1.2.7; Gr. Nyss, *Hom. opif.* 16.5.

[85] The LXX renders the verb of this verse in the first person (ἐποίησα), although the MT has it in the third person, *'āśāh*. Even, however, if the LXX had rendered the verb in the third person, the expression "in the image of God" would still prompt Philo's question.

Logos is greater than all rational nature" (ὁ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου θεὸς κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις).

At *Plant.* 17-22 Philo discusses the posture of man as a reflection of his heavenly nature and relationship to the *Logos,* yet another theme which will enjoy a rich history among Christian commentators and which Gregory himself will treat throuroughly in *Hom. opif.*[86] Philo argues that man, in contrast to the irrational beasts, was graced with an upright posture so that he might look towards the heavens as a reflection of his heavenly nature, and then counters those who would argue that man's *nous* is a portion of the ethereal nature (τῆς αἰθερίου φύσεως … μοῖραν), namely those who espouse the Stoic, materialistic understanding of *pneuma* (§17f.). Rather, says Philo, Moses does not liken the soul to anything within the created order, but to "a genuine coin (δόκιμον νόμισμα), as it were, of the divine and invisible spirit, marked and stamped by God's seal (σημειωθὲν καὶ τυπωθὲν σφραγίδι θεοῦ), the impress (ὁ χαρακτήρ) of which is His eternal *Logos*" (§18).[87] It is in this context that Philo most clearly reconciles the account of breathing the spirit of God into the newly formed man and that of creating him according to the image of God; immediately after describing man as stamped with God's seal and its impress, the *Logos,* Philo explains,

> For [Moses] says, 'God breathed into his face a breath of life,' so that necessarily the one who receives [the breath] reflects the image of Him who sent it (ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὸν ἐκπέμποντα τὸν δεχόμενον ἀπεικονίσθαι); for this reason it is also said that man was created (γεγενῆσθαι) according to this image of God, not according to the image of anything of the created order (§19).

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[86] *V., e.g.,* Bas., *Att.* 8; *Struct. hom.* 2.15; Gr. Nyss, *Hom. opif.* 8.

[87] *Cf.* Gregory's exegesis of the parable of the lost coin (*Virg.* 12, discussed below, ch. 4).

Philo, it would seem, here equates the role of the *Logos* as the intermediary image between man and God with that of the "breath of life" which passes from God to man, and in both scenarios, man is a reflection of God through the *Logos,* since the recipient reflects the sender. The logical corollary, Philo concludes, is that "since man's soul was made in the image of the archetypal *Logos* of the Cause (κατὰ τὸν ἀρχέτυπον τοῦ αἰτίου λόγον ἀπεικονισθείσης), the body was also raised upright and stretched its eyes towards the purest portion of the universe, namely the heavens, so that what was invisible might clearly be comprehended by means of the visible" (ἵνα τῷ φανερῷ τὸ ἀφανὲς ἐκδήλως καταλαμβάνηται, §20). By fixing man's eyes on the heavens, God has made man's physical eyes a reflection of his mind's attraction towards God Himself (τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὂν διανοίας ὁλκήν) and "a clear image of the incorporeal eye" (εἴδωλον ἐναργὲς ἀειδοῦς ὄμματος, §21). Philo frequently insists on the incorporeality of the image, and yet in this passage man's physical construction is not unrelated to his divine image. Later Christian interpreters will offer various ways of understanding the relationship of the image to the body,[88] but this passage is particularly reminiscent of Gregory's argument at *Hom. opif.* 12.9 (PG 44.161d) that the body, which similarly has been created in order to express man's relationship to the *Logos,* is "the mirror of the mirror."[89]

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[88] *Cf., e.g.*, Irenaeus, who argues that the image is in fact corporeal, *Haer.* 5.6.1, and the Antiochene tradition, which regards the image as man's position relative to the animals (*v.* McLeod, *The Image of God,* 55-85).

[89] Speaking more broadly at *Hom. opif.* 12.11 (PG 44.164a), Gregory also refers to "the nature which is controlled by the *nous*" as "an image of an image" (καθάπερ τὶς εἰκὼν εἰκόνος).

PHILO ON THE *HEGEMONIKON*

One difficulty in parsing out Philo's understanding of the soul and the role of the *hegemonikon* in relation to it is that Philo describes the soul at times according to the Platonic tripartite model of the soul (*e.g. Leg. all.* 1.110), at times according to an Aristotelian tripartite soul (*e.g. Q.G.* 2.59), and at other times in a Stoic manner, as consisting of the *hegemonikon* and seven faculties (*e.g. Opif.* 17). Despite taking recourse to these various paradigms, however, Philo seems essentially to follow the bipartite model of the soul, standard among Plato's followers by Philo's time, whereby the fundamental division is between the rational and irrational soul.[90] Within this bipartite soul, Philo feels the freedom to describe the irrational soul in various ways and to divide it into various faculties, while he retains the rational soul as a single and undivided entity known by different names: *nous, hegemonikon, logikon,* etc. Thus, Philo easily conflates the various schools' understanding of the soul. It is perhaps this conflation of differing understandings of the soul that accounts for Philo's ambivalent position on one of the unresolved philosophical questions of the day, the location of the *hegemonikon*. Philo wrote at a time when a Stoic minority, tenaciously clinging to the idea of a cardiocentric *hegemonikon,* was still sizable and vocal enough to prevent a definite resolution to the debate. Because Philo's understanding of the soul is largely Platonic, he tends towards an encephalocentric understanding of the *hegemonikon*. At times, however, he hints at a cardiocentric position and sometimes professes outright agnosticism.

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[90] Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the* Timaeus, pp. 304f., 468.

In several passages Philo interprets the inbreathing of the spirit at Gn 2.7 as the moment in which the *hegemonikon* is planted in the face, which he describes as the *hegemonikon* of the body.[91] As Philo describes it at *Leg. All.* 1.39, this correlation depends upon the fact that the senses are centered upon the face. For Philo, God's inbreathing of man at Gn 2.7 contains both a natural and an ethical significance (εἰς δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμπνεῖ καὶ φυσικῶς καὶ ἠθικῶς): naturally it means that God created the senses in the face (ἐν προσώπῳ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐδημιούργει), while ethically it indicates the correspondence between the face, the *hegemonikon* of the body, and the *nous,* the *hegemonikon* of the soul, and consequently that God deigned to breathe into the *nous* alone (τούτῳ [sc. νῷ] μόνῳ ἐμπνεῖ ὁ θεός). Philo further adds the novel idea that the the *nous* in turn inbreathes and ensouls the Stoic sevenfold complex of the senses and the faculties of speech and reproduction. The *nous* even serves as a god to the irrational part of the soul (θεός ἐστι τοῦ ἀλόγου ὁ νοῦς) just as Moses at Ex 7.1 served as a god to Pharaoh (§140). Once again Philo here underscores the analogy between God, the *hegemon* of the universe, and the *nous,* which is the *hegemonikon* of the soul. This analogy becomes especially clear in §41, where Philo argues that, although all things are created by God, not all come into being through his agency, the prime example of which is the soul:

> The most noble things have both been created by God and through His agency (καὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ γέγονε καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ) … among these is also included the *nous*; but the irrational part was created by God, but not through His agency (ὑπὸ θεοῦ μὲν…, οὐ διὰ θεοῦ δέ), but rather through the agency of the rational part that governs and rules in the soul (διὰ τοῦ λογικοῦ τοῦ ἄρχοντός τε καὶ βασιλεύοντος ἐν ψυχῇ).

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[91] Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the* Timaeus, p. 266, notes that the idea of the face or head as the *hegemonikon* of the body ultimately derives from Plato, esp. *Ti.* 44d5, where he describes the head (κεφαλή) as "a thing most divine and ruling over all the parts within us" (θειότατον … καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντων δεσποτοῦν), but also 45b2, 70c1, 73a7.

Similarly, at *Opif.* 139,[92] Philo describes man being made the image and likeness when God breathed the breath of life into his face, the location of the senses (ἔνθα τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁ τόπος). Here also, the *hegemonikon* is given its usual role of governing the senses, through which the creator ensouled (ἐψύχωσεν) the body. Finally, at *Spec.* 4.123, Philo paraphrases Gn 2.7 as follows: "God breathed the breath of life into the most sovereign part of the body (τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἡγεμονικώτατον), namely the face." Once again, the role of the face as the *hegemonikon* of the body depends upon its relationship to the senses, which, says Philo, "are stationed [in the face] as attendants (δορυφόροι) of the mind as though of a great king."

In these passages, however, it is unclear whether or not Philo is speaking in a purely allegorical sense regarding the location of the *hegemonikon*. That is to say, can the "face" of Gn 2.7 be equated to the physical human head and thereby reveal an encephalocentric position, or does it simply indicate the identity of the *hegemonikon* as the *nous*?[93] In at least one passage, Philo does speak in more concrete, anatomical terms. At *Fug.* 182, Philo likens the *hegemonikon* to a spring that brings forth the faculties (δυνάμεις) that it sends to the various sensory organs and further comments that these senses are in every animal located around the head and face (αἱ δ' εἰσὶ παντὸς ζῴου περὶ κεφαλὴν καὶ πρόσωπον). Philo concludes, "Therefore the face, which is the *hegemonikon* of the body, is watered, as it were, from the spring that is the *hegemonikon* in the soul" (ποτίζεται οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικοῦ τὸ σώματος ἡγεμονικὸν

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[92] *V.* the discussion of this passage above.

[93] Tobin, *The Creation of Man,* pp. 77, 95, follows the allegorical explanation and argues that Philo interprets "into the face" simply to mean "into the *nous*"; Runia, *Philo: On the Creation,* is willing to see a hint of an encephalocentric position in *Opif.* 139, but notes Philo's ambivalence elsewhere.

πρόσωπον). The correlation between the *hegemonikon* and the face as the *hegemonikon* is here quite concretely understood as the physical head, and not simply the allegorical face of Gn 2.7. Philo's clear indication of an encephalocentric position in this passage thus makes it all the more likely that elsewhere, when he discusses the face as the *hegemonikon* of the body, he understands Gn 2.7 both allegorically and anatomically.

Likewise, Philo's summary explanation of Gn 2.7 at *Q.G.* 1.5 also hints at a more anatomical interpretation of the verse:

> Why is it said that [God] breathed life into his face? First of all, because [life] is the principal [part] of the body; for the rest was only made as a sort of pedestal, but [life] was put upon it as a statue. Moreover, the sense is the fountain of the form of the soul, but the sense resides [completely] in the face. Secondly, man has been created as a partaker not only of a soul but also of a rational soul; and the head is the temple of the intellect, as some have said.[94]

Philo speaks here quite plainly of the senses being located in the face and at the end of the passage reveals that he equates this with the head, but he also adds two images, that of the statue atop a pedestal and the head as the temple of reason, that indicate that he is speaking not only of the allegorical face, the *nous,* but also of the physical head. Similar images appear elsewhere in Philo's corpus, of which the most relevant is that of the *nous* residing in the head, the acropolis of the body, from which it controls the body.[95] This is perhaps most plainly stated in another passage of the *Q.G.,* in which Philo interprets the dimensions of the Noah's ark: "But again, very wisely did God ordain that the summit be completed in one cubit; for the upper part [of the ark]

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[94] Translation based on the Latin translation in J.B. Aucher, *Philonis Judaei paralipomena Armena,* p. 4. The Greek of this particular question has not survived.

[95] Besides the passages discussed here, *v. Leg.* 2.91, *Agr.* 46, *Abr.* 150, *Mos.* 2.83.

imitates the unity of the body; indeed the head is like a king's citadel, which has as its inhabitant the chief of all (*principem*), the intellect" (2.5).[96] Given Philo's statements in other passages, it is likely that here the Greek word behind *princeps* (Armenian *zārajnord išxann,* literally, "first sovereign") would be ἡγεμών, which would constitute an unmistakable reference to the *nous* in its role as *hegemonikon*. The images of the citadel and the statue atop a pedestal appear together at *Spec.* 3.184, where Philo writes that "nature has assigned the governance (ἡγεμονίαν) of the body to the head and has also granted a most fitting location, like a citadel for a king (ὡς βασιλεῖ τὴν ἄκραν) -- for after [nature] sent it forth to rule the body [ἐπ' ἀρχήν], it established it in a lofty place and placed underneath it the entire complex from the neck to the feet, as though it were a pedestal for a statue."

Philo's use of the term ἡγεμονία in this last passage underscores that he is addressing the question of the location of the *hegemonikon,* and in several other passages he relates the image of the head as the citadel of the *nous* more closely to philosophical discussions. Of these passages Philo most clearly endorses the Platonic, encephalocentric position at *Spec.* 4.92, where he reports that "those who have not simply tasted of philosophy with the tips of their lips, but have feasted fully on her proper doctrines" describe a tripartite soul divided into reason (λόγος), anger (θυμός), and appetite (ἐπιθυμία), and assign each of these faculties to a region of the body: "To the reason, inasmuch as it is the sovereign (ὡς ἡγεμόνι), they have attributed the summit, the head (τὴν ἄκραν … κεφαλήν), as a most suitable abode, in which the ranks of the *nous,* namely the senses, have been stationed like a king's bodyguards." These philosophers, says Philo, have

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[96] Again, translated from the Latin version in Aucher, *Philonis Judaei paralipomena Armena,* pp. 79f.

also located anger in the breast and the appetite in the diaphragm, near the navel, so that reason might have direct influence over anger, and so that the appetite might be kept as far as possible from the citadel of the mind: "For it was necessary that [the appetite], since it has only the slightest share in reason (λογισμοῦ), be removed as far as possible from [reason's] palace" (τῶν βασιλείων αὐτοῦ, §94).[97] At *Leg. All.* 3.115, Philo cites these same philosophers, though here he is rather circumspect and does not openly endorse their position, nor does he, however, raise any objections to their explanations:

> Some of the philosophers have therefore distinguished these parts (of the soul) from one another only by their function (δυνάμει), but some have even divided them by their respective locations (τόποις); they have subsequently assigned to the rational faculty (τῷ λογιστικῷ) the area round the head on the grounds that, where the king is, there also are his bodyguards, and the body guards of the *nous* are the senses located around the head, such that the king also would be there, as though he held the highest point of the city to dwell in.

When, however, Philo mentions the philosophers at *Somn.* 1.32, he presents the two competing views with no indication that one is preferable over the other:

> But where has the *nous* set up its lair in the body? Has it been assigned a home (οἶκον)? For some have dedicated to it that acropolis that is in us, namely the head, around which the senses also have their dens, since they regard it fitting that [the senses], like the bodyguards of a great king, be stationed close at hand. But others are of the opinion, and argue adamantly (γνωσιμαχοῦσιν), that [the *nous*] is enshrined like a statue in the temple of the heart (ὑπὸ καρδίας αὐτὸν ἀγαλματοφορεῖσθαι).

At *Leg. All.* 1.59, however, Philo casts a more critical eye upon the cardiocentric position. As he interprets the tree of life planted in paradise as "the most general virtue, which some call

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[97] This distribution of the tripartite soul between the head, chest and abdomen derives from Plato's schema in *Ti.* 45a-b, 69d-70a, 70d-71b. *Cf.* Galen's anatomically more specific assignment of the reason to the brain, anger to the heart, and appetite to the liver; *PHP passim*.

goodness (ἀγαθότητα)," he notes that some have interpreted the tree as the heart, "since it the the cause of life (τοῦ ζῆν) and has received the center of the body, and rightly so, since it is, according to them, the ruling element (ἡγεμονικόν)." Philo rejects this theory as "a medical, rather than a philosophical, opinion" (ἰατρικὴν δόξαν … μᾶλλον ἢ φυσικήν). Though Philo interprets the tree of life as ἀγαθότης, already before he considers the cardiocentric theory, he hints that he really regards the tree of life as the *hegemonikon,* or at least a disposition of the *hegemonikon,* by deploying his now familiar image: the tree of life, says Philo, "has been placed in the middle of the garden, and has the most essential position (τὴν συνεκτικωτάτην χώραν), so that it might be accompanied by a retinue of bodyguards (δορυφορῆται) on both sides." Philo's use of the term δορυφορεῖσθαι is also telling, since elsewhere he so frequently uses this verb and its cognates to describe the relationship between *nous* and senses in an encephalocentric understanding of the *hegemonikon*.[98] Later in the same passage, Philo compares the tree of life to that of the knowledge of good and evil and interprets them as different dispositions of the soul. Noting that Moses does not specify the location of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, Philo concludes that the tree is both inside and outside the garden, "in actuality in it, but in potentiality outside it" (οὐσίᾳ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ ἐκτός, §61). This paradox is explained by the fact that "our *hegemonikon* is receptive of all things (πανδεχές) and like wax, which receives all impressions, whether beautiful or ugly" (τύπους καλούς τε καὶ αἰσχρούς). Philo continues, "When [the soul] receives the impression of perfect virtue (τὸν τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χαρακτῆρα), it becomes the tree of life, but when it receives that of wickedness (τὸν τῆς κακίας), it becomes the

[98] *V.* examples above.

tree of the knowledge of good and evil" (*ibid.*). Philo therefore concludes, "The *hegemonikon* which has received [wickedness] is therefore in the garden in actuality (κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν), for the stamp of virtue, which belongs in paradise (οἰκεῖος ὢν τῷ παραδείσῳ), is in it; but again, potentially (ἐν δυνάμει) it is not in it, because the impress (τύπος) of wickedness does not belong in [a place] of divine sunrises" (*ibid.*). Philo does not find such an interpretation problematic, since he recognizes that "at the present moment the *hegemonikon* is in the body in actuality (κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν), but potentially (δυνάμει) is in Italy or Sicily, whenever it thinks upon these places, or even in heaven, when it thinks of heaven" (§62).[99]

In at least one passage, Philo speaks in such a way that he might be interpreted as supporting a cardiocentric position. At *Leg. All.* 2.5f. allegorizes the newly created Adam and Eve as representations of the *nous* and its helpers, the senses. Philo notes that the allegory of Adam, the *nous,* being created before Eve, the senses, corresponds to medical science:

> Just as according to the best doctors and philosophers (φυσικῶν) the heart seems to be formed before the rest of the body (τοῦ ὅλου σώματος), like a foundation, or a ship's keel, on which the rest of the body is built -- moreover, they also say that even after death [the heart] still beats (ἐμπηδᾶν), as it is both the first created and the last to succumb to corruption (ὡς καὶ πρώτην γινομένην καὶ ὑστέραν φθειρομένην) -- so also the *hegemonikon* of the soul is older that the rest of the soul (τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς), but the irrational portion is younger.

Unlike in the previous passage, Philo does not here regard the doctors and the philosophers, or at least the best of them, as contradicting one another, and somewhat surprisingly he openly endorses the symmetry between the heart as the first-formed element of the body and the

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[99] This explanation of the difference between an actual and a potential location of the *hegemonikon* is particularly relevant to *Hom. opif.* 12-15, where Gregory argues that the *nous* is not physically locatable.

hegemonikon as that of the soul. Philo leaves unanswered, however, the question of the relationship between heart and *hegemonikon*. Does he imply that the analogy between heart and *hegemonikon* derives from the fact that the *hegemonikon* is actually located in the heart, or is the analogy simply that? It is at the very least curious that Philo would miss such an opportunity to make explicit the relationship between heart and *hegemonikon,* if he were in fact suggesting a cardiocentric position. Although there is no guarantee of internal consistency in Philo's work, given his other statements on the matter, it is unlikely that he argues for the cardiocentric position in this lone passage.

More frequently, Philo takes a rather diplomatic position and declines to enter what remained a heated debate in his own day. For example, at *Post.* 137, where Philo interprets Rebecca's water vessel (Ex. 24.14-20) as the body, which serves as a container for the *hegemonikon*, Philo recognizes that the *hegemonikon* must have a physical location, but he is unwilling to specify any part of the body: "Let the experts on such things philosophize as to whether [the vessel of the *hegemonikon*] is the brain (μήνιγγα) or the heart." What is more striking, however, is that in two passages Philo projects his own ambivalence into the Biblical text and argues that Moses himself recognized the quandary. At both *Sacr.* 136f. and *Spec.* 1.213-15 Philo questions why the Levitical prescriptions for sacrifice call for the organs other than the brain and the heart (Lv 3.3ff.), "which," he says, "would have naturally been consecrated before the other parts, since even according to the Lawgiver, the *hegemonikon* is generally agreed to be in one of these two" (*Sacr.* 136). In both passages, Philo argues that the brain and heart are exempted from the sacrifices precisely because one of them is the location of

the *hegemonikon*. In an explanation reminiscent of his allegory of the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (*Leg. All.* 1.59-62), Philo explains in these two passages that the capacity of the *hegemonikon* to receive either good or evil impressions and, consequently, to alter its nature, renders it an unfit sacrifice. The Lawgiver, therefore, removed the unworthy offering from the altar, according to Philo's explanation at *Sacr.* 138; at *Spec.* 1.215, the wisdom of the prescription is attributed to the Scriptures themselves: "Therefore the Sacred Scriptures (ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος) deemed it right that one should not offer on the altar of God … the vessel (ἀγγεῖον) in which the *nous,* which has abandoned the way that leads to virtue and excellence in order to follow the trackless path of injustice and impiety, once made its lair (φωλεύσας)." The implication of Philo's exegesis is startling: Moses himself, or, even more startling, perhaps the Word himself, if that is the implication of Philo's personification of the ἱερός λόγος,[100] did not know whether the *hegemonikon* resides in the brain or the heart. At the very least, Philo's interpretation establishes the contemporary debate over the location of the *hegemonikon* as a conundrum so perennial that it is even reflected in the very rites of Jewish sacrifice.

A final pair of passages deserves mention because of Philo's description of the *hegemonikon* in relation to the blood. At *Her.* 54, Philo etymologizes the name of Mesek's son,

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[100] Sandmel, *Philo of Alexandria,* p. 95f., argues that Philo uses the term ἱερὸς λόγος to refer to Moses, and by extension to Moses' writings, which constitute the completely rational account of how man should live and a perfect expression of the "sacred, priestly rational *Logos*."

"Damaskos" (Gn 15.2), to mean "blood of a sackcloth robe."[101] This peculiar expression, explains Philo, allegorically indicates that the sackcloth robe is the body, while the blood is the life which is found in the blood (ζωὴν τὴν ἔναιμον). Philo further explains the soul as bipartite, consisting of the entire soul as well as its hegemonic part (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτῆς μέρος), which Philo terms "the soul of the soul" (ψυχὴ ψυχῆς), just as the pupil is the most important part (τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος) of the eye (§54). Most importantly, however, Philo correlates the bipartite soul to a view of the blood quite consistent with Alexandrian medicine. On the basis of Lv 17.11 ("The blood is the life [ψυχή] of all flesh"), Philo argues that Moses himself regarded not only the capacities or functions, but even the essence of the soul (οὐσία), as twofold: "blood, the essence of the entire soul, but divine *pneuma,* the essence of the most hegemonic part (τοῦ δ' ἡγεμονικωτάτου πνεῦμα θεῖον, *ibid.*)." Philo further distinguishes between the general soul, found in the created blood, which is tainted by its relation to, and oversight of, the body, and the more noble origins of the *hegemonikon*: "[the Lawgiver] did not make the essence of the *nous* dependent upon anything, but rather introduced it as inbreathed by God (ὑπὸ θεοῦ καταπνευσθεῖσαν, §56)." Philo here cites Gn 2.7 as his proof, and immediately harmonizes it with Gn 1.26: "[God breathed into the man's face] 'the breath of life' … by which, so the Scriptures have it, he was also stamped with in the image of the Creator" (πνοὴν ζωῆς … ᾗ καὶ

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[101] Most modern translations of the Gn 15.2 do not regard *ben-mešeq* as referring to "the son of Mesek," but rather translate it as the noun, "successor." Similarly, the name *Dammeseq,* is not regarded as one of the names of the successor, but rather indicates Eliezer's origin, Damascus. Philo, however, is working with a version of the LXX, which renders the verse: "ὁ δὲ υἱὸς Μασὲκ τῆς οἰκογενοῦς μου, οὗτος Δαμασκὸς Ἐλιέζερ." Philo thus etymologizes the toponym to mean "blood of sackcloth" (αἷμα σάκκου), apparently from Hebrew *dam* (blood) and *saq* (sackcloth). According to Speiser, *Genesis,* p. 111, the original, non-Semitic name *Dimašgi,* whose origins are still unknown, was especially prone to etymologizing, *e.g.* the Aramaic version of the name, *di mašqya,* was explained as "having water resources."

κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ποιητοῦ λόγος ἔχει τυπωθῆναι., *ibid.*). Similarly, at *Q.G.* 2.59 Philo interprets Gn 9.4, "you shall not eat meat in the blood of its soul" (ἐν αἵματι ψυχῆς),[102] to indicate that the blood constitutes the essence of the lower parts of the soul, here the Aristotelian nutritive and sensory souls; the rational soul by contrast is made of divine *pneuma,* evidence of which Philo provides by citing Gn 2.7. Philo argues that the phrase "blood of the soul" indicates that blood and soul are two distinct, but not separate entities: the soul comprised of *pneuma* does not have its own location, but is "carried in, and intermingled with, the blood" (ἐμφέρεσθαι καὶ συγκεκρᾶσθαι αἵματι). Philo explains that the blood and *pneuma* are intermingled in both the veins and arteries, but in inverse proportion: in the veins, blood predominates, while in the arteries, *pneuma*.[103]

These passages are particularly remarkable not only because they explicitly identify the breath of life with the divine image, and both of these with the *nous*/*hegemonikon* -- a now familiar complex of associations -- but also because Philo has located this complex in the divine *pneuma,* which is not simply a more philosophically acceptable equivalent of πνοή, but rather the actual source and substance of the psychic *pneuma* that circulates in the body along with the blood; it is the "life that is in the blood." This doctrine is found nowhere in Plato and only rarely in the Hippocratic corpus. By allowing that the blood circulates in the arteries as well as the veins, Philo endorses Hierophilus' arguments over those of Erasistratus, who separated the blood

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[102] Normally this phrase is better translated as "the blood of life" or "the life-blood," but in this context Philo has seized upon the word ψυχή, which he interprets as the soul.

[103] Philo actually refers to the arteries as "respiratory veins" (Armenian *šnč'ap'ołk'*). Only the first half of this question survives in Greek, the second half only in Armenian. Aucher, *Philonis Paralipomena Armena,* pp. 142f.

and *pneuma* into separate circulatory systems, the veins and arteries, respectively.[104] Thus, Philo has integrated fully his interpretation of the image of God with the philosophical doctrines of the *nous* and *hegemonikon* as well the dominant circulatory theory of his day.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis has traced the origins and outlines of what might be termed the Philonic model of theological anthropology, which many Christian theologians will later accept with only slight modifications. The foundation of this model is Philo's choice, influenced by the momentum of earlier philosophical and medical inquiry, to identify the Greek philosophical concepts of the *nous* and *hegemonikon* with the "image of God" of Gn 1.26f., as well as the "breath of life" of Gn 2.7. Philo primarily expresses the identity of the image and the *hegemonikon* by comparing the hegemonic function of the *nous* to God's role as the great *hegemon* of the universe. As a consequence of identifying image, *nous* and *hegemonikon* as a single entity, Philo interprets the image of God primarily in terms of the most salient characteristic of the *nous,* namely rationality, which, expressed in various Greek cognates, necessitates a connection between the image and the *Logos*. Despite the fact that Philo occasionally argues that man is created directly in the image of God, he generally emphasizes the significance of the preposition κατά in the phrase κατ' εἰκόνα so as to present the *Logos* as the intermediary in whose image man is created; he thereby provides a scheme into which later Christian exegetes can easily insert Christ the *Logos*. Moreover, Philo's characteristic

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[104] Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the* Timaeus*,* p. 318.

interpretation of Gn 1.27, whereby he compresses the verse to read, "God made man in the image of God," will provide those exegetes with the scriptural basis for finding Christ in the narrative of Creation. Finally, Philo, on the basis of both his scriptural exegesis and philosophical argument, advocates the encephalocentric theory of the *hegemonikon* and regards *pneuma,* imparted in the "breath of life" in Gn 2.7, as the means by which the *hegemonikon* exercises its rule over the soul and body. Although on most aspects of this model Philo exhibits some level of ambivalence or internal contradiction, the model is clear enough in its outlines. His Christian successors, presuming a general consistency in his writings, read them with a less critical (in the modern sense) eye and through the filter of a Christian theology that predisposed them to seize upon certain elements. The Christian-Philonic tradition was so entrenched by Gregory's time that whether is questionable whether he would have even noticed such inconsistencies.

CHAPTER 2: MEDICAL AND EXEGETICAL TRADITIONS

GALEN

The stalemate over the location of the *hegemonikon* was eventually resolved in the late second century AD by the anatomical arguments and keen rhetoric of Galen. Galen marshalled the insights derived from his experiments not only to prove the encephalocentric position, but also to provide a sounder foundation for Platonic psychology, particularly as described in *Ti.* At the heart of Galen's own teaching is the fundamental likeness between God and the soul, both in the unknowability of their respective essences and in their hegemonic function. Although some after Galen still clung to a cardiocentric position,[1] they were increasingly fewer, and Galen's teachings, not only about the *hegemonikon,* were gradually enshrined as medical orthodoxy.

Galen brought to the debate over the *hegemonikon* not only an encyclopedic knowledge of anatomy, but also a logical basis for argumentation. Galen rejected any appeal to plausible analogies, even analogies for which he had some sympathy and that he sometimes used, because they offered no scientific proof. Thus, Galen readily admits:

> Nor is it necessary that, because the brain, like the Great King (δίκην μεγάλου βασιλέως), dwells in the head as in an acropolis, for that reason the ruling part of the soul is in the brain, or because the brain has the senses stationed around it like bodyguards (δορυφόρους), or, even if one should go so far as to say that as heaven is to the whole universe, so the head is to man, and that therefore as the former is the home of the gods, so the brain is the home of the rational faculty (*PHP* 2.4.17f.).

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[1] T. Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus,* pp. xxxvif., notes that the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias was not convinced by Galen's arguments and offered his own counterarguments (*De Anima,* 94.7-100.17 Bruns), thereby "bearing witness to the appeal and scientific respectability of the cardiocentric theory well into the second [third?] century CE." Among the Christian authors, Origen is the most notable proponent of cardiocentrism, a position that he bequeaths to Athanasius and Basil; *v.* the discussions below.

While these analogies might have been acceptable within an encephalocentric context, they provided no more sound a basis for argumentation than the specious proofs of the cardiocentric Stoics. Instead, Galen attempted to prove the validity of the encephalocentric theory *more geometrico*.[2] Central to his argument was the syllogism, "where the source (ἀρχή) of the nerves is, there is the *hegemonikon*; the source of the nerves is in the brain; therefore this is the location of the *hegemonikon*."[3] The bulk of Galen's tome *On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates* (*PHP*), largely a point-by-point refutation of Chrysippus' arguments for the cardiocentric position, is dedicated to proving this syllogism with evidence gathered from his animal dissections and vivisections.[4] Most important in this regard were his experiments in neural and arterial ligation and/or section. Besides showing anatomically that the nerves descend from the brain, Galen reports the results of his experiments whereby ligation of an animal's carotid arteries leads to no sensory or motor impairment, while any damage or manipulation of nerves in the neck immediately renders the animal voiceless.[5] Galen applied this type of experiment to many other parts of the body and proved the more general point:

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[2] Galen seems to have taken his interest in the *hegemonikon* from the early second-century Alexandrian anatomist Marinus, to whom he was especially indebted and greatly admired. Galen reports (*Lib.Prop.* 3) that he composed a four-volume summary of Marinus' twenty-volume work on anatomy, of which "the seventeenth discusses the dominion (κυριότητος) of the brain" (Mueller 108.6f.; Kühn XIX.29). *V.* Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* p. 45.

[3] *PHP* 8.1.22. There may be an implied *double-entendre* with the word ἀρχή, such that a tautology is created: the source of the nerves is also the sovereignty over the nerves, which is necessarily the *hegemonikon.* Galen emphasizes this at *PHP* 2.8.22, where he specifies that the object of his search for the hegemonikon is "the source that pertains to power" (τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀρχήν), rather than simply "that which pertains to beginning" (τὴν κατὰ γένεσιν).

[4] Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* p. 35, notes, "as far as can be determined on the available evidence, the practice of human dissection and vivisection in antiquity began and ended with Herophilus and Erasistratus." Galen had benefitted from anatomical studies in Alexandria, where specimens of human skeletons were kept, but his main advances were due to his examinations of cattle, swine, and monkeys, often performed before an audience in Rome.

[5] Described especially at *PHP* 2.6.

> as soon as a nerve is severed, the part in which the nerve was spread immediately becomes immobile and, what is more, loses sensation. But although two other natural structures, the artery and the vein, reach each part, neither of these, when severed from the rest or separated by ligation, renders that part either insensate or immobile. It is therefore clear that the parts that are moved voluntarily by the animal are made mobile and sensate by the nerves alone.[6]

Galen augmented this proof with experiments in which he opened the skull of a live animal and compressed various portions of the brain.[7] By such experiments, Galen determined that the location of the *hegemonikon* was the fourth ventricle, located near the cerebellum. Galen further supplemented this evidence with that provided by the butcher: a knife inserted between the base of the skull and the first vertebra proves fatal because it opens the fourth ventricle and, consequently, destroys the *hegemonikon*.[8]

Despite the sophistication of his dissections, vivisections, and experiments, Galen was by no means a practitioner of the modern scientific method inasmuch as he was not open to any possible outcome that they might produce. Rather, Galen embarked upon these investigations with the intent to prove the reality of the Platonic tripartite soul and to establish it on a surer basis in anatomy. Only within the framework of Alexandrian medicine and Platonic psychology does Galen develop his own understanding of the relationship between soul and body. Not surprisingly, Galen is most indebted to Plato's *Ti.,*[9] which gives general indications of the

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[6] Gal., *Plat.Tim.* fr. 13b (Larrain)

[7] Most clearly described at *AA* 9.12 (Duckworth, pp. 18f.), a passage that Rocca, "Anatomy," p. 251, calls "the most impressive account of anatomical exegesis and physiological experimentation extant in Antiquity."

[8] *AA* 9.10 (Duckworth, p. 14). This explanation depends upon Galen's estimation of how far the fourth ventricle descends; *v.* Rocca, "Anatomy," p. 249.

[9] This is clear enough from *PHP,* but even more so from his (unfortunately fragmentary) *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (*Plat.Tim.*); *v.* Larrain, *Galens Kommentar.*

anatomical correlations to the parts of the soul, although Galen makes these more specific. Whereas Plato had associated the rational soul and the spirited and appetitive parts of the irrational soul with the head, chest, and stomach, respectively,[10] Galen identifies the fourth ventricle of the brain, the heart, and the liver as their specific locations.[11]

Galen combines this arrangement with Alexandrian pneumatic medicine to arrive at a very detailed theory of how the soul functions in the body. By Galen's account, external air (ἔξωθεν ἀήρ) enters the lungs, which in turn process it into a "*pneuma*-like" (πνευματῶδες) substance. This substance enters the left ventricle of the heart, where, with the help of the heart's innate heat (ἔμφυτον θερμόν), it is transformed into vital (ζωτικόν) *pneuma.* Thence it is sent through the arterial system and reaches the brain through the retiform plexus (δικτυοειδὲς πλέγμα) and the choroid plexus (χοροειδῆ πλέγματα), which transform the vital *pneuma* into psychic *pneuma,*[12] the means by which the nervous system, and hence the soul, functions.[13] Galen even explains how the complicated vascular networks of the retiform plexus (the *rete mirabile,* not actually present in humans, but present in the pigs and oxen on which Galen based his conclusions) and the choroid plexus refine vital *pneuma* into psychic *pneuma*: by complicating the flow of blood rather than providing a direct path to the the brain, these

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[10] *Ti.* 44d, 69e

[11] The arguments for this scheme are found throughout *PHP.* P. Donini, "Psychology," p. 188, notes the discrepancies between Galen's account and Plato's, especially regarding the appetitive faculty.

[12] The distinction between vital and psychic *pneuma,* the origin of vital *pneuma* in the left ventricle of the heart, and the production of psychic *pneuma* in the brain are among several ideas that Galen oddly inherits from Erasistratus, his normal object of derision; *v.* von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," p. 112. Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* pp. 63f., notes that previous authors, including Erasistratus, regarded this as a quantitative distinction (*i.e.* the heart refines natural *pneuma* into increasingly finer states, the last of which is psychic *pneuma*), while Galen understood this as a qualitative change.

[13] Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* pp. 64f.

structures delay the vital *pneuma* in those regions of the brain so that it may be converted.[14] Galen likens these plexus to the vascular structures found before the male testes and the female breast, which he says serve to refine blood into sperm and milk, respectively, and draws a general conclusion: "For wherever nature desires to produce a precise refinement of a substance (ἀκριβῶς κατεργάσασθαι τὴν ὕλην), it prepares a lengthy stay (πολυχρόνιον διατριβήν) for it in the organs of concoction (πέψεως)."[15]

Galen couples the specificity of this pneumatic schema with a healthy dose of agnosticism regarding the relationship between soul and *pneuma*. Galen vacillates between asserting that the soul *is* the *pneuma* contained in the cerebral cavity and that it uses the *pneuma* as an instrument by which to operate the senses and control the body.[16] The latter option, however, is Galen's clear preference,[17] and he frequently refers to *pneuma* as the soul's "primary instrument" (πρῶτον ὄργανον).[18] At *SMT* 5.9 Galen contrasts his own position on the matter to that of the Stoics, who regard the *pneuma* and the substance of the soul as one and the same; Galen would not dare to speak definitely about the soul's substance and regards such talk as useless (περιττόν). What Galen will say, however, is that he proved in *PHP* that connate (σύμφυτον) *pneuma* is the soul's primary instrument (Kühn XI.731). With this claim, Galen may

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[14] *PHP* 7.3.23-29; *v.* von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," p. 113.

[15] *UP* 9.4 (III.699f. Kühn; II.12.5-8 Helmreich); von Staden, *ibid.* The basic idea, for proof of which Galen discovers anatomical structures, derives from Aristotle, *GA* 735a-36a, who regarded the male semen and the female menstrual fluid and milk as products of different degrees of concoction of the blood; *v.* Freudenthal, *Aristotle's Theory,* pp. 107, 122.

[16] *E.g., Ut. Resp.* IV.508f. Kühn. *V.* Donini, "Psychology," p. 185 and n. 11, for further citations.

[17] *Ibid.,* pp. 185f.

[18] *E.g., PHP* 7.3.21, 27 (Kühn 3.603-05).

refer to the conclusions one could draw based on the results of compressing various parts of the brain and opening the ventricles, as described at *PHP* 7.3.14-18. Two tempting possibilities emerge from these experiments, says Galen: either the *pneuma* is the soul's primary abode (οἰκητήριον) or is identical with the soul (§19). Both options, however, are belied by the fact that if the ventricles are closed again, the animal regains sensation and motion (§20). Galen therefore concludes:

> It is better, then, to suppose that the soul – whatever it may be in its substance, since we have not yet come to a consideration of that topic – dwells in the very body of the brain, and that the primary instrument for all the animal's sense perceptions as well as its voluntary (καθ' ὁρμήν) movements is the *pneuma.* It is for this reason that the *pneuma,* once it has been emptied and until it has been collected again, does not deprive the animal of its life, but rather renders it insensate and motionless. If, however, it were the substance of the soul, the animal would die as soon as the *pneuma* was emptied (§§21f.).

The agnosticism regarding the substance of the soul that Galen professes in this last passage is not, as Galen here feigns, simply a topic which his investigations have yet to settle, but rather reflects his general stance towards the issue. Galen accepts the soul's existence based on general consensus and the conventional designation of the cause of voluntary motion and sensation as the soul, but adds the caveat, "But I do not claim to know the substance of the soul, much less ought I to know whether it is immortal" (*Prop.Plac.* 3.1). Galen regards that he has sufficiently proved that the soul has three parts and that these are associated with the brain, heart, and liver, but the question of the soul's essence (οὐσία), as well as the associated question of its immortality or mortality, is unanswerable, perhaps even unprofitable, from his perspective (3.2).[19] At *PHP* 9.9.3, Galen attributes his reticence on such matters to Plato himself, who in *Ti.*

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[19] *Cf. PHP* 9.7.13-15.

characterized his description of the human soul as "plausible" (τὸ … εἰκός, *Ti.* 72d): "Therefore, just as [Plato] said that his prior statements about the soul are known to us as far as is plausible and likely (ἄχρι τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ εἰκότος), for the same reason I also do not dare to proclaim a reckless opinion on the matter" (§7).

Because of the divine origin of the soul, Galen is equally agnostic about the nature of the god and gods. Indeed, both in *Prop.Plac.* and *PHP*, Galen's arguments for a restrained description of god exactly parallel those offered for the soul. At *Prop.Plac.* 2, Galen claims to have "no knowledge about the creator of all those things that exist in the world, whether he is corporeal or incorporeal and in which place he is located," a claim that he extends to the divine powers that reveal the creator's activities in the world. Galen, however, distinguishes his own agnosticism from that of Protagoras, who denied even knowledge of the gods' existence;[20] by contrast, Galen denies only knowledge of their substance, since their existence is proven by their activities. Galen sees such activity in the god's constitution[21] of the bodies of animals, in their communications to men through divination and dreams, but, most importantly, through his own experience of being cured of an illness:[22] "This plainly indicates an amazing power, and I myself have experienced it. But I do not see that it harms men to be ignorant of the substance of the divinity, and I see that I should proclaim and follow the law in this matter and accept the

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[20] *V.* DK 80.B.4 (= Eus., *P.e.* 14.19.10).

[21] *Regimen,* which, according to Nutton, *Galeni de Propriis Placitis,* p. 135, n. to p. 58,5, represents διοίκησις (through the medium of Arabic *tadbīr*), in the sense of "the general organisation of the body by the creator."

[22] *Cf. Lib.Prop.* 2 (II.99 Mueller; XIX.19 Kühn), where Galen attributes his lifelong dedication to Asclepius to an episode in which the god healed him of an abscess. The reference to dreams also has a personal significance to Galen, who began his studies in medicine after Asclepius had appeared to his father in dream (*Praen.* 2.12). In general, dreams were especially associated with Asclepius, at whose shrines worshippers would sleep overnight in order to receive dreams. *V.* Nutton, *Galeni de Propriis Placitis,* p. 136, n. to 58,6-7, and p. 138, n. to p. 58,10.

teaching of Socrates, who taught rather firmly regarding this." Similarly, at *PHP* 9.9.1-3 Galen attributes his reticence to speak of the god's essence to the example of Plato in *Ti.* Discussing the passage (*Ti.* 41a-d) in which the Demiurge commands the lesser gods (τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ παισί by Galen's account) to create the human race by combining the substance of the immortal soul (τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν), received from the Demiurge himself, and the generated part (τὸ γεννητόν), Galen urges his reader to recognize "that to prove and assert that we were fashioned in the providence of some god or gods is fundamentally different from knowing the substance of the fashioner (τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ κατασκευάσαντος), just as we do not even know the substance of our soul" (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν). In the cases of both the soul and the gods, Plato maintains the same restraint: "That which the most divine Plato says about the essence of the soul and the gods that fashioned us and, even more so, all that he says about our whole body, extend as far as is likely and probable" (ἄχρι τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ εἰκότος), as he himself showed in the *Timaeus*" (§3).

Galen's phenomenologically based confidence in the existence of both god and soul derives from the fundamental likeness between the two. At the most basic level this is so because, despite Galen's protestations of agnosticism about the divine essence, his god, *i.e.* the Demiurge of Plato's *Ti.,* whom Galen is even willing to equate with the God of the Jews as described by Moses, is himself pure *nous*.[23] One fragment from Galen's lost commentary on *Ti.* gives particular emphasis to the relationship between the soul's divine nature and its hegemonic role within the body; commenting on *Ti.* 44d6, Galen writes:

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[23] *V.* Frede, "Galen's Theology," pp. 105, 123. Galen twice calls god *nous* at *UP* 17.1 (Helmreich 446.22, 447.21; Kühn IV 359f.). For Galen's equation of the Demiurge with the Jewish God, *v.* esp. *UP* 11.4.

> But the *nous,* alone of those elements within us, is "most divine" (ὁ δὲ νοῦς μόνος ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν θειότατος).[24] That the *nous* also "rules over" (δεσπόζει) the whole animal is clear from the fact that voluntary motion takes place at its instigation. For when it is necessary that there be movement (κινηθῆναι), the mind (λογισμόν) must first judge, then move the parts of the body through the nerves and, thus, through the tendons. Therefore, the *hegemon* and ruler of all the voluntary movements and sensations in the animal is [the *nous*], "to which the gods entrusted the whole body, which they had assembled as a staff of attendants for it" (fr. 15 Larrain).

Just as Galen's god is shown to exist by his actions, so also the *nous* is shown to be the *hegemon* of the body by the animal's voluntary motion. Galen's aforementioned reference at *Plac.Prop.* 2 to "Socrates' teaching" on the uselessness of inquiring into the nature of the gods suggests that, for Galen, hegemonic activity is both the primary activity and identifying characteristic of the soul. There "the law" and "Socrates' teaching" most likely refer to Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.3.13-16,[25] where Socrates encourages Euthydemus to honor the gods, not because he has seen them *per se,* but because he has seen their works and concludes that one should heed Apollo's prescription to follow the laws of the city, since the law in all places is to please the gods so far as possible with sacrifices (ἱερά). In this passage, which appears to be one of the foundational texts for Galen's theology and psychology, Xenophon establishes a paradigm by which the great forces in the universe are invisible, but known through their actions. The god "who orders and holds together (συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων) the whole universe… is visible in doing his greatest works, but invisible to us in ordering them" (τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος

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[24] Here I amend Larrain's text, which reads θειότητος rather than θειότατος. The passage, even as Larrain notes, refers to *Ti.* 44d6: τοῦτο ὃ νῦν κεφαλὴν ἐπονομάζομεν, ὃ θειότατόν τέ ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντων δεσποτοῦν· ᾧ καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα παρέδοσαν ὑπηρεσίαν αὐτῷ συναθροίσαντες θεοί, κατανοήσαντες ὅτι πασῶν ὅσαι κινήσεις ἔσοιντο μετέχοι. The θειότατος and δεσπόζει of Galen's text are clearly intended as references to Plato's θειότατον and δεσποτοῦν.

[25] *V.* Frede, "Galen's Theology," pp. 99f.; *cf.* Nutton, *Galeni de Propriis Placitis,* p. 140, n. to p. 58.17-20.

ἡμῖν ἐστιν, §13); the sun's existence is obvious to all, but, if man tries to spy its precise activity, the sun will blind him; the gods' servants, the thunderbolt, and the winds are all invisible, yet the effects of their actions are readily felt; finally, "it is clear that man's soul, which, more than anything else human, has a share of the divine (τοῦ θείου μετέχει), reigns (βασιλεύει) within us, but is itself invisible" (§14). What is most notable about this passage is that, of the various entities enumerated, only the supreme god and the human soul are described as performing hegemonic activity. In the case of the supreme god, his rule over the universe is hidden from us, while only his handiwork is visible; it is the soul's hegemony itself, however, that is the visible proof of its existence and the most direct consequence of its divine origin. Indeed, the congruence of the unknowable essence of both God and soul and the hegemonic activity of each within its respective sphere is fundamental to Galen's entire project of determining the location of the *hegemonikon*. Galen's syllogism whereby the *hegemonikon* must be located at the source of the nerves and the experiments that he devises to prove his thesis presume his epistemological commitment to investigate the actions, rather than the essence, of the soul.

It would be difficult to overestimate the magnitude of Galen's legacy, which has been described as nearly tantamount to "the history of medicine since his death."[26] For the purposes of this study, it is especially noteworthy how quickly Galen's fame spread in his own lifetime and shortly thereafter. Around the turn of the century, Galen had already secured enough of a reputation as a preeminent man of science and philosophy to earn a cameo appearance in Athenaeus (*Deip.* 1.1e, 26c-27d; 3.115c-116a) and to be grouped by his fierce critic, Alexander

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[26] Nutton, "The Fortunes of Galen," p. 355.

of Aphrodisias, with Plato and Aristotle as "a man of high esteem" (τινι τῶν ἐνδόξων, *in Top.* 159a38; Wallies, p. 549, l. 23f.). Galen claims to have received inquiries from the far reaches of the Empire, and already in the first half of the third century, his *PHP* was being copied and read at both ends of North Africa, in both upper Egypt and Morocco.[27] More importantly, Christians were rather well disposed towards Galen, perhaps because of his respectful criticism of the God of Moses, and there is some indication in Eusebius that Galen was among the philosophers and scientists revered by the heretical Roman sect led by Theodotus the Cobbler.[28] Already Galen's younger contemporary, Clement of Alexandria, demonstrates a close familiarity with his ideas of philosophical demonstration and seems to have heavily relied upon Galen for the arguments of *Str.* 8.[29] Origen also read and used Galen, though to a lesser extent than had his teacher,[30] and there are some tantalizing hints of Galenic epistemology in Athanasius, though these are most likely derived from Clement.[31] Thus, in addition to Gregory's direct engagement with Galen in his medical studies, Galen exerts an indirect influence through the Alexandrian tradition.

By the late-fourth century, when Gregory wrote *Hom. opif.,* Galen's legacy had been further consolidated, so that he was already acquiring the singular authority that he would enjoy

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[27] As evidenced by the writings of Gargilius Martialis and a papyrus fragment of *PHP* (P. Mon. Gr. Inv. 329 and P. Berol. inv. 21141). *V.* Manetti, "Un nuovo papiro di Galeno"; Nutton, "The Fortunes of Galen," pp. 358f., and "Galen in the eyes of his contemporaries," p. 318; Riddle, "Gargilius Martialis."

[28] Eus., *HE* 5.28.13-15; *v.* Nutton, "Galen in the eyes of his contemporaries," p. 316f.

[29] *V.* esp. Havrda, "Galenus Christianus?" and the discussion of *Str.* 8.4.14 below.

[30] *V.* Grant, "Paul, Galen, and Origen," pp. 535f. Origen's departure from Galen's encephalocentric position is thus all the more noteworthy. Junod, *Sur le libre arbitre,* p. 84, hypothesizes that, in his writings on fate, Origen has been inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Fato*. If Origen is in fact well acquainted with the writings of Alexander, one of the latest proponents of a cardiocentric position, this may help to explain Origen's own espousal of the same, despite the clear encephalocentric positions of both Philo and Clement.

[31] *Gent.* 38; *v.* n. 124 below.

during the Byzantine period. This is evidenced in the work of Oribasius, who, as court physician to Julian the Apostate and at the emperor's request, compiled an anthology of "the useful passages written by Galen that are useful for the doctor's craft" as an aid to inexperienced and poorly trained physicians who were unable to undertake more detailed study and even as a handy reference "in times of urgent necessity" to those who had received a thorough training (*apud* Phot., *Bibl.* 216 (174a)). The presupposition of the work is that a synopsis of Galen suffices the general student and practitioner, and only in a second, much larger work, did Oribasius expand his scope to include "all the best authors" (πάντων τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν). So as to avoid the redundancy that would follow from excerpting both the greater and lesser authors, Oribasius explains that in this new work he will only draw from the better authors "and will neglect nothing of what Galen has said because he is superior (κρατεῖ) to all those who have written on the same topics, both in his use of methods and in his very precise definitions, since he follows the principles and opinions of Hippocrates" (*Coll.Med*. 1.p.3). By the late-fourth century, then, Galen has become the standard authority in matters medical, and his encephalocentric theory of the *hegemonikon* has acquired the status of a scientific consensus.[32] Moreover, it is nearly certain that Gregory was familiar with Oribasius' works; both Basil (*ep.* 151) and Gregory (*Trin.,*

[32] According to Temkin, "Byzantine Medicine," p. 204, Oribasius' compilations reflect a Galenic "unification of medicine," which "was achieved by the second half of the fourth century" and was to be further consolidated in the medical encyclopedias of the sixth century. Similarly, Nutton, "From Galen to Alexander," pp. 2f., holds that such a focus on Galen was "not a purely personal decision by Oribasius, a personal whim. It reflected the growing importance of Galen, and the belief, easily induced by Galenic rhetoric, that he had somehow defined and completed medicine."

traditionally enumerated as Bas., *ep.* 189) corresponded with his son, a Christian who also served as the imperial chief physician (ἀρχίατρος) and to whom he dedicated his *Syn.*[33]

Clement of Alexandria

The Philonic model of anthropology described in the previous chapter became part of the Christian tradition largely through the efforts of Clement of Alexandria, who adapted Philo's hermeneutical techniques to a distinctively Christian interpretation of the scriptures. While it seems that during the first and second centuries A.D. Philo's writings had become one of many elements in the complex emerging Christian community at Alexandria, where many versions of Christianity vied for preeminence, Clement's reliance upon Philo decisively incorporated Philonic exegesis into the Christian tradition. Indeed, Clement is the first Christian author to betray a definite and close knowledge of Philo,[34] and the much-discussed catechetical school at Alexandria, led in succession by Pantaenus, Clement and Origen, may ultimately have been responsible for preserving Philo's corpus for Christian posterity.[35] Of the many themes that Clement inherits from Philo, the interpretation of the image and likeness is among the foremost;

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[33] *V. PLRE,* vol. 1, *s.v.* "Eustathius 4."

[34] Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature,* pp. 127-30, surveys the extant Alexandrian texts up to the time of Clement that might contain Philonic reminiscences, but none show a direct knowledge, and any similarities could derive from indirect influences. Van den Hoek, *Clement of Alexandria,* has provided a detailed evaluation of Clement's usage of Philo's writings in *Str.* and has proved that in certain instances Clement was working with a scroll of Philo "on his desk," as it were, in one instance even winding the scroll backwards.

[35] Barthélemy, "Est-ce Hoshaya Rabba," p. 60, proposes that Pantaenus' school was responsible for rescuing Philo's writings after the destruction of the Jewish community at Alexandria in AD 117, a view which Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature,* p. 22, regards as plausible given the lack of direct references to Philo prior to Clement. Van den Hoek, "The 'Catechetical' School," pp. 81f., theorizes that there must have been a Christian library preserving Philo's works and those of other Jewish interpreters for the use of scriptural exegetes such as Clement and Origen and, further, that there must have been a scriptorium associated with such a library, since the textual history of Philo as well as the epistles of Paul originate in 2nd century Alexandria.

Clement, in fact, cites no other verses from the Old Testament more frequently than the accounts of man's creation in Gn 1f. and, similarly, cites no passages from Plato's dialogues more frequently than Plato's call to assimilation to God.[36]

The prominence of the image and likeness in Clement's thought is due to the fact that he has augmented Philo's metaphysical interpretation of the image and its nature with a moral interpretation that forms the framework for his understanding of the life of a true Christian gnostic. This moral interpretation rests upon Clement's distinction between image and likeness, whereby the former refers to the *nous* given to man at creation, while the latter constitutes a prophecy to be fulfilled in Christ, who is a visible archetype and whose likeness man acquires through baptism and progress in the spiritual life.[37] Clement's call for the gnostic to conform himself to the image of Christ and thus gain the likeness is regarded as his central contribution to later theology,[38] and this well-explored topic need not be repeated here.[39] More important for this study is the observation that Clement's understanding of the relationship between image and likeness appears to result from applying a Philonic filter, as it were, to an older Christian moral tradition, perhaps attributable to Irenaeus.[40] Although Irenaeus' teaching on the image and likeness exhibits some similarities to that of Clement, *e.g.* the distinction between the two terms,

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[36] Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria,* p. 233.

[37] *V., e.g., Paed.* 1.12.98.

[38] Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria,* p. 233.

[39] Mayer, *Das Gottesbild im Menschen,* remains the fullest treatment of the topic, but *v.* also Hamman, *L'image de Dieu,* pp. 113-26.

[40] Regarding Irenaean influence on Clement, *v.* Patterson, "The Divine Became Human," esp. pp. 505-08, where he discusses Clement's debt to Irenaeus on the topic of the image and likeness.

a focus on the Son as the archetype of the image,[41] the continual progression towards true likeness,[42] and the plural ποιήσωμεν of Gn 1.26 interpreted as evidence of the Trinity,[43] it is still at a considerable remove from the subsequent tradition, and the elements that constitute this divide are precisely those that Clement derives from Philo: the identification of the image as the *nous,* exclusive of the body, *contra* Irenaeus' corporeal image[44]; the conflation of Gn 1.27 and 2.7 as representing the moment at which the image/*nous* was inbreathed; a focus on the eternal *Logos,*[45] now identified as the Son, as the Father's true image according to which man was created; progress in the spiritual life being understood as the process of becoming rational (λογικός) through conformity to the image of the *Logos.* Thus, if Irenaeus' theology of the image appears lacking from a later, patristic vantage point, it is largely due to the absence of Philo's metaphysical interpretation of the image.

The Philonic paradigm that Clement inherits hinges on the exegetical choice to conflate Gn 1.27 and 2.7. While Irenaeus, by contrast, regards the two accounts of creation as a single

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[41] *V. haer.* 5.6.1, where the image is corporeal, but the likeness is a future reality based on conformity to the Son; Clement, *Str.* 2.22.131.5f., already sees the distinction between image and likeness in Plato and speaks of such a distinction as a common interpretation among Christian exegetes, who, in addition to fellow Alexandrians, could include Irenaeus.

[42] *haer.* 5.1.3: *Non enim effugit aliquando Adam manus Dei* [*i.e.* Son and Spirit, *cf. haer.* 5.6.1], *ad quas Pater loquens dicit: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.*

[43] *haer.* 4.22.1, 5.1.3

[44] *haer.* 5.6.1: *carni, quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei.*

[45] Rather than the *Logos* incarnate as Christ, as in Irenaeus, *v. haer.* 5.16.1: Ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν χρόνοις ἐλέγομεν κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐδείκνυτο δέ· ἔτι γὰρ ἀόρατος ἦν ὁ Λόγος, οὗ κατ' εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεγόνει· διὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ῥᾳδίως ἀπέβαλεν. Ὁπότε δὲ σὰρξ ἐγένετο ὁ Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὰ ἀμφότερα ἐπεκύρωσε· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ἔδειξεν ἀληθῶς, αὐτὸς τοῦτο γενόμενος ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν βεβαίως κατέστησε συνεξομοιώσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ ἀοράτῳ Πατρὶ διὰ τοῦ βλεπομένου Λόγου.

entity,[46] he lacks Philo's identification of the image as the *nous*[47] and therefore does not interpret the "breath of life" as the moment at which the image was bestowed upon man.[48] Clement, however, despite Philo's vacillation between a unified and a double creation, fixes upon the conflation of the two accounts. Both the scriptural conflation and the debt to Philo are particularly evident at *Str.* 5.14.94, where Clement praises Moses' expression that the body was formed (διαπλάττεσθαι), but the rational soul, inbreathed (ἐμπνευσθῆναι, §3) into the face. In a likely reference to Philo, Clement alludes to others that interpret this passage as the introduction of the soul, on the grounds that the *hegemonikon* is said to reside in the face, and as the means by which man was created in the image and likeness (διὸ καὶ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγονέναι, §4). As Clement, hinting at the role of the *hegemonikon,* further explains, "the image of God is his divine and kingly (βασιλικός) *Logos,* an impassible man (ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθής), but the image of the image (εἰκὼν δ᾽ εἰκόνος) is the human *nous"* (§5).

The motivation for such an exegetical choice, as well as for the conclusion that the true image of God is the *Logos* and that the "image of the image" is man's *nous,* is a prior commitment to identify God the Father as pure *nous*. Plato, says Clement, understood the fundamental congruence between the divine and human *nous* and, therefore, rightly says that

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[46] As evidenced by frequently citing verses from both accounts side by side; *v.* the comprehensive list of such citations in Steenberg, *Irenaeus on Creation,* app. iii., pp. 225f.

[47] At *haer.* 4.4.3, Irenaeus does say that man's rationality constitutes a certain likeness to God: *homo vero rationabilis, et secundum hoc similis Deo.* He does not, however, develop the idea further nor connect this to the image or likeness of Gn 1.26f.

[48] Given Irenaeus' corporeal understanding of the image, it is likely that he regards Gn 2.7 as the moment when the image was bestowed, not through the inbreathing of the spirit, but rather through the shaping of the mud, as at *haer.* 4.20.1: *"Et plasmavit Deus hominem, limum terrae accipiens, et insufflavit in faciem ejus flatum vitae." Non ergo angeli fecerunt nos neque plasmaverunt nos, neque enim angeli poterant imaginem facere Dei, neque alius quis praeter verum Deum, neque virtus longe absistens a Patre universorum.*

"one capable of contemplating the ideas (τὸν τῶν ἰδεῶν θεωρητικόν) will live like a god among men" because "*nous* is the place of the ideas, and God is *nous*" (*Str.* 4.25.155.2).[49] At times,

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[49] Νοῦς δὲ χώρα ἰδεῶν, νοῦς δὲ ὁ θεός. Despite Clement's frequent identification of the Father with *nous,* Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea,* p. 56, insists that this passage (unsatisfactorily translated as "mind is God") refers to the Son and that the following passage (4.25.156f.), which describes the Son as "admitting of demonstration and description," is but its expansion. Radde-Gallwitz appears to be following Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria,* p. 201, who claims that the equivalence of the *Logos* with the mind of God "is clearly implied" in this passage (which he does not translate, but must understand as does Radde-Gallwitz), as well as at *Str.* 5.11.73.3 (δυσάλωτος γὰρ ἡ χώρα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἣν χώραν ἰδεῶν ὁ Πλάτων κέκληκεν), especially when construed *via* Philo. As usual, however, Philo is ambivalent, even in the two passages that Lilla cites: at *Cher.* 49, it is very clearly God, and not his *Logos,* that is named ἀσωμάτων ἰδεῶν ἀσώματος χώρα, while at at *Opif.* 20, the location (τόπος, rather than χώρα) of the ideas is "the divine reason" (τὸν θεῖον λόγον). Clement himself never applies the expression "place of the ideas" to the *Logos.* In the passage at hand, the articulate use of θεός not only marks it as the subject of which νοῦς is the predicate in a nominal construction, but also indicates that Clement is speaking of the Father. Radde-Gallewitz fails to recognize that, in the subsequent passage, it is the same articulate ὁ θεός, which Clement has just equated with *nous,* that Clement *contrasts* with the Son: *ὁ μὲν οὖν θεός,* ἀναπόδεικτος ὤν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός, *ὁ δὲ υἱὸς* σοφία τέ ἐστι, καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἀλήθεια, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτῳ συγγενῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει καὶ διέξοδον (§156, emphasis mine). (Eventually Lilla, p. 222, contradicts himself and appeals to this passage to claim that "Clement regards the highest divinity as a νοῦς which comprehends the ideas in itself.") It therefore seems implausible that Clement has a "particular concern to distinguish the 'place of the ideas,'" which Radde-Gallwitz has mistakenly identified with the Son, "from the utterly ineffable God" (*ibid.*). At *Str.* 5.3.16.3 (ἡ δὲ ἰδέα ἐννόημα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅπερ οἱ βάρβαροι λόγον εἰρήκασιν τοῦ θεοῦ), Clement does subscribe to the common Middle Platonic notion that the ideas are God's thoughts, but Lilla, *ibid.,* p. 203, n. 2, misinterprets this second clause of this sentence as Clement's own theological statement about the *Logos*. Clement is in actuality saying that pagan philosophers (οἱ βάρβαροι) used the term λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ (*a logos,* not *the Logos*) as an equivalent to ἐννόημα τοῦ θεοῦ; he is not, as Lilla claims, speaking of the "λόγος of the Father" that is "identical to the νοῦς of [*Str.* 4.25.155.2]." Radde-Gallwitz, *ibid.,* accepts Lilla's error. Equally suspect is Radde-Gallwitz's conclusion (*ibid.*), on the basis of *Str.* 5.14.93.5, that Clement understands the ideas as the thoughts of the "second God," *i.e.* the Son, rather than of God the Father, because "such multiplicity is inconsistent with the first God's simplicity." There Clement sees agreement between pagan philosophy, which posits an intelligible cosmos that is the archetype of a sensible, created cosmos and is attributed to a "monad," and Moses' cosmogony, which begins, "in the beginning God (ὁ θεός) made the heavens and the earth, and the earth was invisible" (ἀόρατος, Gn 1.1); Clement mentions neither the Son nor a "second God." Although ὁ θεός appears here again with the article, Radde-Gallwitz concludes with the unsubstantiated claim that "the term 'monad' here, as elsewhere, appears to be a name for the Son" (*ibid.,* n. 63). Radde-Gallwitz's source for such a claim would again seem to be Lilla, p. 207, who cites 5.14.93.4 (καὶ τὸν μὲν [νοητὸν κόσμον] ἀνατίθησι μονάδι, ὡς ἂν νοητόν) as evidence that Clement regards the *Logos* and the intelligible world as one and the same and equivalent to "the monad." Lilla, however, again makes an error of attribution, as this sentence describes a tenet of pagan philosophy (ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία), rather than Clement's own theology. In none of the other ten instances in which Clement uses the term μονάς (in its various cases, *Prot.* 9.88.2; *Paed.* 1.8.71.1; *Str.* 5.11.71.2f. (2x), 6.11.84.7, 6.11.85.3f. (2x), 6.11.87.2, 6.16.141.1, 7.17.107.6) does he apply the term to the Son; most frequently it appears in numerological discussions. Convinced that the *Logos* is the philosophical "monad," Lilla, p. 216, interprets *Paed.* 1.8.71.1 (ἓν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα) to mean that the ultimately simple God is beyond "the monad," *i.e.* the *Logos.* This passage, however, states little more than the transcendence of God's unity (*Cf.* Origen's almost identical phrasing at *Cels.* 7.38). It certainly does not identify the *Logos* as "the monad," and, in the absence of the article, arguably speaks not of "*the* monad," but rather of "unity itself." In any case, Lilla's interpretation of this passage must be tempered by *Str.* 5.11.81.3-82.1, where Clement explicitly names the Father as "the one" (τὸ ἕν, cf. its parallel usage with μονάς in the previous passage) and lists "Father," *nous,* "God," and other similar titles as imprecise, but necessary names that must be used "in order that the mind (διάνοια) might lean upon them."

Clement will use the term *nous* as a substitute for "Father," as at *Prot.* 10.98.4,[50] where Clement refers to the divine *Logos* as the "genuine Son of the *Nous*." The "image of the *Logos,*" consequently, is "the true man,[51] the *nous* that is in man, which is accordingly said to have been created 'in the image and likeness' of God" (*ibid.*). According to Clement, the identification of the Father with *nous* is an idea that the ancient Greeks properly understood. Thus, the Pythagoreans rightly taught that "God is one,… father of all, *nous* and animating force of the whole universe" (ψύχωσις τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ; *Prot.* 6.72.4), and other philosophers, especially Anaxagoras, at least recognized the priority of *nous* and placed it over all things, although they did not understand it as the first cause of the universe (ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅλων) and, neglecting its creative role (αἰτίαν ποιητικήν), did not honor the first cause as God (*Str.* 2.4.14.2). So also, the identity of God as *nous* and his relationship to the *Logos* are encoded in the name of the patriarch Abraham, which, following Philo, Clement interprets as "chosen father of sound" (πατὴρ ἐκλεκτὸς ἠχοῦς)[52]: "for the sonorous Word resounds (ἠχεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὁ γεγωνὸς λόγος), but his

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[50] In its context, this discussion of the image and likeness also betrays a conflation of Gn 1.27 and 2.7, as Clement here taunts sculptors of Greek cult statues who are unable to produce an "inspired image" (ἔμπνουν εἰκόνα) and poses the rhetorical question, "Which of them breathed a soul into [their creations]?" (10.98.2).

[51] *N.b.* Clement probably derives the theme of the *nous*/image as the "true man" from Philo, *e.g. Her.* 231; *Plant.* 42. On the theme's earlier Platonic heritage, *v.* above ch. 1, n. 65.

[52] Eschewing the Biblical passage, which interprets the -*ha*- inserted into Abram's name as coming from *h^{a}mōn,* "host" or "multitude" (construct state), Philo would derive it from *hem^{e}yah,* "sound" (particularly of musical instruments). This interpretation may have been aided by the usage of Is 14.11, where *hem^{e}yah* may mean "multitude" (*v.* Cline, *Dictionary,* vol. 2, *s.v.*; *cf.* the rendering of the LXX, ἡ πολλὴ εὐφροσύνη). Speiser, *Genesis,* p. 124, n. 5, regards the inserted -*ha*-as a "secondary extension in a manner common in Aramaic" that does not alter the meaning of *Abram,* "the father is exalted."

Father is the *nous,* and it is the *nous* of the virtuous man that is chosen" (*Str.* 5.1.8.7).[53] In the very name of the patriarch, then, Clement sees implied the divine *nous*, its image (the *Logos*), and the image of that image (the *nous* of the true gnostic). For Clement, moreover, the relationship between these three entities forms the basis of soteriology, and the fountainhead of this relationship is the Father and *nous.* Thus, at *Str.* 4.25.162.5, Clement attributes the pedagogic role of the *Logos* to the Father's identity as *nous*: "inasmuch as [God] is *nous,* he is [the first principle] of the rational and critical spheres (ἀρχὴ … τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ κριτικοῦ τόπου), and, consequently, the *Logos,* Son of the *nous*-Father, is alone teacher and the instructor of man" (διδάσκαλος … ὁ παιδεύων τὸν ἄνθρωπον).

Just as in the conflation of Gn 1.27 and 2.7, in the case of the role of the Logos as the true image of God, Clement has adopted what was one of two ways that Philo described the image. Although Philo sometimes spoke of man as created directly in the image of God, Clement prefers Philo's other interpretation, which is more attentive to the phrasing of Gn 1.27 and, more importantly, allows for identification of the *Logos* with Christ, whereby man is created in accordance the *Logos,* who is the true image of God. Clement, therefore, underscores the

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[53] While this quotation of Philo, *Cher.* 2.7, is often translated such that λόγος refers to only human speech that is born of the human mind, and perhaps properly so in that context, Clement intends it as an explanation of the name bestowed on the patriarch *after* he comprehended the true nature of God. Whereas Philo associates the change of Abram's name with his newly established friendship with God, Clement is more specific: Abram had looked to the heavens and, according to some interpreters, "had seen the Son in the Spirit," or perhaps an angel, and the addition of the alpha to his name represents "the knowledge (γνῶσιν) of the one and only God." If Clement offers this name as a somewhat tortured explanation of the patriarch's knowledge of God and his Son (*n.b.* the explanatory γάρ), then it is clear that he understands the quotation from Philo as referring to the divine, and not only the human, *nous*. Such a conclusion may be further supported by the (unintentional?) pun in the term γεγωνός (Turnebus' correction from the *editio princeps* of Philo's works, Paris, 1552), which the mss. of both Philo and Clement have as γεγονώς ("the *Logos* that has been born"); it may be that Clement's copy of Philo already had this felicitous error, which may have contributed to his interpretation. On the discrepancy between Philo's statement and Clement's quotation thereof, *n.b.* that Cohn, *Philonis Alexandrini Opera,* vol. 1, p. lx, was convinced that the text of *Cher.* should be corrected based on Clement's testimony, but that he was unable to make the change before his edition was published.

uniqueness of the Son as the image of God by recasting Gn 1.27: "it is clear that only the one that is true, good, just, and in the image and likeness of the Father (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πατρός), his Son, Jesus, the *Logos* of God, is our Instructor" (*Paed.* 1.11.97.2). Clement's exegesis is no doubt influenced by the language of Heb 1.3, where the Son is named the "express image of [God's] nature" (χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ), and especially by that of Col 1.14, which calls the Son "the image of the invisible God" (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου). Clement alludes to this latter verse at *Str.* 5.6.38.7, where he describes the Son as "the first principle of the universe, which was first imaged forth from 'the invisible God' (ἥτις ἀπεικόνισται … ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου) before the ages and has fashioned (τετύπωκεν) all that has come into being after him." This distinction between Father and Son is, Clement will argue elsewhere, the focus of theological reflection for the true gnostic: "the work of theology [τὸ … περὶ τὰ θεῖα ἔργον] must consider what is the first cause [τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον] and what is that 'through which all things came into being and without which nothing came into being'" (*Str.* 7.3.17.2).

As the son of the authentic *Nous,* the *Logos* is itself "completely *nous,* completely light from the Father" (ὅλος νοῦς, ὅλος φῶς πατρῷον, *Str.* 7.2.5.5).[54] For Clement it is only as *nous* that the *Logos* can serve as intermediary between the divine and human *nous*: "For the *Logos* of God is intellectual (νοερός), such that the image (εἰκονισμός) of the *Nous* is visible in man alone. Thus, the virtuous man in his soul has the form and likeness of God (καὶ θεοειδὴς καὶ θεοείκελος ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ κατὰ ψυχήν), and likewise God has the form of man (ἀνθρωποειδής), for the form (εἶδος) of each is the *nous,* which is our distinguishing mark" (ᾧ χαρακτηριζόμεθα, *Str.* 6.9.72.2).

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[54] Clement extends the logic to its furthest extent at *Str.* 5.4.25.5, where he names the Spirit as the *nous* of Christ. *Cf.* 1Cor 2.14-16.

Moreover, as a noetic being, the *Logos* is invisible to the physical eyes and only visible to the *nous.* As Clement syllogizes at *Str.* 5.3.16.1, concepts such as justice, beauty and truth are intellectual categories that are perceived only by the *nous,* "but the *Logos* says, 'I am Truth'; therefore, the *Logos* is reached through contemplation by the *nous*" (νῷ … θεωρητός). Only in the Incarnation does the *Logos* become visible, "when the *Logos* becomes flesh, so that he may also be seen" (§5).

In a corollary of his designation of the *Logos* as the prototype of the divine image in man, Clement has transferred the title of *hegemon* from God to the *Logos.* In the new Christian context, the *Logos,* which, for Philo, was but God in his activity towards the world, has now been identified with the Son, to whom God the Father has entrusted the creation and governance of all things. As pure *nous* and the true image of the Father, the *Logos* necessarily exercises the hegemony that constitutes the iconic basis of the human *hegemonikon.* Thus, Clement refers to the Son as "that which rules and guides" all things (τὸ … ἄρχον τε καὶ ἡγεμονοῦν, *Str.* 7.2.8.3) and affirms that Christians are enjoined to honor the *Logos* and, through him, the Father, "since they have been convinced that he is both savior and *hegemon*" (σωτῆρά τε καὶ ἡγεμόνα εἶναι πεισθέντες, *Str.* 7.7.35.1).[55] At *Str.* 7.2.5, Clement underscores that the *Logos* acts as *hegemon* only inasmuch as he expresses the image of the Father, who is ultimately the true *hegemon*: "most authoritative and kingly … is the Son's nature, which is most intimately connected to the sole ruler of all" (ἡγεμονικωτάτη καὶ βασιλικωτάτη … ἡ υἱοῦ φύσις ἡ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι προσεχεστάτη, §3). The connection between the hegemonic and iconic roles is further evident

[55] For other instances where Clement refers to the *Logos* as *hegemon, v. Paed.* 1.1.1.1, 1.7.55.2, 1.7.58.1, 1.8.65.3; *Str.* 2.2.5.3.

later in the same passage, when Clement writes that the heavenly powers have been subjected to the Father's *Logos,* who is "completely *nous,* completely the light of the Father," and that the *Logos* has accepted control of the holy economy "for the sake of the one who subjected it" (τὸν ὑποτάξαντα, §§5f.).[56] The nature of the relationship is perhaps clearest at *Str.* 5.14.102f., where Clement finds traces of the Father and Son in Plato, *ep.* 6, 323d, in the phrase, "swearing by … the God who is cause of all things (τὸν πάντων θεὸν αἴτιον)[57] and swearing by the lord and father of him that is source and ruler" (τοῦ ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον). This transferance of the role of *hegemon* from the Father to the *Logos* finds its parallel in the description of the *Logos* as the creator; in the same passage, Clement notes that Plato, *Ti.* 41a, calls the creator (δημιουργός) "father" and, consequently, finds a description of the Trinity at Plato, *ep.* 2, 312e,[58] whereby the second "cause" mentioned refers to the Son "'through whom all things came into being' according to the will of the Father" (§103.1). Just as the Son is *hegemon* of the universe only because the Father has subjected all things to him, so also he is creator of all insofar as the Father has willed to create all things by him.

Clement makes explicit the analogy between the divine *hegemon* and the human *hegemonikon* when he describes the composition of the human soul at *Str.* 2.11.50f. Here Clement has augmented the standard Stoic doctrine of an eightfold soul, which he probably

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[56] *Cf. Str.* 1.24.159.6.

[57] *N.b.* that the text of Plato's letter here actually reads τὸν τῶν πάντων θεὸν ἡγεμόνα τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων, which might have proved even more amenable to Clement's interpretation. Later, Origen, *Cels.* 6.8, will cite the same passages to accuse Celsus of willingly overlooking evidence of the Trinity in Plato.

[58] The passage quoted by Clement: περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστί, κἀκείνου ἕνεκεν τὰ πάντα, κἀκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων <τῶν> καλῶν, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα.

adopts from Philo,[59] with two more elements to form a decad more consonant with his exegesis of Ex 16.36: "the *omer* was the tenth of the three measures." Repeating Philo's interpretation of the verse from *Cong.* 100, Clement interprets the "three measures" as indicative of three broad faculties, or "measures," of the human soul: sensory perception (αἴσθησις), verbal perception (*logos*) and noetic perception (*nous*).[60] Whereas Philo interprets the "tenth" of Ex 16.36 as a call for man to offer the first fruits of each of these measures, for Clement it as an intimation that these three present in summary the ten constituent parts of the human composition: the body, the soul, the five senses, the faculty of speech (τὸ φωνητικόν), the reproductive faculty (τὸ σπερματικόν), and a tenth element that Clement calls either the intellectual (τὸ διανοητικόν), or the spiritual, faculty, but which he ultimately equates with the *nous.* This last element is the "tithe" that must be consecrated to God. Clement regards the position and role of the *nous* relative to the other elements of the human composition as analogous to that of God to the various levels of the cosmos:

> We must, so to speak, surpass all others and stop at the *nous,* just as, for example, we must also surpass the nine divisions in the cosmos, first the level consisting of the four elements gathered in one place for balanced change, and then the seven wandering divisions and the ninth that does not wander, and arrive at the perfect number that is above the nine, the tenth division. Put succinctly, we must desire the creator after the creation (μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τὸν ποιητήν) and arrive at the knowledge of God (2.11.51.1).

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[59] On the Stoic eight-fold soul, *v. SVF,* vol. 2, 827f., 830-33, the last of which testifies to Philo's predilection for this scheme.

[60] Clement passes over the opportunity to connect this triad to the trinity, possibly because he is following the text of Philo so closely. It is not unlikely, however, that he implies as much, given his frequent substitution of the terms *nous* and *logos* for Father and Son and the easy association of the Spirit with sensory perception, which, most philosophers and physicians of the second century would have agreed, was effected and transmitted to the *nous* by means of *pneuma.*

Clement has again borrowed from Philo, *Cong.* 103-06, the image of God presiding over the levels of the universe, but there the extent of the metaphor is that the tenth portion of an ephah of wheat led the Israelite priests to realize that they should look beyond the physical reality of the nine-tiered cosmos to the invisible God. Clement has expanded Philo's exegesis with the analogy to the human *nous,* drawn from other Philonic passages, such as *Opif.* 69.

Clement provides his most detailed exposition of the *hegemonikon* at *Str.* 6.16.134-36 in an allegorical interpretation of the Decalogue. Following Philo's allegorization of the two tablets of the Law as the rational and irrational soul (*Her.* 167), Clement interprets them as man's two-fold spirit, namely the *hegemonikon* and the subordinate part of the soul (τὸ ὑποκείμενον, 134.1). Clement additionally offers two possible ways of describing man's constitution as a decad. The first description closely resembles that given at *Str.* 2.11.50.f., except that now the decad describes only the soul and its faculties: the body has been removed; the eighth element, after the senses, the vocal and the reproductive faculties, is "the spiritual faculty given at the formation [of man]" (τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλάσιν πνευματικόν); the *hegemonikon* of the soul constitutes the ninth element; and the tenth element is "the distinctive characteristic of the Holy Spirit, which is added through faith" (§2).[61] In the second description, man's physical constitution (ἡ πλάσις, §3) is analyzed as five senses and the organs subservient to them, *i.e.* the hands and feet, counted as four. To these is added the soul and, as a further addition, the *hegemonikon.* The *hegemonikon,*

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[61] The addition of the Holy Spirit as an element of man's constitution is particularly reminiscent of Irenaeus' concept of man perfected through the addition of the Spirit. *V. haer.* 5.6.1: *perfectus autem homo commixtio et adunitio est animae assumentis Spiritum Patris et admixtae ei carni quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei.... Cum autem Spiritus hic commixtus animae unitur plasmati, propter effusionem Spiritus spiritalis et perfectus homo factus est: et hic est qui secundum imaginem et similitudinem factus est Dei.*

which is the faculty of rational discourse (ᾧ διαλογιζώμεθα) and is "not born at the deposit of the seed," is not counted as part of the ten, which execute human actions (135.1), but rather is the element that accounts for their coherence in the composition of man: "we therefore say that the reasoning faculty (τὸ λογιστικόν), the *hegemonikon,* is responsible for the constitution of the living creature, as well as for animation of the irrational soul and the fact that it is a portion of [man's constitution]" (αἴτιον … τῆς συστάσεως τῷ ζῴῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος ἐψυχῶσθαί τε καὶ μόριον αὐτῆς εἶναι, §2). While the fleshly spirit, says Clement, accounts for the basic vital force, including nourishment, growth and movement (§3), the *hegemonikon* is distinguished by the power of deliberate choice (τὴν προαιρετικὴν … δύναμιν), including inquiry, learning, and knowledge, and the parts of man's constitution are ordered and subordinated in military fashion, as it were, to the *hegemonikon* (ἡ πάντων ἀναφορὰ εἰς ἓν συντέτακται, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), which gives man both life and the quality of his life (δι' ἐκεῖνο ζῇ τε ὁ ἄνθρωπος καί πως ζῇ, §4). As so often for Clement, the rule of the *hegemonikon* is not a simple given, but is understood in the moral terms of the life of the gnostic. Thus, Clement attributes the basic functions of life, as well as wrath, pleasure and desire (ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἥδεται, ὀργίζεται), to the bodily spirit, and even allows that it proceeds on to conceptual and intellectual actions (τὰς πράξεις … τὰς κατ' ἔννοιάν τε καὶ διάνοιαν), but qualifies that only when it masters the desires does the *hegemonikon* rule (ἐπειδὰν κρατῇ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, βασιλεύει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, 136.1); hence Clement restates the injunction, "You shall not desire" (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις), of the ninth and tenth commandments as, "You shall not be enslaved to the fleshly spirit, but shall rule over it" (§2). Clement further explains the rule of the *hegemonikon* as man living according to

nature (τὴν κατὰ φύσιν … διεξαγωγήν), and it is in this regard that man is said to be created in the image of God: "inasmuch as God creates all things by the *Logos,* the man who has become gnostic performs good deeds by his reasoning faculty" (τῷ λογικῷ, §2f.).[62]

Even in a moral interpretation of the image, then, the point of likeness remains the *Logos,* and the distinguishing characteristic of the *hegemonikon* is its rule over the lower portions of the soul, even if this is not explicitly linked to the role of the *Logos* as the universal *hegemon*. The Lord himself, according to *Str.* 2.19.102.6, stamps into the *nous* and *logismos*[63] the likeness, which consists of beneficence and ruling (τὸ εὐεργετεῖν … τὸ ἄρχειν). Indeed, in Clement's moral interpretation of the image and likeness, the acquisition of the likeness is often tantamount to the *hegemonikon* assuming its proper role. Thus, "the one who is 'in the image and likeness,' the gnostic, is he who imitates God as much as possible," which includes, among other things, "ruling over the passions" (βασιλεύων τῶν παθῶν, *Str.* 2.19.97.1). Similarly, at *Str.* 3.10.68.5, Clement allegorizes the "two or three" that "gather in my name" (Mt 18.20) as the Platonic tripartite soul and later equates the proper ordering of the soul to the gnostic life and the acquisition of the image:

> When he has also surpassed these, namely wrath (θυμοῦ) and desire (ἐπιθυμίας), and truly loves the creation (κτίσιν) for the sake of the God and creator (ποιητήν) of all, he will live in the manner of a gnostic (γνωστικῶς), as he will have acquired an effortless habit of self-control in his likeness to the Savior (ἕξιν ἐγρατείας ἄπονον περιπεποιημένος κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν σωτῆρα ἐξομοίωσιν, 3.10.69.3).

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[62] *Cf. Prot.* 10.98, the most concise expression of the frequent theme whereby the gnostic, by being conformed to the likeness of the *Logos,* becomes himself rational (λογικός).

[63] Regarded as a single entity, as indicated by Clement's use of the singular relative pronoun, ᾧ.

In other words, when the *hegemonikon/logismos* rules properly over the lower parts of the soul, then the gnostic can be said to be, not only in the image, but also the likeness. Or, as Clement writes in another context, "The study of [true, Christian philosophy], practiced with an upright life, leads upwards through Wisdom, the artificer of all things, to the *hegemon* of the universe" (*Str.* 2.2.5.3). Conversely, the prophet Isaiah's phrase "those in darkness," says Clement, refers to those who have their *hegemonikon* buried in idolatry (*Str.* 6.6.44.4). Clement finds scriptural warrant for the connection between the image and likeness and the proper ordering of the soul in Gn 1.27f.[64]: after explaining how the gnostic has, through adoption, acquired the likeness of God, *i.e.* the mind (διάνοιαν) of the teacher (*Str.* 6.14.114.6-15.115.1), Clement writes that "it is truly necessary that the royal, Christian man, be fit for rule and authoritative (ἀρχικὸν … καὶ ἡγεμονικόν), since we have been enjoined to rule over (κατακυριεύειν) not only the beasts without, but also the wild passions within us" (§2).[65]

Despite Clement's predilection for the Stoic description of man's composition, he nonetheless adopts Philo's encephalocentric understanding of the location of the *hegemonikon,* though, like Philo, he is somewhat inconsistent on this point. Clement is perhaps at his most inconsistent at *Prot.* 10.98, where his description of man as "an inspired image" prompts his rhetorical question, "Who inbreathed the soul?" The subsequent discussion of the image as the

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[64] καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν,… καὶ εὐλόγησεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Θεός, λέγων· αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε καὶ πληρώσατε τὴν γῆν καὶ κατακυριεύσατε αὐτῆς καὶ ἄρχετε τῶν ἰχθύων τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν κτηνῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἑρπετῶν τῶν ἑρπόντων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.

[65] Clement here presages the traditional Antiochene exegesis of Gn 1.26-28, whereby the command for man to rule over the fish and beasts provides the impetus to interpret the image of God is understood as man's mastery over creation; *v.* McLeod, *The Image of God,* pp. 58-85. Basil, *Struct. hom.* 1.6, 8-10, will reconcile this interpretation with the traditional Alexandrian reading by arguing that man exercises his hegemony over the animals by means of his reason. Gregory, *Hom. opif.* 7, largely follows Basil's explanation. *V.* below, ch. 3, n. 64.

nous would seem to imply a conflation of Gn 1.27 and 2.7 and, hence, the encephalocentric position that Clement espouses elsewhere. But in his subsequent comparison of the divine creator with the famed sculptors of Greece, Clement also asks, "Who has inflated the veins (φλέβας ἐφύσησεν)? Who has poured blood into them (αἷμα ἐνέχεεν ἐν αὐταῖς, §2)?" These questions not only betray the Herophilean notion that the veins circulate blood and *pneuma* together, but, perhaps, should also be closely construed with the original question, "Who inbreathed the soul?" Such questions, then, would be indicative of the cardiocentrism expressed in §4, where Clement states that man is "likened to the divine *Logos* by the understanding in his heart (τῇ κατὰ καρδίαν φρονήσει) and, by this, [rendered] rational (ταύτῃ λογικός)." This passage is especially problematic in light of Clement's clear encephalocentric position elsewhere. Perhaps the inconsistency is only apparent, if Clement is referring metaphorically to the heart in accordance with scriptural language; this may be reflected by the use of κατά rather than ἐν, which would better express anatomical location. Alternatively, this passage may represent an early dalliance with cardiocentrism in *Prot.,* before Clement had developed the encephalocentric position expressed in *Paed.* and *Str.,* perhaps even before he had fully incorporated the Philonic model into his own theology. If anything, Clement is more consistent in this regard than Philo, who had several times professed agnosticism concerning the location of the *hegemonikon*; only once does Clement appear to express similar ambivalence, at *Str.* 8.4.14.4, where he offers the anatomical location of the *hegemonikon* as paradigmatic of the type of philosophical question in which one knows the affects and properties, but not the essence (τὴν οὐσίαν), of an entity. Here, however, Clement is not indicating any personal ambivalence, but is rather describing the nature

of the philosophical problem of demonstration and, in fact, may be taking the example from a lost work of Galen.[66] In any case, the idea of a *hegemonikon* whose essence is unknowable is consonant with Galen's epistemology as described in the previous section. At *Str.* 2.19.98.1, there may be some hint of a cardiocentric position, when Clement states that the gnostic is called to repent through his mouth, heart and hands, and interprets the heart as a symbol of volition (βουλή), but Clement is here virtually quoting Philo, *Virt.* 183,[67] and provides no elaboration that would indicate that this is anything more than an allegory of repentance.

More characteristic is *Paed.* 1.2.5.1, where Clement allegorizes Moses' command to shave the head (Nm 6.9) as an exhortation to remove ignorance from the *logismos,* which "is enthroned in the brain" (ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ).[68] In a similar vein, Clement notes in passing at *Paed.* 2.8.72.2 that "those who are educated by the *Logos* abstain from Greek garlands, not because they think that they restrict that *logos* that is seated in the brain (καταδεῖν … τὸν λόγον ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ τοῦτον ἱδρυμένον),… but because they have been dedicated to idols." The Lord, also, wore the diadem upon his head as a symbol of how he bore the sins (τὰ πονηρά) of mankind "by means of his head, the *hegemonikon* of his body" (74.3). It is, moreover, the mark of the gnostic

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[66] Solmsen, "Early Christian Interest," p. 105, Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus,* p. 30, and Mansfield, "Doxography and Dialectic," p. 3184f., note the similarities between *Str.* 8 and Galen's ideas on demonstration, but attribute them to traditional examples in the Middle Platonic school. More recently Havrda, "Galenus Christianus?" has argued that a lost work of Galen on demonstration was the main source for *Str.* 8, including the present example (*v.* pp. 360f.).

[67] Oddly, Clement neglects to provide the scriptural verse (Dt 30.14) that had introduced the mouth, hands and heart into Philo's interpretation.

[68] While this allegory sounds perfectly Philonic, Philo only comments on this verse at *Agr.* 175, where the import is different. This passage is, therefore, particularly noteworthy as an instance in which Clement has either internalized Philo's exegetical style or preserved the exegesis of another interpreter or, possibly, that of Philo from a work that does not survive. *N.b.* also the persistent royal imagery.

to "be ordered in the ruling part (κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν … ταγείς) of his own body, namely the head" (*Str.* 6.18.164.3). Even in a moral interpretation, when Clement allows for the metaphorical movement of the rational part, the anatomical association with the brain remains. At *Paed.* 2.2.34, Clement describes how the *logistikon,* when enslaved to desire and wrath (ἐπιθυμίᾳ τε καὶ θυμῷ), especially under the influence of alcohol, may be found in the bowels, rather than in its proper location of the head (τὸ λογιστικὸν ἵδρυται οὐκ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐντοσθιδίοις, §1); Clement's explanation for this, however, proves that he still locates the *logistikon* in the brain: "the brain, dizzied by drunkenness, falls from above, with a great fall upon the liver and the heart, that is, into wrath and love for pleasure" (§2). This is merely another way for Clement to say that the Platonic tripartite soul has become disordered such that the *hegemonikon* no longer performs its proper role.

Clement also contributes one association of the encephalic *hegemonikon* that could never have occurred to Philo, namely with Christ as the head of the Church. This is a natural association for any Christian exegete, given the frequency with which the term κεφαλή is applied to Christ in the letters of Paul.[69] At *Str.* 4.8.63, after citing two passages of Euripides that describe a wife's inferiority to her husband, Clement concludes, "the *hegemonikon,* therefore, is the head. If 'the Lord is head of the man, and the man is the head of the woman,' then the man is the lord of his wife, since he is 'the image and glory of God'" (§5). Thereafter Clement provides an extended quotation of Eph 5.21-25, 28f., wherein the role of the man as head of his wife is explicitly linked to that of Christ as head of the Church and savior of the body. Clement offers

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[69] *E.g.* 1Cor 11.3; Eph 1.22, 4.15, 5.23; Col 2.10.

no further explanation of how the *hegemonikon* relates to these passages, but, as he quotes 1Cor 11.3 in §5, he may have in mind the part of the verse that he omits: "and the head of Christ is God." The hierarchy in which God the Father is the head of Christ, who, in turn, is the head of man, who, in turn, is the head of woman, neatly parallels the relationship of God the Father, as *Nous* and true *hegemon,* to his Son, who, as the *Logos,* is also pure *nous,* functions as *hegemon* of the created universe, and is the model for the *nous* and image in man, which, in turn, functions as *hegemonikon* over the human body.

The association between the *hegemonikon* and Christ's headship of the Church appears to be operative at *Str.* 5.6.36-38 in Clement's elaborate allegorical interpretations of the Tabernacle and the Priest's vestments. Hinting at an encephalocentric position, Clement explains the face of the Cherubim in the Tabernacle as a symbol of the rational soul (λογικῆς ψυχῆς, 36.4). Describing in the subsequent paragraph the depiction of the celestial bodies on the breast of the high priest's robe, Clement mentions in passing that the breast is the dwelling (οἰκητήριον) of the heart and soul (37.2); given how consistently Clement maintains the encephalocentric position and the specification of the rational soul in the preceding paragraph, he must be speaking of the irrational soul over which the *hegemonikon* rules. Finally, in the next paragraph Clement allegorizes the priest's golden mitre (πίλος) as a symbol of the Lord's royal authority (τὴν ἐξουσίαν … βασιλικήν) and a sign of most authoritative rule (ἡγεμονικοτάτης ἀρχῆς), "since the Savior is 'the head of the Church'" and "the head of Christ is the Father" (37.5-38.1). Clement finds confirmation of his exegesis in the priest's breastplate, one element of which, the "oracle" (λόγιον), hints at the *Logos* and, in fact, depicts the heavens which were created by the

Logos and are "subject to Christ, the head of all" (38.2). Although Clement does not state the conclusion explicitly, the preceding discussion of the face as a symbol of the rational soul and the heart as the location of the (presumably irrational) soul would seem to parallel the association of the rational soul with Christ, the head of the Church.

ORIGEN

If Pantaenus, or at least his school, perhaps even in the person of Clement himself, was responsible for the preservation of Philo's writings, it was Origen, Clement's pupil and successor, [70] who brought those writings to Caesarea in Palestine[71] and, as the teacher of Gregory Thaumaturgus, Basil's and Gregory's spiritual ancestor, ensured that Philonic anthropology would make its way into the wilds of Cappadocia. Despite many points of continuity, however, between Clement's and Origen's theology, the difference between their respective interpretations of Gn 1.26f. and understandings of the image and the *hegemonikon* is striking. This difference is not the result of one following, and another rejecting, a Philonic model, but rather is due to Origen's use of different themes and emphases within Philo's corpus. Origen is, on the one hand, closer to Philo than Clement in the sense that his main endeavor is allegorical scriptural exegesis, in many ways directly indebted to that of Philo, and yet, on the basis of his scriptural study, Origen develops a spiritualized cardiocentrism in contrast to the encephalocentrism that Clement adopts nearly nearly whole-cloth from Philo. Despite his close reading of scripture,

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[70] Eus., *H.E.* 6.6.1

[71] Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature,* pp. 17-23, details the evidence for the early textual transmission of Philo's works and for Origen's role in bringing the manuscripts to the library at Caesarea.

however, Origen's interpretation of Gn 1.26f, the image and the *hegemonikon* is constrained by his peculiar cosmology and anthropology.

Origen shares with Clement the Philonic presupposition that "the image of God" refers to the *Logos* and that man is merely created "according to the image," by which man is rendered rational, *logikos.*[72] The reflection of the image in man, consequently, is also for Origen the *nous,* the upper part of the soul, inasmuch as Origen conceives of God as pure intellect (*intellectualis natura simplex, Princ.* 1.1.6). Origen, furthermore, will at times follow Clement's distinction between the indelible image and a progressively acquired likeness.[73] More often, however, Origen appeals to another strain of Philo's exegesis of Gn, namely the distinction between the created man of Gn 1.26f., indicated by the use of the verb ποιῶ, and the molded man of Gn 2.7, indicated by the use of the verb πλάσσω.[74] For Origen, this distinction is particularly useful as a defense against a corporeal understanding of the image, as described at *Hom. 1 in Gen.,* §13, where the created man (*factus*) is incorporeal and alone contains the image, while the man molded (*plasmatus*) from the earth is corporeal. Origen, again following the Philonic paradigm, equates the created man with the inner man (*Is autem, qui ad imaginem Dei factus est, interior homo noster est, ibid.*).

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[72] *V., e.g., Cels.* 6.63, *Hom. 1 in Gen.,* §13.

[73] *E.g.*, *Princ.* 3.6.1; *Cels.* 4.30.

[74] *Cf.* Philo, *Opif.* 134.

While Origen's exegesis of these two passages may be influenced by his belief in the pre-existence of souls prior to a bodily incarnation,[75] the desire to reconcile the account of creation in Gn with Pauline theology is his prime motivation. Origen goes so far as to claim that Paul himself understood the distinction:

> The Apostle Paul, well understanding this and certainly versed in these things, wrote quite openly and clearly that in each individual man there are in fact two men; for he says the following: 'for if our external man is subject to decay, our inner man is being renewed day by day' (2Cor 4.16), and again, 'for I rejoice in the law according to my inner man' (Rom 7.22), and he writes several passages similar to these. Accordingly, I think that no one should doubt any longer that, in the beginning of Genesis, Moses wrote, respectively, of the creation or fashioning (*factura vel figmenta*) of two men, when he sees that Paul, who certainly understood the writings of Moses better than we, says that there are in each individual man two men (*Cant.* prol.).

Similarly, Origen argues at *Dial.* 15 that Paul betrays knowledge of the dual creation and an immaterial image that is "greater than every bodily substance" (κρεῖττον πάσης σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως) when he speaks of "putting off the old man" and "putting on the new, who is being renewed in knowledge after the image of his creator (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, Col 3.9). Origen sees the dual creation reflected not only in Paul's distinction of the inner and outer man, the new and old man, but also, most pointedly and frequently, in that of the heavenly and the earthly man (1Cor 15.47-49).[76] This strain of exegesis is indicative of the difference between Clement's and Origen's approach to the Philonic tradition. Whereas Clement was content to

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[75] Origen, in fact, only vaguely correlates the pre-existent soul with the two creation accounts. The pre-existent soul is that which is created "in the image," and the Fall must fall somewhere between the two creations, though Origen does not explain this. Indeed, since Origen regards the physical body as consequence of the Fall, the creation of the sexes at Gn 1.27 proves a quandary that he can only resolve by allegorizing "male and female" as Christ and the Church. *V. comm. in Mt.* 17.33; Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image,* p. 149, 153. *Cf.* also *Hom. 1 in Gn.,* §15, where Origen allegorizes "male and female" as the spirit and the soul, whose offspring are good works and thoughts.

[76] *E.g. Hom. 13 in Gen.,* §4; *sel. in Gen.* (PG 12.96); *Hom. in Jer.* 2.1; *Hom. in Luc.* 39, p. 219, ll. 25-28, *et passim.*

adopt *in toto* most of Philo's exegesis and very often quotes him verbatim, Origen, first and foremost a scriptural exegete, subjects the variant strains of Philo's interpretation of Gn 1f. to the New Testament and even to traditional Christian interpretations and attempts to reconcile the two.

Working within the constraints of this Pauline framework, Origen tends towards a moral understanding of the image. Whereas Clement consistently distinguishes between an ontological given, *i.e.* the image, and a moral imperative, *i.e.* the likeness to be acquired, Origen does so infrequently.[77] Origen is far more likely to describe man as vacillating between opposing images. Thus, while man was created in the image of God, he later received an additional image, that of the earthly man, through his disobedience.[78] More strikingly, Origen equates these opposing images to those of the Father and the Devil, respectively, in his interpretation of Jn 8.44 ("You are from your father, the Devil, and you want to do the desires of your father"):

> [we know] that everyone who wants to do the desires of the Devil in no way comes from God as a father, but has become a child of the Devil, and, by his willingness to do the desires of the knave, has come to be formed in the image of the wicked father (κατ' εἰκόνα γινόμενον τοῦ πονηροῦ πατρός), from whom the images of that man of the earth derive and are impressed. For he was the first earthly man and, as the first to fall from better things and to desire things other than that life that is better than life, he was made worthy to be "the first" (ἀρχή), not of any mode of creation (οὔτε κτίσματος, οὔτε ποίηματος), but "of the Lord's fashioning (πλάσματος), made to be mocked by His angels" (Job 40.19 (LXX)). Even our own previous existence (ὑπόστασις) is in that which is in the image of the creator (ἐν τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος), but our existence from the time of our guilt (ἡ δὲ ἐξ αἰτίας) is in the figure (πλάσμα) taken from the dust of the earth (*Comm. in Jo.* 20.22.181f.).

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[77] *V.* above, [n. 66].

[78] *Hom. in Luc.* 39, p. 219, l. 26; *cf. Hom. in Jer.* 2.1.

Origen, therefore, regards the Christian life as a process of abandoning the earthly image of the Devil and conforming oneself to the heavenly image of God and exhorts his readers to turn from one to the other: "If … we all incline towards Him in whose image we were created, we will also be in the likeness of God" (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ, §183). The moral dimension of life is presented in turn as obedience to one's father in Origen's dictum that "every created nature wants to do the desires of its own father, just as each one also does the works of its own father" (§184).

Origen's equation of image with fatherhood is representative of a general principle of his theology and extends beyond the realm of moral theology to his understanding of the relationship between God the Father and his Son, the *Logos*. Indeed, the iconic relationship lies at the foundation of Origen's trinitarian theology. As Origen explains at *Princ.* 1.2.6, εἰκών is the proper term to express the relationship between Father and Son. In order to explain the meaning of Paul's description of the Son as "the image of the invisible God" (Col 1.15), Origen adduces two examples of an iconic relationship from Gn: that between the *Logos* and his image, man, and that between Adam and Seth, who was born "in the likeness and image" of Adam (κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ, Gn 5.3 (LXX)).[79] For Origen, the image consists in both cases of "the unity of nature and substance between father and son" (*naturae ac substantiae patris et filii … unitatem, ibid.*). Origen argues elsewhere that the iconic relationship between Father and Son is implied in the term ἀρχή[80] as used at Jn 1.1:

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[79] In the MT, the verse employs the same terms (*d^{e}muth* and *ṣ^{e}lem*) as Gn 1.26, albeit in reverse order.

[80] In the following passages, the Greek term ἀρχή is left untranslated, as any attempt at translation would render the passages incomprehensible, tedious, or both.

> The Father is the *archē* of the Son, and the creator is the *archē* of his creations, and, simply put, God (ὁ θεός) is the *archē* of all that exists. This will be supported by the verse, 'In the *archē* was the *Logos*.' By the term *'Logos'* the passage intends the Son, who is said to be 'in the *archē,'* which is equivalent to being 'in the Father'" (*Comm. in Jo.* 1.17.102).

Origen furthermore appeals to Gn 1.26f. to support this interpretation of Jn 1.1 and thereby extends the relationship between God, the Father, and his Son, the *Logos,* to that between the *Logos* and man, created in his image:

> If "the first-born of all creation is an image of the invisible God," then the Father is his *archē.* Likewise, Christ is also the *archē* of those created according to the image of God (τῶν κατ᾽ εἰκόνα γενομένων θεοῦ). For if men are "according to the image," but the image is "according to the Father" (κατὰ τὸν πατέρα),[81] then the "according-to-which" of Christ is the Father, his *archē* (ὁ πατὴρ ἀρχή), but Christ is the "according-to-which" of men, who have been created, not according to that of which [Christ] is an image, but "according to the image." And our passage "in the *archē* was the *Logos*" will conform to this same pattern (1.17.104f.).

The symmetry of this relationship is most evident at *comm. in Jo.* 2.2f., where Origen describes the precision with which the evangelist in his prologue uses the article in conjunction with the words θεός and λόγος. Origen notes that, in the case of θεός, the article is reserved for "the unbegotten cause of all" (ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγενήτου… τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου, 2.2.14), *i.e.* the Father,[82] while the *Logos* is described with the inarticulate θεός. He also suggests that the article carries the same force when applied to λόγος, namely that, just as the Father is the one true God and source of divinity, his Son is the one true *Logos* and source of rationality: "In the same way that

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[81] *Cf. Comm. in Jo.* 1.32.231, where Origen describes the Son as being κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ Πατρός.

[82] This observation may derive from Philo, *Somn.* 1.229; *v.* Behr, "Response to Ayres," p. 146. *Cf.* also *Fug.* 71f., where Philo notes that the "true man … par excellence" of the first creation of Gn 1.27, who is "purest *nous,*" is the creation of the one God and that both are therefore distinguished by the article (ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον), while the exhortation of Gn 1.26 (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον) is spoken as if to a plurality and therefore indicates a multitude of workmen that create sensible man in his multiplicity.

the God over all is 'the God' and not simply 'God,' so also the source of the *logos* that is in every rational (λογικῶν) creature is 'the *Logos,*' while the *logos* that is each individual would not properly be named and called 'the *Logos,*' in the same way as the first" (2.2.15). The role of the article, says Origen, is to distinguish God the Father, who is "God-in-himself" (αὐτόθεος, 2.2.17) from all others that are divine by participation in him and thereby called "god" without the article. This latter category includes both "the first-born of all creation" and man, who is created in his image, although the Son is a perfect and eternal image of the Father and is eternally with the Father:

> The true God, then, is "the God," and those gods who are formed according to him (κατ' ἐκεῖνον) are as images of a prototype, but again the archetypal image of all other images is the *Logos* that is "with God" (τὸν θεόν), who was "in the *archē*" and always remains God (θεός) by virtue of being "with God" (τὸν θεόν), but would not have remained God (θεός) were he not to continue in uninterrupted contemplation of the depths of the Father (2.2.18).

To allay any fears that he might be reducing the *Logos* to the level of lesser gods, Origen grounds his explication of the hierarchy between God, the *Logos,* and man on Gn 1.26 and 1Cor 8.6:

> For the *logos* that is in each rational creature has the same relationship (τοῦτον τὸν λόγον) to the *Logos,* which is in the *archē* and is God-*Logos* "with God" (πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὄντα λόγον θεόν), as the God-*Logos* has to God (ὃν ὁ θεὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεόν). For just as the Father is God-in-himself and true God (αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεός) in comparison to the image and images of the image (πρὸς εἰκόνα καὶ εἰκόνας τῆς εἰκόνος) -- it is for this reason that men are said to be "according to the image," not "images" -- so also is [the Son] the *Logos*-in-himself (ὁ αὐτόλογος) in comparison with the *logos* found in each individual. For both enjoy the role of a spring (πηγῆς), the Father as the source of divinity and the Son as that of *logos*. "Just as," therefore, "there are many gods…, but for us there is one God, the Father," and just as "there are many lords…, but for us there is one Lord, Jesus Christ," so also there are many *logoi,* but we pray that we have the God-*Logos,* the *Logos* that is in the *archē* and is with God (2.3.20f.).

Thus, Origen seamlessly integrates the hierarchy between God the Father, his *Logos,* and man on the basis of iconic relationships.

Consequently, Origen renders the creation of Gn 1.26f. a far more trinitarian passage than had Clement. For Clement, the verses bear a trinitarian import to the extent that Christ is the *Logos,* the image of God, according to which man is created; nonetheless, Clement rarely speculates about the role of the *Logos* as image and accepts the identification of these two largely on the basis of Philo's philosophical argument. Clement rarely cites 2Cor 4.4 (τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ) or Col 1.15 ([ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ] ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου), which are foundational to Origen's theology of the *Logos* as the image of God.[83] Origen, by contrast, appealing to an interpretation at least as old as Justin Martyr,[84] argues that the plural ποιήσωμεν of Gn 1.26 is proof of trinitarian deliberation prior to man's creation: "It is, therefore, this [heavenly] image about which the Father said to the Son, 'Let us make men (*homines*) in our image and likeness.' The Son of God is the painter of this image" (*Hom. 13 in Gen.,* §4). Origen observes, moreover, that the phrasing of Gn 1.26 implies a conversation between the Father and the Son:

> We must see what this image of God is and ask in whose image man has been made. For he did not say, "God made man in his own image or likeness,' but rather 'he made him in the image of God." What other image, then, is there in the likeness of whose image man has been made, except our Savior, who is "the first-born of all creation" (Col 1.15); about whom it is written that he is "the radiance of the eternal light and express image of God's person" (Heb 1.3; *Hom. 1 in Gen.,* §13).

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[83] *V. Cels.* 6.63, et passim; Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image,* p. 67. Col 1.15 is especially central to Origen's theology; *Biblia Patristica,* vol. 3, pp. 436f., lists over 127 passages where Origens cites, or alludes to, the verse.

[84] *V.* Just., *Dial.* 62.

In these two passages, Origen brings together several interpretations of Gn 1.26f. that will form the standard exegesis of the passage for Origen's successors. First, the plural ποιήσωμεν is understood as addressed by the Father to the Son.[85] Secondly, the Son is not only the image according to which man is created, but is in fact the one who imprints the image in man. This idea is consonant with Origen's general understanding of the respective roles of Father and Son in creation: the Son as the direct creator (τὸν προσεχῶς δημιουργὸν … καὶ ὡσπερεὶ αὐτουργὸν τοῦ κόσμου) and the Father as primary creator by virtue of ordering the Son to execute the creation (πρώτως δημιουργόν, *Cels.* 6.60). Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for Gregory's use of the verse in *Hom. opif.,* Origen adopts Philo's distillation of Gn 1.27 to the form, "[God] made [man] in the image of God,"[86] and, in the light of the New Testament, identifies the image of God as Christ the *Logos.* If there were any ambivalence in the preceding tradition, Origen securely establishes Gn 1.26f. as a passage of primarily trinitarian, rather than anthropological, import.

Although Origen variously identifies the image with the free will, the virtuous faculty, or other aspects of the soul,[87] he locates the image, in an ontological sense, in the superior part of the soul, the *nous,* whose primary characteristic is the possession of *logos.* This is only natural, as man's creation in the image is for Origen prior to the creation of the body, and, prior to his embodiment, man existed as *nous*, not *psychē,* which would include the lower elements of the soul inextricably associated with the body. Indeed, Origen regards as the fundamental division

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[85] An idea also found at *Cels.* 2.9, 5.37.

[86] Clement notably never repeats this element of Philo's exegesis.

[87] *V.* Crouzel, *Théologie de l'Image,* pp. 157-60.

within the human person not that between soul and body, but rather that between the *nous,* on the one hand, and, on the other, the body and the carnal soul together.[88] Origen emphasizes that the *nous,* as the seat of *logos* and the image of the *Logos,* serves as a unique faculty for spiritual sight (τὸ διορατικόν) and is the means by which man sees and knows God. In his allegory of the creation, Origen portrays man as a microcosm of the universe[89] and interprets the difference between the heavens and the firmament as that between *nous* and the body: "the first sky, which we have called 'spiritual,' is our intellect (*mens*), which is itself also a spirit, that is, our spiritual man that sees God and perceives him clearly" (*perspicit*[90]; *Hom. 1 in Gen.,* §2). Elsewhere, Origen explicitly links this visual role of the *nous* to its connection with the image: "we have no need of a body in order to know God. For that which knows God is not the eye of the body, but the *nous,* which sees that which is 'in the image of the creator' (Col 3.10) and has by God's providence received the faculty of knowing God" (τὸ δυνάμενον γινώσκειν θεόν; *Cels.* 7.33). Several chapters later, Origen attributes the role of the *nous* as a faculty of divine perception to its similarity with the divine *nous*: "Therefore, since we say that the God of all (τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεόν) is simple, invisible, and bodiless *nous,* or rather beyond *nous* and being (ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας), we will never say that God (τὸν θεόν) can be perceived by means of anything other than

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[88] *Ibid.,* p. 159; *v.* esp. *Fr. in Luc* 53.

[89] *V. Hom. 1 in Gen.,* §11, *Cum ergo haec omnia fierent quae videntur iussu Dei fieri per Verbum eius, et praepararetur immensus iste et visibilis mundus, simul autem et per allegoriae figuram ostenderentur quae essent quae exornare possent minorem mundum, id est, hominem, tunc iam ipse homo creatur secundum ea quae in consequentibus declarantur.* Origen does not, however, reflect on the similarity between the macro- and microcosm as a means for attaining knowledge of the divine. Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator,* p. 135, n. 267, also notes that Jerome (*Lib. contra Ioann. Hierosol.* 25; PL 23.376b) reports Origen's adherence to another idea to the microcosm, *viz.* that the four elements correspond to man's flesh, breath, blood, and heat.

[90] Given the frequency with which Origen refers to the *nous* as τὸ διορατικόν, it is most likely that *perspicit* translates the verb διορᾷ.

the [*nous*] that is created in the image of that *nous*" (τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ νοῦ εἰκόνα γενομένῳ; 7.38). At *Mart.* 47, Origen explains the perceptive function of the *nous* on the grounds that the logical soul has a certain kinship with God (τι συγγενὲς θεῷ) and that, just as the eyes are created to perceive things visible, and the ears, things audible, the *nous* is created to perceive "noetic realities and the God who is beyond noetic realities" (τὸν ἐπέκεινα τῶν νοητῶν θεόν).[91] The acuity of this perception, moreover, depends upon contemplation of the *Logos* and the impress of the Truth, whereby believers are "enlightened in their *nous* in order to see those things that are naturally visible through that light (πρὸς τὴν θέαν τῶν δι᾽ ἐκείνου τοῦ φωτὸς θεωρεῖσθαι πεφυκότων), by eyes illumined at the Lord's command" (*ibid.*).

Particularly noteworthy is that this perspicacious role of the *nous* has in Origen's theology nearly supplanted any hegemonic role. To be sure, the *hegemonikon* is still the *nous,* but the expositions of the symmetry between the supreme God of the universe and the *nous* as *hegemonikon* of soul and body as found in Philo and Clement are conspicuously absent in Origen's writings.[92] It would seem that Origen has simply adopted Stoic usage of the term ἡγεμονικόν as a mere synonym for νοῦς. Although the word itself is to be found far more frequently in Origen than either Philo or Clement,[93] in most of these instances Origen gives no

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[91] Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image,* p. 158, notes that this is an extension of the Hellenistic philosophical principle of knowing like by like.

[92] At times, however, Origen still identifies the *hegemonikon* with the Father, as at *Hom. in Jer.* 8.1, where he observes that in Ps 51 the expression πνεῦμα ἡγεμονικόν (v. 14) refers to the Father, πνεῦμα εὐθές (v. 12), to the Son, and το πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον (v. 13), to the Holy Spirit. This identification of the *hegemonikon* with the Father, however, does not prompt any further reflection.

[93] A search of the *corpora* of each of the three authors in the TLG shows that the various forms of ἡγεμονικόν in the singular appear in Origen's writings more than twice as frequently as in Philo's and nearly five times as frequently as in Clement's. This can only provide a rough comparison, however, as some of these examples in each author's count will represent uses of the term as a true adjective rather than as the substantive adjective τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

special emphasis by choosing the word ἡγεμονικόν over νοῦς or even, in a more scriptural idiom, καρδία: God speaks "to those enlightened in their *hegemonikon* by the *Logos* himself" (*Cels.* 6.17); "Thy kingdom" from the Lord's Prayer refers to "the blessed state of the *hegemonikon*" (*or.* 12.1.6); God hardens Pharaoh by "working around his *hegemonikon*" (*comm. in Ex apud philoc.* 27.2); the *hegemonikon* is "agitated by the demons" (*Cels.* 8.63), etc. Origen's new way of speaking of the *hegemonikon* is reflected by the fact that he almost never associates the *hegemonikon* with man's creation in the image. Perhaps the only example is found in a catena: "In our very center is the intellectual faculty (τὸ διανοητικόν), which some call the "*hegemonikon,*" and there is the *logos* according to which we are rational (λογικοί), which is itself identical to God's image (ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ θεοῦ), according to which man was created in the image of God" (*fr.* 17 *in Jo.*). This lone exception, however, proves the rule in that Origen offers no further reflection on the relationship between the image and its seat, the *hegemonikon,* nor on how the intellectual faculty exercises its hegemonic function; his focus remains on the image as man's *logos* and its connection to the eternal *Logos.*

Perhaps Origen's most noteworthy departure from his Alexandrine predecessors, as well as the clearest example of Stoic influence upon his thought,[94] is that he is a consistent advocate of the cardiocentric theory of the *hegemonikon.*[95] In the preceding example, Origen interprets Jn

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[94] Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," demonstrated that Origen was intimately familiar with Stoic forms of argumentation and used these against Celsus. The cardiocentric position, however, is a clear example of Origen adopting some of the content of Stoic philosophy, since by Origen's day, cardiocentrism was a distinctive and nearly exclusively Stoic doctrine.

[95] Guillaumont, "Les sens des noms du cœur," p. 69, argues that Origen, in his attempt to maintain scriptural terminology, associates the heart and the *nous* only metaphorically or spiritually. The passages cited here, however, demonstrate that Origen often describes the *hegemonikon* in physical, anatomical terms: the heart, as the location of the *hegemonikon,* is in the center of the body and rules over the other members of the body.

1.26, "He whom you do not know has stood in your midst" (μέσος ὑμῶν), as a description of the *hegemonikon,* the seat of the *logos,* that is located "at our very center" (ἐν μεσαιτάτῳ ἡμῶν). This interpretation is one of Origen's favorites, repeated several times in his *comm. in Jo.,* and at 2.35 he makes the cardiocentric import of the verse explicit: "Consider whether, because the heart is in the middle of the whole body, and in the heart is the *hegemonikon,* the expression, 'He whom you did not know has stood in your midst,' can be understood as the *logos* that is in each man" (κατὰ τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγον). Origen even resorts to cardiocentrism to explain why Caleb received the first apportionment of land in Canaan (Jos 14): "It is fitting that Caleb was first to receive a lot. [His name] is interpreted as 'like a heart.' And it is he who heeds all things by his thoughts, who is 'like a heart' and has been completely transformed into a *hegemonikon* over all the members over which he has been appointed."[96]

Elsewhere, Origen reveals that his preference for this interpretation derives from the conviction that the scriptures themselves maintain a cardiocentric position: "Let the expression, 'he stood in your midst,' be understood to mean 'because you are rational (λογικούς) humans, he stands in your midst,' which is proven by the fact that in the middle of the entire body is the

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[96] *Hom. 18 in Jos.,* §2 (Preserved in a catena *apud* Proc. G., *Jos.,* PG 1028a): Πρῶτος δὲ Χάλεβ εἰκότως ἔτυχε κλήρου. ἑρμηνεύεται δὲ ὡς καρδία· ἔστι δὲ οὗτος ὁ πάντα προσέχων τοῖς νοήμασιν, ὁ παρὰ πάντα τὰ μέλη, οἷς ἀπετάξατο, χρηματίζων ὡς καρδία καὶ ὅλος ἀναστοιχειωθεὶς εἰς ἡγεμονικόν.

Cf. Rufinus's translation: *Primo omnium Chaleb interpretatur quasi cor. Quis ergo est quasi cor, nisi is, qui in omnibus intellectui operam tribuit, qui non aliquod membrum corporis ecclesiae esse dicitur, nisi illud, quod est in nobis praeclarius, cor, id est omnia cum ratione et prudentia gerit et ita cuncta dispensat, quasi non sit aliud nisi cor?*

hegemonikon, which is in the heart, *according to the scriptures.*"[97] No doubt Origen here refers to the prevailing usage of both the Old and New Testaments, where the primary center of man's thoughts and interaction with God is the heart.[98] Origen, as first and foremost a scriptural exegete, is compelled to associate the scriptural heart with its functional equivalent in Greek philosophical terms, the *nous*. Thus, in the passage from *Cels.* 7.33 treated above, when Origen describes the "faculty of seeing God" as "the *nous,* which sees that which is 'in the image of the creator,'" he further concludes on the basis of the sixth beatitude (Mt 5.8) that "the faculty for seeing God (τὸ ὁρῶν δὲ θεόν) is a pure heart." On the basis of such usage, however, Origen sees the cardiocentric *hegemonikon* throughout the scriptures. He states as much at *Princ.* 1.1.9, another passage where he interprets the sixth beatitude as a description of noetic apprehension of God (*mente* [*deum*] *intellegere et cognoscere*): "To be sure, you will find many times, in all the scriptures, both old and new, that the heart is named for the *nous* (*mente*), that is, for intellectual strength (*pro intellectuali virtute*)." The identification of heart and *nous* also extends to other related terms. Perhaps the most striking instance of this is *Cant.* 1, on Song 1.1-3 (PG 13.87af.), where Origen claims that the scriptures use many terms for the *hegemonikon* (*principale cordis*

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[97] Origen's elder contemporary, Tertullian, *Anim.* 15, had come to the same conclusion: …*Christiani, qui apud deum de utroque deducimur, et esse principale in anima et certo in corporis recessu consecratum. Si enim scrutatorem et dispectorem cordis deum legimus, si etiam prophetes eius occulta cordis traducendo probatur, si deus ipse recogitatus cordis in populo praeuenit: quid cogitatis in cordibus uestris nequam? si et Dauid: cor mundum conde in me deus, et Paulus corde ait credi in iustitiam, et Iohannes corde ait suo unumquemque reprehendi, si postremo qui uiderit feminam ad concupiscendum, iam adulterauit in corde, simul utrumque dilucet, et esse principale in anima, quod intentio diuina conueniat, id est uim sapientialem atque uitalem (quod enim sapit, uiuidum est), et in eo thesauro corporis haberi, ad quem deus respicit…*

[98] In the LXX and the Greek New Testament, the instances of the word καρδία in its various forms (1116x) dwarf those of νοῦς (42x). For a survey of how "heart" is used in the Old Testament, *v.* Fabry's entry *s.v. lēb, lēbab* in *TDOT,* v.7 (esp. the discussion in III.3 of various ways it is translated in LXX); in the New Testament, Behm's entry *s.v.* καρδία in *THNT,* v. 3. For a more synthetic treatment, *v.* Guillaumont, "Les sens des noms du cœur," pp. 42-51 (OT), 63-67 (NT).

in Rufinus' translation). In the context of a banquet, says Origen, scripture often designates the *hegemonikon* with terms such as "bosom" or "breast" (*sinus, pectus*), the prime example of which is the disciple "whom Jesus loved" and who "reclined on Jesus' breast" (ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ, Jn 13.23): "In these [passages], it is clear that John is said to have rested on the *hegemonikon* of Jesus (*in principali cordis Jesu*)[99] and on the inner meanings of his teaching (*in internis doctrinae eius sensibus*) and that he there searched and examined the treasures of wisdom and knowledge that were hidden in Christ Jesus."

It may be that the hermeneutic weight of the scriptural heart, together with Origen's own ideas about pre-existent souls and their post-lapsarian bodies, accounts for his reluctance to conflate Gn 1.26 and 2.7 and, consequently, for his preference for Philo's distinction between the created and molded man. Because Origen sees the heart as the scripturally appropriate location for the *nous,* he feels no compulsion to regard the inbreathing of the "breath of life" into the face of the newly created Adam as the moment at which the image was implanted in man.[100] Indeed, it is striking how Origen avoids the topic of the πνοὴ ζωῆς altogether. Only three times,[101] and briefly and at that, does he attempt to explain this *crux interpretum* as a reference to God's Spirit

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[99] I have translated the phrase *in principali cordis Jesu* simply as "on the *hegemonikon* of Jesus" on the basis of Rahner, "'Cœur de Jésus,'" p. 173, who rightly argues that *cordis* is Rufinus' supplementary addition to the term *principale.* Rahner points out that the phrase ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς καρδίας is found nowhere in Origen's surviving writings and that at *Hom. 1 in Jer.,* §14, where both Origen's Greek and Rufinus' Latin survive, Rufinus has translated ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν as *sub principale cordis*.

[100] Only once are the two ideas mentioned together, and even there it is difficult to tell whether or not the two acts are being equated. In P. bibl. univ. Giss. 17, ll. 30f., Origen (if the attribution is correct) refers to man as ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίω[σιν] ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενηθεὶς καὶ ὑπ' αὐ/[τ]οῦ ἐμπνευσθεὶς καὶ ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀλόγων ἀξιωθείς. *N.b.* that if the three ideas contained in this passage are to be conflated as a single idea, then this passage also marks a rare example in Origen's corpus where the image is associated with a hegemonic function over the passions.

[101] *Cels.* 4.37; *Princ.* 1.3.6; *comm. in Jo.* 13.23f.

given to man. The passage at *Princ.* 1.3.6, which combines a cardiocentric description of the *logos* with an explanation of the breath of life, is instructive: Origen concludes on the basis of Rom 10.6-8, especially Paul's quotation of Dt 30.14 ("the word is very close to you, in your mouth and in your heart"), that "Christ is in the heart of all, inasmuch as he is the "word" (*uerbum*), or "reason" (*ratio*), by participation in whom [all] are reasonable (*rationabiles*)." The gloss of *uerbum* as *ratio* is not, as it might seem, Rufinus' addition. Rather, Origen has had to gloss the original ῥῆμα of v. 8 in order to justify his Christological interpretation: ῥῆμα is the equivalent of λόγος,[102] which refers to *the Logos,* and therefore Paul is expressing here a cardiocentric view of the human *logos.* After so confidently offering this contorted interpretation, when he also cites Gn 2.7 as proof of man's communion with, and participation in, God, Origen is ambivalent as to whether the πνοὴ ζωῆς refers to a generalized human spirit or God's spirit given to his saints: "But if this [*i.e. spiramentum uitae*] is interpreted to have been given to all men, then all men have participation in God; but if this is to be interpreted as regarding the spirit of God, since it is to be found among some interpreters that even Adam prophesied, then it can be granted that it has been given, not generally, but to certain saints."

This same avoidance of the encephalocentric position is found in *Dial.,* where Origen attempts to explain Lv 17.11, "the soul of all flesh is the blood" (ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμά

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[102] Despite the fact that Paul in the same verse explains the meaning of ῥῆμα: τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσομεν.

ἐστιν).[103] Origen first states that his general hermeneutic of dealing with anatomical terms in the scriptures is "that every part of the outer man is named in the inner man as well" (*Dial.* 16). With this hermeneutic Origen reads various scriptural passages about the eyes that would be nonsensical if interpreted literally; he concludes that these must refer, not to physical eyes, but to those of the inner man and that therefore in scripture "the eyes are the *nous*" (§17). A bit further on, Origen mentions a perplexing verse that would seemingly lend itself most readily to an encephalocentric interpretation: "the eyes of the wise are in his head" (Eccl 2.14). Origen, however, adduces Paul to arrive at another interpretation: "the aforementioned eyes of the wise man, which have been illumined by the Lord's command, are "in his head," that is, "in Christ," since the Apostle says "the head of a man is Christ" (1Cor 11.3). Therefore, his intellectual faculty (τὸ διανοητικόν) is in Christ" (§20). Despite this interpretation, Origen still attributes intellectual function to the heart in his interpretation of Is 46.12 ("Listen to me you who have lost your heart"): "When one neglects the cultivation of his intellectual state (τῆς ἕξεως νοητικῆς) and from great idleness his intellectual faculty has withered, then has he lost his heart" (§22). With the same hermeneutical principle, Origen finally returns to the question of the blood, which he concludes is, in fact, the soul, but only if the blood is understood according to the inner man, and only if "it is understood that in it [*i.e.* the soul] is the element that is in the image" (τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα, §23). This spiritual blood is the "vital force of the soul" (*ibid*.) that pours forth from the heart of the inner man. Origen thus centers the soul upon the central organ of the circulatory system, which he identifies with the intellectual faculty, if only in a spiritual sense. To be sure,

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[103] The verse is perhaps better translated, both from MT and LXX, as "the *life* of the flesh is in its blood," but Origen takes this as an opportunity to question the location and nature of the soul (ψυχή, *nefeš*).

he explicitly denies that the soul is actually in the blood, otherwise the soul would be trapped in the grave at death (*ibid.*). Hence, he probably implies that the heart is not literally the *nous* or its physical location, although he does say this elsewhere. Yet even though Origen does not here speak of the physical location of the *nous,* it is this type hermeneutic that undergirds his cardiocentrism elsewhere.

Origen's cardiocentrism is further reinforced by his rejection of the Platonic tripartite soul. At *Princ.* 3.4.1, Origen denies the view of certain Greek philosophers who would divide the soul into rational and irrational parts and would further subdivide the irrational part into the appetitive and irascible faculties (*affectus cupiditatis et iracundiae*). As is his wont, Origen rejects Platonic psychology because, from his vantage, "it is largely not confirmed by the authority of divine scripture," though he does not elaborate this point. While direct evidence of a tripartite soul is certainly absent from both the LXX and the NT, this had not prevented Philo and Clement from finding a scriptural basis, however tenuous, for the teaching.[104] Origen, no doubt, is aware of both Philo's and Clement's precedents. Thus, his rejection is not simply a rejection of a philosophical tenet evaluated on the basis of scripture; it is a rejection of a tenet wholeheartedly endorsed by the two that taught him to interpret scripture. The most likely explanation is that the rejection of the tripartite soul is a function of his rejection of the encephalocentric theory. Origen, convinced of the cardiocentric stance of the scriptures, must reject the tripartite soul that is inextricably associated with Plato's encephalocentrism.

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[104] *E.g.*, Philo, *Leg.* 3.115f.; Clement, *Str.* 3.10.68.5

The cardiocentrism that Origen espouses in his anthropology is, moreover, reflected in a certain sense in the relationship between God and the *Logos*. Although Origen locates the image proper in a cardiocentric *nous,* he also sees in the intellectual constitution of man a certain reflection of the generation of the Son from the Father. The principle underlying this subsidiary image is the association of divine filiation with divine intellectual processes, as at *Princ.* 1.2.6: "The image of the Father is formed in the Son, who has been truly born of him, just as a certain desire of his that proceeds from his intellect." Elsewhere, however, in a discussion of the prologue of Jn, Origen extends the analogy and likens the divine filial relationship to the human word brought forth from the intellect:

> It may be that the Son is "the *Logos,*" because he announces (ἀπαγγέλλειν) the secret things of that Father, who is *nous* in the same way that the Son is called *Logos.* For just as the *logos* that is in us (πὰρ᾽ ἡμῖν) is a messenger of the things seen by the *nous,* so also the *Logos* of God (τοῦ θεοῦ), because he knows (ἐγνωκώς) the Father, while no created being can approach him without a guide, reveals the Father whom he knows (*comm. in Jo.* 1.38.277).

Origen continues this reflection with a discussion of Ps 45.1, "My heart has belched forth a good word" (Ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου λόγον ἀγαθόν), which, with some ambivalence, he accepts as being spoken by the Father. Applying his standard hermeneutic for anthropomorphic descriptions of God, Origen concludes that the heart cannot be a heart like that in the human body, but must refer to God's "intellectual and providential power over the universe" (τὴν νοητικὴν … καὶ προθετικὴν περὶ τῶν ὅλων δύναμιν) and that the "*logos,*" clearly to be associated with *the Logos,* is "the means of announcing (τὸ ἀπαγγελτικόν) the things that are in [the heart]" (§ 282). Rather humorously, Origen also emphasizes the significance of the

Psalmist's choice of the verb "to belch," which could easily have been replaced with any number of expressions. Belching, says Origen, is the sporadic, unpredictable emanation of a hidden breath (πνεύματος), which may indicate that "the Father does not withhold visions of the truth (τὰ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρήματα), but belches them forth and leaves their imprint in the *Logos,* which is therefore called 'the image of the invisible God'" (§ 283). Again, the physiological understanding of the heart as the seat of the *nous,* which is in turn the source of *logos,* corresponds to a spiritual cardiocentrism, as it were, that reflects the relationship between the *nous*-Father and his *Logos.*

ATHANASIUS

Born some forty years after the death of Origen, Athanasius was raised and educated in an Alexandrian church whose teaching was greatly shaped by the writings of the old master. Athanasius' own debt to Origen has been somewhat difficult to specify: implicitly, it is near ubiquitous, although it is rarely clear what derives from Origen in particular and what can be attributed to a broader Alexandrian tradition; explicitly, Athanasius names Origen only twice.[105] The interpretation of Gn, however, together with its accompanying anthropology and cosmology, is an instance in which Origen's influence is especially palpable. It is commonly recognized that Athanasius' anthropology is centered upon the Incarnation rather than the account of creation in

[105] *decr.* 27; *ep. Serap.* IV, 4.9f.; Kannengiesser, "Origen's Doctrine," pp. 889f. Kannengiesser, *ibid.,* argues at length that Athanasius' dependence on Origen can be seen in the thematic and structural similarities between Or., *Princ.* I-II.3, and Ath., *Ar.*

Gn.[106] Athanasius consequently speaks most convincingly of the image in terms of its role in salvation: the *Logos,* who is the image according to which man was originally created, has appeared in order to renew the secondary image in man.[107] This orientation, combined with the explicitly polemical nature of so many of Athanasius' later writings, accounts for the notable infrequency (especially in comparison with his Alexandrian predecessors) with which Athanasius discusses the creation of man.[108] Outside of the dual work *Contra Gentes-De Incarnatione,* Athanasius' treatment of Gn 1.26f. is largely limited to brief discussions of the trinitarian implications of the plural ποιήσωμεν and the difference between the verbs ποιεῖν as applied to man and γεννᾷν as applied to the *Logos*. Equally noteworthy is his near silence on the meaning of Gn 2.7,[109] which, despite Origen's precedent, he appears to conflate with Gn 1.27.[110]

The peculiarities of Athanasius' use of Gn 1.26f. and 2.7 can be attributed to the legacy of Origen. Given Athanasius' pronounced incarnational focus, the broader scope of a nearly systematic and catechetical work[111] such as *Gent.-Inc.* requires Athanasius to fill out his own

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[106] *V.* Hamman, *L'image de Dieu,* p. 153. Bernard, *L'image de Dieu,* p. 24, argues that, whereas Athanasius' predecessors were more concerned with "man in the image," and only infrequently proceed to consider the singular image, this image, *i.e.* the *Logos,* is the focus for Athanasius, hence his reticence to discuss anthropology *per se.*

[107] *V.* esp. *Inc.* 13f.

[108] Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu,* p. 168, notes that after *Gent.-Inc.* the theme of image and likeness gives way to that of divinization and observes, n. 110, that in *Ar.* the phrase ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον is found four times, but the expression κατ᾽εἰκόνα καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν, not once.

[109] Although the projected Athanasian volume of the *Biblia Patristica* was not published, its indices are available online through the *Biblindex* (http://www.biblindex.mom.fr/). A search there finds only five citations of, or allusions to, Gn 2.7, none of which offer any substantive reflection. A search in the TLG further confirms that πνοὴ ζωῆς (in its various cases), the phrase of Gn 2.7 most relevant to this study, appears nowhere in the Athanasian corpus, nor does the related phrase, ψυχὴ ζῶσα.

[110] The conflation, perhaps intended as a rejection of Philo's and Origen's distinction between the created and the molded man, can be seen at *Ar.* 2.48: οὕτω καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα γένος γέγονε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀδὰμ ἐκ γῆς μόνος ἐπλάσθη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι τῆς διαδοχῆς παντὸς τοῦ γένους.

[111] Such a description is that of Anatolios, *Athanasius,* p. 30.

theology by drawing upon that of other authors. Athanasius makes it clear in the preface to *Gent.* that he is in fact producing something of a synthesis of patristic exegesis:

> For the holy and divinely inspired scriptures are sufficient for the proclamation of the truth. There are, however, also many works of our blessed teachers that were composed for this purpose, and, if anyone should read them, he will know one way or the other the interpretation of the scriptures and will be able to attain the knowledge that he seeks. But since we do not now have the writings of the teachers at hand, we must proclaim to you in writing the things that we learn from them, namely faith in Christ the Savior (*Gent.* 1).

Athanasius, however, is notably circumspect and names no individual teacher that he follows; the subsequent passages, however, leave no doubt that his primary source is Origen, albeit in a somewhat dilute form. Athanasius' interpretation of the account of creation follows the same general narrative as that of Origen, while avoiding Origen's more speculative ideas: Man was created to contemplate God, but turned his contemplation to sensible reality and then fell into sin and, eventually, idolatry; Man is created in the image of the *Logos,* who is in turn the image of the Father; in contemplating his own *logos,* Man can come to know the *Logos* and, through him, return to contemplation of the true God. This narrative is clearly Origen's, minus the pre-existent intellects and the cooling fall into bodies, and its nature as a graft into the larger work is betrayed by the fact that in these passages Athanasius makes no mention of the Incarnation.[112] In the case of Gn 1.26f., Athanasius naturally turns to the premier Alexandrian exegete to explain a passage of scripture the interpretation of which, while obviously essential to any theological treatise of such a scope, did not grow organically from his own incarnational theology and, indeed, never was to do so, as his later works would seem to indicate. Athanasius' neglect of of Gn 2.7 further

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[112] Noted by Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu,* p. 154.

betrays his reliance on Origen, who, as described in the previous section, interprets the verse as the creation of the corporeal man, rather than the man in the image. Because Athanasius does not fully adopt Origen's cosmology, he is left with little to say regarding this verse; his failure to appeal to the interpretation of others suggests that when he speaks of "the writings of the teachers," he in fact means "the writings of Origen."[113]

It is clear that Origen's understanding of the relationship between God, his Image, and Man, has come to be the Alexandrian tradition as Athanasius knows it. The one God and demiurge is the Father,[114] and his image is the *Logos,* through whom he creates all things and according to whom he creates man; the ποιήσωμεν of Gn 1.26 is therefore addressed by the Father to the Son.[115] Athanasius adheres in practice to Origen's observation that the articulate ὁ

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[113] The preface to *Gent.* has been much discussed in an attempt to date the composition of the treatise. Tillemont first argued that the phrase, "since we do not now have the writings of the teachers at hand," indicated the treatise was composed in exile, a theory that many have since accepted. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius,* p. 112, argues that exile need not be the only explanation and observes that Athanasius does not make the expected and stereotypical complaints about lacking books in exile. Van Winden, "On the Date," pp. 294f., further points out that Athanasius claims that the absence of said books is the reason for, not the impediment to, his writing. So far as I can tell, no one has considered the possibility that Athanasius claims not to have the books at hand as a convenient way to avoid citation. In *Gent.-Inc.* Athanasius does not attach interpretations to specific teachers, even though he sets out to write a synthesis of their teachings. The reason for this may be that his primary source is Origen and that, by the time Athanasius writes the two treatises, it has already become a liability to invoke Origen's authority.

[114] *E.g., Inc.* 40: ἀνάγκη πᾶσα… τὸν παρ᾽ ἡμῶν προσκυνούμενον καὶ κηρυττόμενον τοῦτον μόνον εἶναι θεὸν ἀληθῆ… τίς δὴ οὖν ἐστιν οὗτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ … ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ Πατήρ. Because, however, the Father creates all things through his *Logos,* the Son himself, even in his role as the Wisdom of God, is sometimes called "demiurge" in a functional sense, *e.g. Gent.* 47: ἀγαθὸν καὶ δημιουργὸν Υἱὸν ἔχων ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὁ Πατήρ, and *Ar.* 2.78: ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν γενομένη σοφία, ἐν ᾗ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ φρονεῖν ἔχοντες δεκτικοὶ γινόμεθα τῆς δημιουργοῦ σοφίας καὶ δι᾽αὐτῆς γινώσκειν δυνάμεθα τὸν αὐτῆς πατέρα.

[115] *V. Gent.* 46.

θεός refers to the Father,[116] and, although he does not use the term αὐτόθεος, his use of the corresponding term αὐτόλογος[117] to describe the *Logos* suggests that he was aware of the significance Origen attached to the article. Athanasius reserves the term εἰκών for the *Logos* and only speaks of man as being created "according to the image," and therefore as possessing only τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα.[118] The paradigm is neatly summarized in a passage from *Gent.* 2:

> For God, who is creator of the universe and king over all, who exists beyond all existence and human thought (ἐπινοίας), inasmuch as he is noble and exceedingly good (ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὑπέρκαλος), has, through his proper *Logos,* our Savior Jesus Christ, made the human race according to his own image and has endowed man, through his likeness to the *Logos,* with the capacity for contemplation and knowledge of realities (τῶν ὄντων), by giving him a conception and knowledge of his own eternality so that, if he should preserve his identity, he would never depart from his idea of God (τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ φαντασίας), nor turn from the common life of the saints, but rather so that, having the grace of him who bestowed it as well as his proper power from the Father's *Logos,* he might rejoice and converse with God, thereby living the carefree, blessed and truly immortal life. For since he has no impediment to the knowledge of the divine, he contemplates through his own purity the image of the Father, the divine *Logos,* in whose image he himself was created. For he is amazed when he realizes God's providence for the universe through the *Logos* and is raised above sensible realities and every bodily apparition, but is united to the divine intellectual realities in the heavens by the power of his *nous*.... Then, indeed, once [the *nous*] has surpassed sensible realities and all things human, it is raised high aloft and, when it beholds the *Logos,* it sees in him the Father of the *Logos,* as well.... In the same

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[116] Athanasius does frequently use the article in the phrase ὁ θεὸς λόγος (in various cases: *Gent.* 2, 8, 33, 43; *Inc.* 7, 10 (4x), 12, 14-16, 18 (2x), 19, 31, 33, 37, 39, 42 (2x), 43, 45-47, 49, 53, 55 (4x), 57), but this cannot be interpreted (*pace* Bernard, *L'image de Dieu*, p. 34) as a departure from Origen's practice, much less as a way to emphasize the unity between Father and Son, since θεός is here used attributively, and the article modifies λόγος. This attributive use of θεός renders it the functional equivalent of the adjective θεῖος and was in fact the standard translation for Latin *divus* in the title of the emperor. LSJ, *s.v.* θεός, §3b, cites Strabo, 4.1.1, ὁ θεὸς Καῖσαρ, and, more importantly, the bilingual text of Augustus' *Res Gestae,* 10.4, where *divi Iuli* is rendered θεοῦ Ἰουλίου. More immediately, Athanasius' phraseology comes from Origen, *comm. in Jo.* 2.37.228, who can compress Jn 1.1 to speak of τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καὶ θεὸν λόγον (*cf. Inc.* 42: τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Θεὸν Λόγον). Both these phrases make nonsense if τὸν… θεὸν λόγον is regarded as a Greek equivalent of the expression "God the Word." By contrast, when Athanasius speaks of "God, the Father," the word θεός is articulate, while the noun Πατήρ is found in attributive position: τὸν [τοῦ Χριστοῦ/τοῦ Λόγου/τῆς ἀληθείας] πατέρα Θεόν (*Gent.* 6, 19, 26, 29, 45; *Inc.* 7). Both expressions are examples of Athanasius' general tendency to use nouns in attributive position; *cf.* n. 126 below.

[117] The patently Origenic term is found three times in his corpus, all in *Gent.-Inc.*: *Gent.* 40, 46; *Inc.* 54.

[118] *V., e.g., Gent.* 34; *Inc.* 13, 20.

> way, the sacred scriptures say that in the beginning the first-created of mankind, who was named "Adam" in the Hebrew language, enjoyed by virtue of his *nous* an unashamed freedom (παρρησία) to converse with God and to dwell with the saints in the contemplation of intelligible realities, a contemplation which he enjoyed in the place that the holy Moses figuratively called "paradise." Purity of the soul, moreover, is sufficient for God to be reflected through it, just as the Lord himself says: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

Athanasius here, and in general, retains Origen's theological structure, but has attempted to correct Origen's anthropology. As in Origen, the *nous* remains the point of interaction between Man and the *Logos,* the means for contemplating the Father through his *Logos,* and yet, when speaking of the inner structure of the human, Athanasius often uses *nous* and soul interchangeably, as at the end of the passage, where the mirror of the *nous* is equated to the purity of the soul and, further, that of the heart. Athanasius' imprecision in vocabulary, however, reflects, not a corresponding conflation of *nous* and soul in his anthropology,[119] but rather an attempt to soften the sharp distinction Origen had drawn between the *nous* and the inferior soul that was the product of the cooling Fall (whence his etymology of ψυχή from ψυχρός). For this reason, Athanasius frequently emphasizes the close interrelation of *nous* and soul, particularly by using such periphrases as "the soul and its *nous*." This relationship is particularly evident in Athanasius' retention of Origen's understanding of the *nous* as the faculty of divine vision.[120] At *Gent.* 7, Athanasius describes "the soul of men," once fallen in sin, as "having closed the eye through which it can see God." Similarly, at *Gent.* 8 he relates that the soul, which has forgotten its iconic nature, has obscured "the mirror, as it were, which is in it, through which (δι᾽ οὗ) alone

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[119] *Pace* Roldanus, *Le Christ et l'homme,* pp. 54f.

[120] *V.* the discussion in the previous section.

it can see the image of the Father," and, consequently, the soul "no longer sees the things that the soul must apprehend" (νοεῖν). While one might interpret the "eye" or the "mirror" of the soul as mere metaphors, the Origenic pedigree of this type of imagery implies the existence of a more concrete element of the soul. Athanasius confirms such an hypothesis at *Gent.* 30, where he clarifies the expression, "the path towards God" (τὴν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ὁδόν): "[by this phrase] I mean each man's soul and the *nous* that is in it (τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ νοῦν). For through [the *nous*] alone can God be contemplated and apprehended" (δι᾽ αὐτοῦ γὰρ μόνου δύναται Θεὸς θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ νοεῖσθαι). When, therefore, Athanasius writes at *Gent.* 33 that it is the soul that has "the concept of contemplating God (τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ θεωρίας… τὴν ἔννοιαν) and becomes its own path by receiving, not from without, but from itself the knowledge and apprehension of the divine *Logos*" (τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου γνῶσιν καὶ κατάληψιν), it must be understood that he is referring to the *nous* inasmuch as it is the part of the soul that is λογικός. Likewise, in the following chapter Athanasius describes the possibility of Man's ascent and return to God "by the *nous* of his soul" (τῷ νῷ τῆς ψυχῆς), yet immediately thereafter calls for men to remove all impurities from the soul, "so that in [the soul, ἐν αὐτῇ] they might contemplate the Father's *Logos,* according to which they themselves were created (γεγόνασιν) from the beginning" (§34). Such usages demonstrate that Athanasius often uses the term ψυχή as shorthand for λογική ψυχή, *i.e.* the soul rendered λογική by the presence of *nous*.[121]

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[121] The expression λογική ψυχή appears eight times in *Gent.* 30-32, 34, 44. The adjective λογικός is a perennial thorn in the side of translators. Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image,* pp. 126f., drawing attention to the inadequacy of the translation "rational," opted to transliterate, rather than translate, the term, but suggested *verbifié* as a possible alternative that would emphasize the connection with the *Logos.* Roldanus, *Le Christ et l'homme,* pp. 38 n. 2 and 46f., follows suit.

If the *nous* can be the means of divine vision and the path of return to God, it is so in its capacity as the locus of the divine image in man. This equation is evident in the same passage, as Athanasius explains the relationship between divine contemplation and that which is according to the image:

> when the soul has rid itself of of every stain that covers it and keeps pure only that which is in the image (τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα), then it is only natural that, once [that which is after the image] has been illumined (διαλαμπρυνθέντος τούτου), [the soul] beholds (θεωρεῖ), as though in a mirror, the image of the Father, namely the *Logos,* and in him arrives by means of its *logos* to the Father (ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν Πατέρα… λογίζεται), of whom the Savior is the very image (§34).

A similar substitution is found at *Inc.* 12, where Athanasius writes that "the grace of being created after the image (ἡ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα χάρις) is sufficient in itself for coming to know the divine *Logos* (τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον) and, through him, the Father." Since Athanasius has elsewhere specified the *nous* as the only means of divine contemplation, it is clear that in both these passages that he regards the divine image in Man (τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα, ἡ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα χάρις) as the *nous* and is therefore in continuity with his Alexandrian predecessors.

Athanasius, moreover, retains the notion of the *nous* as the *hegemonikon*. Although he appears never to use the word ἡγεμονικόν in its technical sense,[122] he frequently indicates the hegemonic role of the *nous* through various cognates and analogies. At *Gent.* 5 the soul is the Platonic charioteer that drives the members of the body into sin. The *nous* is likened to a skilled lyre-player at *Gent.* 31:

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[122] Only twice, both times in the likely pseudeponymous *Exp. Ps.* 118.51, 145f. The adjective ἡγεμονικός, -ή, -όν appears in Athanasius' writings only in reference to Ps 51.12 (πνεύματι ἡγεμονικῷ στήριξόν με): *ep. Amun.* (PG 26.1173d-76a); *Exp. Ps.* 50.13. On the authenticity of *Exp. Ps., v.* Dorival, "Athanase ou Pseudo-Athanase?" pp. 84-89.

> The harmony [of the notes of the lyre] and the proper scale (σύνταξις) is manifest when the master of the lyre (ὁ κατέχων τὴν λύραν) strikes the strings and fittingly dampens (ἅψηται) each one; since the faculties of sense (τῶν αἰσθήσεων) are similarly tuned, as it were, like the strings of a lyre, when the skilled *nous* rules (ἡγεμονεύῃ) over them, then the soul also distinguishes and knows what it is doing and how it is faring.

In the following chapter, Athanasius cites the human ability to turn the senses away from their natural purposes (*i.e.* that the eyes can turn their vision away from something, the hands can refrain from touching, etc.) as proof that "a rational soul rules over the body" (ψυχὴν λογικὴν… ἡγεμονεύουσαν τοῦ σώματος) and compares the relationship between soul and body to that of a horse and its master.

It is especially noteworthy that in *Gent.-Inc.* Athanasius, despite his reliance upon Origen in many matters anthropological, frequently reflects upon the functional similarity between the *hegemonikon* and the hegemon of the universe, a theme which Origen neglects almost entirely.[123] Beginning at *Gent.* 34 Athanasius takes up the theme of how creation, particularly in its order, reveals the God who has created it and continues to guide it. In *gent.* 38, in order to illustrate the argument that the order of the universe is proof of a unifying master, Athanasius presents the analogy of a city in which the various inhabitants live in harmony with one another. Any observer of such a city would conclude, says Athanasius, "that the presence of a ruler (ἄρχοντος) obtains concord (ὁμόνοια), even if we do not see him." Athanasius concludes the analogy with the maxim that "order is the evidence of the ruler" (ἡ δὲ τάξις τὸν ἡγεμονεύοντα δείκνυσι), then

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[123] *V.* the discussion in previous section. Anatolios, *Athanasius,* p. 59, furthermore notes that "despite his use of the terminology of governance (ἡγεμονία) to describe God's activity in relation to creation as a whole, Athanasius nowhere, to my knowledge, uses this terminology to describe God's activity in relation to humanity." Anatolios regards this as evidence that man is "ordained… to receive [the power of the Word] actively" (*ibid.*). Athanasius' usage may also reflect his understanding of the iconic relationship between a universal *hegemon* and the human *hegemonikon*.

immediately turns to the analogy of the body, in which the order maintained between the various faculties and members demonstrates "that there is a soul in the body that rules (ἡγεμονεύουσαν) over these, even if we do not see it."[124] These two analogies lead Athanasius to the following conclusion:

> Thus, in the order and harmony of the universe we must apprehend the God who is ruler of the universe (τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ἡγεμόνα νοεῖν ἀνάγκη Θεόν) and that he is one and not many. Moreover the orderly arrangement of the universe (τῆς διακοσμήσεως)[125] and the harmonious interaction of all things also shows that the *Logos,* who is its ruler and guide, is not many, but one" (οὐ πολλοὺς, ἀλλ᾽ ἕνα τὸν αὐτῆς ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα δείκνυσι Λόγον).

Order in the universe, according to Athanasius, demonstrates the existence, not only of one God, but also of one *Logos*;[126] both are described as ἡγεμών, the *Logos* is also named as ἄρχων. This conclusion hints at a unity of action between God and his *Logos* that is further clarified by *Gent.* 40, where Athanasius insists that his arguments against polytheism have proven that the God of the Christians "is alone true God, the Lord of creation and creator of every existent being" (πάσης ὑποστάσεως). When Athanasius rhetorically ponders the identity of this God, he concludes that it is none other that "the Father of Christ, who, like an excellent helmsman, steers

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[124] *N.b.* the similarity to the epistemology expressed by Galen and followed by Clement. Particularly Galenic is the essential similarity between God and the soul, both of which are invisible, yet known by their works. The divine epistemology is also succinctly expressed at *Gent.* 35, where the invisible God is known by his works through the *Logos*: τὴν κτίσιν οὕτω διεκόσμησε τῷ ἑαυτοῦ Λόγῳ ὁ Θεός, ἵν', ἐπειδὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἀόρατος, κἂν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων γινώσκεσθαι δυνηθῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

[125] In these passages, Athanasius appears to distinguish διακόσμησις, as the order created by the *Logos*, from τὸ πᾶν, the universe *in toto,* as created by the Father.

[126] The parallel construction between τὸν… Θεόν and τὸν… Λόγον makes clear that the noun-head of each article is in hyperbaton after its respective verb (ἀνάγκη νοεῖν, δείκνυσι). Thus, it is Θεόν, not ἡγεμόνα, that is articulate, and Athanasius thereby contrasts an articulate "God" (*i.e.* the Father) with the *Logos.* The attributive usage of a noun is one of Athanasius' favored constructions: *e.g.* ὁ… Θεὸς Λόγος in various cases (citations listed above, n. 116), τὸν… πατέρα Θεόν (citations listed *ibid.*), τὸν [τοῦ κόσμου] ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν Θεόν (*Gent.* 27, 30, 35), τὸν [τῶν πάντων] δημιουργὸν Θεόν (*Gent.* 45; *Inc.* 12, 53). *Cf.* n. 116 above.

and orders all things everywhere by his own Wisdom and his own *Logos*." Because the movement of the universe "has been organized by reason, wisdom and skill (λόγῳ, σοφίᾳ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ), and has been regulated with all order (παντὶ κόσμῳ διακεκόσμηται), it must be that the one who presides over it and has ordered it (τὸν διακοσμήσαντα) is none other than the *Logos* of God." For Athanasius, there is but one God that orders and rules the universe, but his means of ruling the universe is his own proper *Logos,* hence both are, in a sense, regarded as the singular *hegemon* to which the order of the universe points. Accordingly, when Athanasius describes creation as "illumined by the hegemony of the *Logos*" (*Gent.* 41), he is not describing some autonomous power of the *Logos,* but rather the fact that the God of the universe "steers and establishes the whole of creation by his own *Logos,* who is himself God" (τῷ ἑαυτοῦ Λόγῳ καὶ αὐτῷ ὄντι Θεῷ, *Gent.* 41).

In general, however, Athanasius reserves the title ἡγεμών for the *Logos,* who exercises the Father's hegemony over creation,[127] and indeed one of Athanasius' favored images is that of the *Logos* as king. In addition to the analogy of *Gent.* 38, whereby the well-ordered city proves the existence of a single ruler, at *Gent.* 43 Athanasius likens the *Logos* to a ruler who has built and administers a great city. In *Inc.,* by contrast, the royal imagery takes on a soteriological dimension: when a king has entered a city, that city is thereafter honored, just as the *Logos,* by entering the body, has rescued it from death (*Inc.* 9); likewise, just as a king does not abandon a city that he has built if it has been taken by enemies, but rather returns to rescue it, so also the

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[127] *V. Gent.* 1, 29, 38, 44, 47; *Inc.* 12, 16, 41. In enumerating the various titles of Christ used in *Inc.,* Kannengiesser, *Sur l'incarnation,* pp. 86-93, neglects to mention ἡγεμών, although he does list the more scriptural δεσπότης, which occurs six times in *Inc.*

Logos returned in the Incarnation to rescue Man, whom he created (*Inc.* 10); a king does not allow the lands that he has acquired to serve others, but guides them through letters and, if necessary, through his own presence, just as the *Logos* communicated with his people through the Law and the Prophets before his own appearance in the flesh (*Inc.* 13).

The unity of divine activity between Father and *Logos,* as well as the relationship between the divine *Logos* and the human *logos,* is perhaps most memorably described in another royal allegory at *Ar.* 78-80, Athanasius' only significant reflection on the image outside of *Gent.-Inc.* In an attempt to disarm the Arians' most favored proof-text, the words of personified Wisdom at Prv 8.22 ("The Lord created me, a beginning of his ways, for his works"), Athanasius contrives the interpretation whereby this verse refers not to the creation of Wisdom, *i.e.* the Son and *Logos* of God, but rather to the creation of wisdom in humans.[128] "Just as," says Athanasius, "our *logos* is an image of the *Logos* who is the Son of God, so also the wisdom that has been created in us is an image of his Wisdom, in which we have the capacity for knowledge and prudence and thereby become capable of receiving the Wisdom, the creator (τῆς δημιουργοῦ σοφίας), and through her we are able to know her Father" (§78). To the traditional Origenic distinction between the terms λόγος and ὁ αὐτόλογος, σοφία and ἡ αὐτοσοφία, Athanasius adds the interpretation that human *logos* and wisdom are so closely associated with their iconic prototype that the divine *Logos* and Sophia, Christ, can refer to them as himself. It is for this reason, argues Athanasius, that Christ could tell his disciples, "he who receives you receives me" (*ibid.*; Mt 10.40), just as, because of the close identification of Christ with his body, *i.e.* the

[128] This passage provides, therefore, an interesting counterexample to the partitive exegesis with which Athanasius is generally associated. *V.* Behr, *The Nicene Faith,* pp. 208-15.

Church, he could ask the future apostle, "Saul, why are you persecuting me?" (§80; Acts 9.4). Athanasius therefore concludes that in Prv 8.22, "although he is not one of those being created (τῶν κτιζομένων), nevertheless, because his image and impress (τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ τύπον) is being created in his works (ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις), he says, as though it were himself (ὡς αὐτὸς ὤν), 'the Lord created me, a beginning of his ways, in his works.'"[129] To illustrate his argument, Athanasius composes an allegory that neatly preserves the schema of a God who is the ultimate demiurge and *hegemon* of the universe, but who creates and rules through his Son, who, in turn, leaves his own impress upon creation:

> Just as if some son of a king, when his father wanted to build a city, were to inscribe his own name on each of the works as he made them, both to ensure that the works might endure because his name appeared clearly upon each of them and so that from his name his people might be able to remember both him and his father; when he has completed the city, if he were to be asked how the city was built, he would say, "It was securely built, for I have been depicted (ἐξεικονίσθην) in each work in accordance with my father's will, for my name has been built in the works" (ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις).… Likewise… the true Wisdom replies to those who marvel at the wisdom found in created beings, "'The Lord created me in his works' (εἰς ἔργα). For it is my impress (τύπος) that is in them, and in this I have condescended to the creation" (τῇ δημιουργίᾳ, §79).

Although Athanasius is explicating the expression εἰς ἔργα, his true focus is the impress of Wisdom left in Man, which is identical with the human *logos*. The Arian interpretation of Prv

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[129] Although εἰς ἔργα is best regarded as expressing purpose or intent ("for his works," *i.e.* "in order to perform his works"), it is clear from Athanasius' argument, both in this sentence and in the prince's response in the allegory that follows (τὸ γὰρ ἐμὸν ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐνεκτίσθη), that Athanasius interprets εἰς ἔργα as equivalent to ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. Aside from the obvious polemical demands, such an interpretation is understandable in light of the increasing frequency with which these two prepositions were interchanged in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. *V.* Jannaris, *An Historical Greek Grammar,* §§1538, 1547.

8.22 has compelled Athanasius to follow Origen,[130] or at least the Alexandrian tradition, in applying the language and theology of the *Logos* to divine Wisdom, to which he had previously ascribed a far less prominent role. This is clear from the fact that nowhere in *Gent.-Inc.* does Athanasius reflect on Wisdom in herself, nor in her impress in Man.[131] Just as both Wisdom and *Logos* are titles of Christ in his role as the image of God, so the wisdom in Man is described in the same terms as *logos*: it is the image of a divine prototype and the faculty by which one attains knowledge of the *Logos/*Wisdom, Christ, and, through him, of the Father. Athanasius even explains the phrase, "beginning of his ways," through this anagogic role of human wisdom/ *logos*: it is only through wisdom that Man begins his journey, *i.e.* "his ways," through Wisdom towards God, hence Solomon says, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (§80; Prv 1.7). As with the relationship between the *Logos* and human *logos,* moreover, that between Wisdom and human wisdom is iconic not only in a general sense, but in the specific sense of Gn 1.27. For this reason, Athanasius insists that if humans maintain their wisdom and through it recognize the true Wisdom of God, "they will know that they have truly been created in the image of God" (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ, §79); in other words, the recognition of divine Wisdom is the same process as recognizing the Image according to which man was created. When, therefore,

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[130] Kannengiesser, "Origen's Doctrines," p. 891, observes that *Logos* and *Sophia* are identical in Origen, save for different functions: "*Sophia* plunging into divine mysteries and containing them in herself, whereas the *Logos per se* communicates them." The assimilation of the two, moreover, provides a more scriptural basis for *Logos* and "dispenses Origen from any explicit recourse to philosophical cosmogonies" (*ibid.*). Origen himself even acknowledges (*comm. in Jo.* 1.118) that *Sophia* is the most ancient revealed title for the Son (*v. ibid,* pp. 892f.).

[131] In fully eleven of the sixteen times that Athanasius mentions divine Wisdom in *Gent.-Inc.,* Athanasius uses the title only in passing as an additional title of the Son or *Logos, e.g. Inc.* 32: Θεοῦ Υἱός ἐστιν ἀληθινός, ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἷα δὴ ἐκ Πατρὸς ἴδιος Λόγος καὶ Σοφία καὶ Δύναμις ὑπάρχων. Another four times Athanasius mentions Wisdom only to introduce a quotation from either Prv or Wis. Only once (*Inc.* 46) does he mention "the true Wisdom of God" absolutely, and then only in contrast to "Greek wisdom" and in a passage devoted to the effects of the incarnation of "the true *Logos* of God."

Athanasius writes that "the impress [of Wisdom] is created in her works, just as the image of the Image" (ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς εἰκόνος τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα, §80), these two impresses, as well as the human *logos,* must not be understood as distinct, but one and the same.

The iconic relationship between the *Logos* and the human *logos* furthermore enables Athanasius to explain theology in anthropological terms, as at *Gent.* 45, where Athanasius invokes the relationship between *nous* and *logos* to explain that between Father and *Logos.* There, in an account of his characteristic epistemology, Athanasius describes how Man can look to the heavens and be reminded of the *Logos* who adorned them and, through him, apprehend "God, his Father, from whom he proceeds (προϊών) and is, therefore, rightly called 'interpreter' and 'messenger' of his own Father." For Athanasius these titles of Christ[132] bespeak the fact that the *Logos* is the means by which the Father expresses his will in the same way that in humans *logos* gives expression to *nous*:

> One may also see this from our own construction (ἐκ τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς). For if, when speech proceeds (λόγου προϊόντος) from humans, we conclude that its source (πηγήν) is the *nous* and, by thinking upon the speech, we see with our rational faculty (τῷ λογισμῷ) that the *nous* is interpreted by it (σημαινόμενον), all the more, when with a much greater and incomparably superior act of imagination we see the power of the *Logos,* we also receive a conception (ἔννοιαν) of his noble Father, as the savior himself says, 'He who has seen me has seen the Father."

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[132] Presumably the titles ἑρμηνεύς and ἄγγελος derive from Jn 1.18 (θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε· μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο) and Is 9.6 (καλεῖται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Μεγάλης βουλῆς ἄγγελος); Athanasius, however, appears to adopt the pair from Dionysius of Alexandria, to whom he attributes the following: ὁ πατήρ, ὁ μέγιστος καὶ καθόλου νοῦς, πρῶτον τὸν υἱὸν λόγον ἑρμηνέα <καὶ> ἄγγελον ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει (*Dion.* 23). *V.* Meijering, *Athanasius: Contra Gentes,* p. 143.

This idea, ultimately derived from Origen,[133] though inherited *via* Dionysius of Alexandria,[134] presumes the fundamental likeness between the divine relations and human psychology and comes nigh to establishing a psychological trinitarian analogy.[135]

Perhaps the most conspicuous marker of Athanasius' Origenic inheritance is his spiritualized cardiocentrism. Nothing in Athanasius' writings would indicate that he gave much consideration to the location of the *hegemonikon* beyond accepting Origen's teaching on the matter. Athanasius provides no argument for the validity of the cardiocentric position, but rather takes scriptural language regarding the heart as the self-evident proof that the *nous* and the heart are to be equated. This presumption is seen at *Gent.* 2 (discussed above), where Athanasius describes how Adam enjoyed, by virtue of his *nous,* an unashamed freedom before God and contemplation of noetic realities. Developing this theme, Athanasius in the following sentence

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[133] Or., *comm. in Jo.* 1.38.277; *v.* discussion of the passage in the previous section.

[134] Meijering, *Athanasius: Contra Gentes,* p. 143. The debt to Dionysius is evident in the fragments that Athanasius preserves, *Dion.* 23.3f:

(from bk. 1) πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ὁ θεός· ποταμὸς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προχεόμενος ὁ υἱὸς ἀναγέγραπται. ἀπόρροια γὰρ νοῦ λόγος καί, ὡς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων εἰπεῖν, ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος ἐξοχετεύεται, ἕτερος γινόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου ὁ διὰ γλώσσης νοῦς προπηδῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔμεινε προπέμψας καὶ ἔστιν οἷος ἦν, ὁ δὲ ἐξέπτη προπεμφθεὶς καὶ φέρεται πανταχοῦ· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἕτερος ὢν θατέρου, καὶ ἕν εἰσιν ὄντες δύο. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἓν καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι.

(from bk. 4) ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς ἐρεύγεται μὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν λόγον, ὡς εἶπεν ὁ προφήτης· 'ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου λόγον ἀγαθόν', καὶ ἔστι μὲν ἑκάτερος ἕτερος θατέρου, ἴδιον καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ κεχωρισμένον εἰληχὼς τόπον, ὁ μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης καὶ τοῦ στόματος οἰκῶν τε καὶ κινούμενος· οὐ μὴν διεστήκασιν οὐδὲ καθάπαξ ἀλλήλων στέρονται οὐδέ ἐστιν οὔτε ὁ νοῦς ἄλογος οὔτε ἄνους ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ὅ γε νοῦς ποιεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐν αὐτῷ φανεὶς καὶ ὁ λόγος δείκνυσι τὸν νοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος, καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἐστιν οἷον λόγος ἐγκείμενος, ὁ δὲ λόγος νοῦς προπηδῶν. καὶ μεθίσταται μὲν ὁ νοῦς εἰς τὸν λόγον, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸν νοῦν εἰς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἐγκυκλεῖ. καὶ οὕτως ὁ νοῦς διὰ τοῦ λόγου ταῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ψυχαῖς ἐνιδρύεται συνεισιὼν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν οἷον πατὴρ ὁ νοῦς τοῦ λόγου ὢν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ δὲ καθάπερ υἱὸς ὁ λόγος τοῦ νοῦ, πρὸ ἐκείνου μὲν ἀδύνατον ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἔξωθέν ποθεν σὺν ἐκείνῳ γενόμενος, βλαστήσας δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. οὕτως ὁ πατήρ, ὁ μέγιστος καὶ καθόλου νοῦς, πρῶτον τὸν υἱὸν λόγον ἑρμηνέα <καὶ> ἄγγελον ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει.

[135] *Cf. Inc.* 42, where Athanasius explains the incarnation in similar terms: Καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ νοῦς, δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὤν, ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σώματος, τῆς γλώττης λέγω, σημαίνεται, καὶ οὐ δήπου τις ἐλαττοῦσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ νοῦ διὰ τοῦτο λέγει· οὕτως ὁ Λόγος, διὰ πάντων ὤν, εἰ ἀνθρωπίνῳ κέχρηται ὀργάνῳ, οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς ἂν φαίνοιτο τοῦτο. Here the *nous*, though not localized to any part of the body, employs the tongue (*n.b.* the connection to *logos*) as an instrument of revelation, just as the *Logos* revealed himself through a body.

substitutes "soul" for "*nous,*" which he later equates to the heart when he declares the soul sufficient to reflect God. Like Origen,[136] Athanasius sees the soul's divine vision evidenced in the sixth beatitude (Mt 5.8): "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." The Origenic legacy is even more prominent at *Gent.* 30 (also discussed above), where Athanasius establishes a scriptural basis for man's path to knowledge of God, which he explicitly names as "the soul of each man and the *nous* that is in it":

> [The path to God] is in us… just as Moses himself taught when he said, "the word (ῥῆμα) of faith is within your heart" (Dt 30.14), which the Savior also declared and affirmed when he said, "the sovereignty (βασιλεία) of God is within you" (Lk 17.12). For when we have within ourselves the faith and the sovereignty of God, we are quickly able to contemplate and apprehend the king of the universe (τὸν τοῦ παντὸς βασιλέα), the saving *Logos* of the Father.

By Athanasius' reckoning, both "the word of faith" that is in the heart and the inner kingdom of God are equivalent to the *nous* of the soul. This is particularly significant since Origen had appealed to Dt 30.14, or at least Paul's rendering of it at Rom 10.8, as evidence that the apostle was a fellow cardiocentrist (*Princ.* 1.3.6, discussed in previous section). Origen places the exegetical focus on ῥῆμα, which he interprets as equivalent to λόγος. Against the background of Origen, it is clear that Athanasius, too, interprets this passage in a cardiocentric manner: the "path to God," which he has elsewhere specified as the *nous,* is equivalent to the "word of faith" that is found in the heart. Athanasius also betrays his fealty to Origen's cardiocentrism with his use of Lk 17.12 to describe the *nous*. Like Origen before him and Basil and Gregory after him, Athanasius interprets βασιλεία very literally, as "kingship" or "sovereignty," even as an

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[136] Or., *Cels.* 7.33

equivalent to ἡγεμονία, and is here referring to the role of the human *logos* within man.[137] Thus, as the "kingship" of God within man, the *nous* facilitates his apprehension of the king of the universe.[138]

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[137] At *Hom. 13 in Gen.,* §4, Origen argues on the basis of Lk 17.21 that the believer becomes a source of living water because the word of God is present in him. This passage is immediately followed by a discussion of the parable of the lost drachma, which he says is "the image of the heavenly king" in man, and an exposition on the image proper as described in Gn 1.27. Thus, it is clear that Origen equates the inner "sovereignty of God" with the image, as do his exegetical followers, such as Athanasius in the passage at hand; *v.* also Bas., *ep.* 8.12; Gr. Nyss., *virg.* 12. Origen's other interpretations of the "kingdom of God" include the omnipresent *Logos* himself (*Hom. 18 in Jer.,* §2), the seeds of truth sown in the human soul (*comm. in Jo.* 19.2.77f.), and power in speech (*comm. in I Cor.,* fr. 22).

[138] In addition to these examples, two passages in the dubious *Exp. Ps.* express a cardiocentric view. Ps 118.51 (Ὑπερήφανοι παρηνόμουν ἕως σφόδρα, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ νόμου σου οὐκ ἐξέκλινα.) is explained with the following scholion: Ἐν αὐτῷ [sc. νόμῳ] γὰρ ἐπολιτευόμην, τηρῶν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν μου, ἵνα μὴ γένηται ῥῆμα κρυπτὸν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου ἀνόμιμον. To Ps 118.145 (Ἐκέκραξα ἐν ὅλῃ καρδίᾳ μου) is appended this scholion: Ὃ γὰρ ἐλάλουν κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ὁ Θεός. These scholia, attributed to Athanasius in the *catenae,* exhibit a decidedly Origenic air, especially in the use of τὸ ἡγεμονικόν as a mere synonym of *nous*/heart (*v.* previous section).

Chapter 3: Basil's Theology and Anthropology in the Eunomian Controversy

Non-Nicene Interpretations of the Image

Athanasius' works exemplify the waning usefulness of the exegesis of Gn 1.26f. during the Arian crisis. While the exegesis of these verses had formed a central element in the anthropology and theology of the Alexandrian tradition, they offered little of polemical value to Athanasius' defense of Nicaea. If anything, the traditional complex of Gn 1.26f., Col 1.15, and Heb 1.3, whereby the image of God is the *Logos,* after whose image man is created, lent itself more easily to a non-Nicene interpretation than to reconciliation with the Nicene *homoousion.* Polemically, the Alexandrian interpretation was more useful for combatting the Sabellian tendencies of Nicea's supporters.[1] This tendency is most evident in Eusebius' *Marcell.* (c. 337), where it is Eusebius and the object of Marcellus' attacks, Asterius, that defend, and Marcellus that attacks, the traditional Alexandrine scheme. For example, Eusebius preserves one passage in which Marcellus denies that Gn 1.26f. reflects the separate existence of Father and Son; in response to Neronius of Narcissus' claim that the plural ποιήσωμεν distinguishes the Father and the Son in power, Marcellus counters that the same prophet also wrote "and God created the man" in the singular (*Marcell.* 1.4.53f.).[2] The plural exhortation, Marcellus argues in another passage, is not spoken to a separate entity, but rather must be understood as God speaking to his own *logos* in the manner of a sculptor who says to himself, "Come, let us make, let us fashion a

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[1] *V.* anathema XIV of the Creed of the Council of Sirmium (351), discussed below.

[2] Marcell., fr. 80 (Klostermann); *v.* Lienhard, *Contra Marcellum,* pp. 56, 89.

statue" (*Marcell.* 2.2.38).[3] Elsewhere Marcellus objects to Asterius' description of the only-begotten *Logos* as the "exact image (ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα) of [the Father's] essence, will, glory, and power" (*Marcell.* 1.4.33).[4] Marcellus argues that, if the Son is God, then he cannot also be the image of God, "for the image of God is one thing, and God is another. So, if he is the image, then he is neither Lord nor God, but rather an image of the Lord and of God" (§34). Eusebius' response to this passage demonstrates the congruousness of the title "icon" to an homœan framework; Marcellus, he says, does not understand that "the Son can be said to be a living (ἔμψυχος) image of his own Father, since he is very similar to the Father" (τῷ πατρὶ ὁμοιότατος, §35). To his argument Eusebius adduces several of the verses that had become commonplace in the Alexandrine exegesis of the image, including Gn 5.3 and Heb 1.3 (§36f.).

While Marcellus accepts the identification of the Son with the image, he regards the image of God as physical, something that is subject to sight. In another passage preserved by Eusebius, Marcellus asks rhetorically, "When else did he become the image than when he took on the form (πλάσμα) that is after the image and likeness? Before that, as I have often said, he was nothing other than the *Logos*" (*Marcell.* 2.3.23).[5] Elsewhere, Marcellus states his case more clearly: "before assuming our body, the *Logos* in himself was not the 'image of the invisible God,' for it is proper that an image be seen, so that, through the image, that which was formerly invisible can now be seen" (*ibid.*).[6] Marcellus argues that a pre-incarnate *Logos* could never be

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[3] Marcell., fr. 52 (Klostermann); *v.* Hanson, *The Search,* pp. 225, 843.

[4] Ast. Soph., fr. 10 (Vinzent); Marcell., fr. 96 (Klostermann)

[5] Marcell., fr. 91 (Klostermann)

[6] Marcell., fr. 92 (Klostermann)

an image of the invisible God, because the notion of an invisible image is oxymoronic: only Christ in the flesh can perform the function of an image, namely to make the invisible visible (§24).[7] Marcellus' logic leads him to argue against the by then long-established tradition that the image of God is not bodily. Disregarding the traditional distinction between the verbs πλάττω and ποιῶ, Marcellus interprets Gn 1.26 as God speaking "while molding [the human flesh] with his own Wisdom" and concludes that God "rightly called the human flesh 'an image.' For he knew precisely that, somewhat later, it would be an image of his own *Logos*" (εἰκὼν ἔσται μικρὸν ὕστερον τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ λόγου, §29).[8] Eusebius counters that Marcellus' designation of the flesh as the image would deprive the Savior of any unique status as the image of God, since all human bodies would equally be images (§25).

By contrast, Eusebius, for whom the very point of the title "image" is to indicate the Son's distinct existence, divinity, and inferiority to the Father,[9] adheres to a traditional Alexandrian, even Philonic, interpretation of the image, as evidenced by the sources on which he bases his arguments. At *P.e.* 7.18.1f., Eusebius quotes at length the passage from *Plant.* 18-20 in which Philo interprets Gn 2.7 as the moment at which the image was bestowed on man. Similarly, the whole of *P.e.* 13.13 consists of two extensive quotations from Clement, *Str.* 5, and includes Clement's statement that the encephalocentric understanding of the *hegemonikon* corroborates the interpretation of Gn 2.7 as the inbreathing of the rational soul (*P.e.* 13.13.13f. =

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[7] Marcell., fr. 93 (Klostermann)

[8] Marcell., fr. 95 (Klostermann)

[9] *V.* Lienhard, *Contra Marcellum,* p. 118-20.

Str. 5.14.94.3-6). Eusebius, however, has a unique way of conflating Gn 1.26f. and 2.7, which he describes at *P.e.* 7.10.9:

> by [Moses'] definition, the true man is in the soul and, because he was created after the image of God, has a share of intellectual (νοερᾶς), bodiless, and rational essence; but the body is an earthly covering (περίβλημα) of the soul; and he adds to these a third item, "the breath of life," a faculty that unites and connects that which has been taken from the earth to that which has been made in the image of God.

This description attempts to reconcile Philo's two interpretations of Gn 1f.: the two creations are distinguished as that of the *nous* and that of the body, while the inbreathing of the breath of life refers, not to the implantation of the image of God, but rather to the bestowal of a third element constitutive of man's composite nature. Despite this novel conjecture, Eusebius restates the traditional Alexandrian interpretation of the rational nature and hegemonic role of the image in the continuation of the passage: Moses' narrative proclaims that "from [the divine likeness] we have also received the immortality of the soul, for it is sacrilege that the image of a king be destroyed. The archetype and true image of the God of all is his own *Logos,*... but the image of the image is the human *nous,* and for this reason [Moses] has concluded that [man] was created 'after the image of God'" (7.10.11f.). Eusebius, moreover, identifies the rational image as the source of man's hegemony. In his comments on Philo, *Plant.* 18-20, Eusebius concludes that because man alone "has been created in the image of God and in [his] likeness in respect to his soul, therefore his nature is also observed to be authoritative and royal" (ἀρχικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν, 7.18.3). As Eusebius further explains, it is the intellectual and rational nature of his soul that enables him to master various arts and sciences and, therefore, to rule over the irrational beasts,

who "serve him as master and guide" (§4).[10] Eusebius further emphasizes the hegemonic role of the image when he contrasts the earthly body, which he likens to a beast of burden or loyal slave, to "the inner master" (τὸν δ' εἴσω δεσπότην), which, "because it is noble and akin to God by nature, [one should] honor liberally just as it has been honored by the cause of all himself" (§6).

In general, non-Nicenes accepted the standard Alexandrian interpretation of Gn 1.26, whereby the plural ποιήσωμεν indicates the Father addressing the Son.[11] Eusebius himself argues that "let us make" plainly refers to "the command and exhortation of the first cause (αἴτιον) to the second, as though of a father to a son" (*P.e.* 7.12.11). The moderate Arians who had gathered at Sirmium (351)[12] to condemn Marcellus and Athanasius and to depose Marcellus' student and sometime deacon, Photinus, appended to their creed the following anathema: "If anyone should that the Father does not say, 'Let us make man,' to the Son, but rather that God spoke unto himself [αὐτὸν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν … τὸν θεὸν εἰρηκέναι], let him be anathema."[13] In a letter to Rufianus *et al.*, Germinius of Sirmium repeats this idea and adds that the locution "in our image and likeness" supports the homœan cause: "he added [this phrase] so that he might

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[10] *Cf.* Eus., *P.e.* 11.27.3f., where Eusebius interprets Gn 1.26f. to say that man "was created royal and authoritative over all the things of the earth" (ἀρχικόν φησιν καὶ βασιλικὸν γεγονέναι τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἁπάντων) and concludes that man's dominion over the animals as described in Gn 1.26 is a self-evident corollary to his possession of the divine image: πῶς δ' ἂν ἄλλως εἰκὼν ἐπινοοῖτο θεοῦ καὶ ὁμοίωμα ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ θεῷ δυνάμεις καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁμοιότητα;

[11] For most of the following citations, I rely on the appendix in Vaggione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus,* p. 383.

[12] The historical record, which names four different councils between 347 and 358, is very confused. Barnes, *Athanasius and Constantius,* pp. 231f., argues that some of the some of the supposed councils were small, less formal meetings, and that the council of 351, whose creed Athansius transmits, is the first true, formal council of Sirmium.

[13] Ath., *Syn.* 27.3 (anathema XIV)

reveal that his Son is God and like (*similem*) unto him in all things" (*ep. Ruf.* 1.4).[14] While explaining that all appearances and actions of God in Scripture are those of the Son, the Arian bishop Maximinus argues in his conference with Augustine that the Father's speech to the Son at Gn 1.26 proves that the Son has always been visible from the time of Adam to the incarnation; he further argues that the following verse can only mean that the Son created man (Aug., *Coll. Max.* 14.26 = PL 42.739). At the end of the fifth century, Vigilius of Thapsus will even put this argument in the mouth of Arius in a fictional dialogue between Athanasius and the major heresiarchs of the past:

> Behold he said "let us make" in the plural and clearly showed another to whom God addressed his speech.… Indeed, so that Scripture might show that one had spoken to another, it immediately continues, saying, "And God made man; he made him in the image of God." If there were one, it would say that he had made [man] in his own image. Now, however, one is clearly described as having made [man] in the image of the other (*Ar. Sabel. Dial.* 1.8 = PL 62.185c-d).[15]

The anonymous Arian author of a commentary on Job states that only Moses, who received a revelation from the Holy Spirit, could know that the Father alone spoke the words of Gn 1.26 to the Son (*Job* 1 = PG 17.374a); in another treatise he gives the following summary of 1.26f.: "God spoke, and God made, that is, the Father commanded, and the Son fulfilled [his command]" (*Jud.* 2.4 (80r) = CSCL 87/i.96).

While the more moderate non-Nicenes remained faithful to the traditional Alexandrian interpretation of the image, Eunomius and his allies estranged themselves from this tradition

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[14] Hil., *fragg. hist.* B V.VI.1-4 (*CSEL* 65.161.26-162.1); *V.* Hanson, *The Search,* pp. 593-95.

[15] This passage is especially noteworthy because it is premised on Philo's condensed interpretation of Gn 1.27 ("God made man in the image of God."), a commonplace in the Alexandrian tradition and the very basis of Gregory's anti-Eunomian argument in *Hom. opif.* 16.

through a greater scrutiny of the term "image" as applied to the Son. This can be seen in Ps.-Didymus, *Trin.* 1.16, which contains a lengthy rebuttal of three Anomœan arguments[16] against the correlation between image and divinity: 1) that the Father is incomparable and greater than the Son; 2) that "image" and "God" are mutually exclusive terms; and 3) that Scripture also describes man as the image and glory of God. It is telling of the Anomœan estrangement from the Alexandrian exegetical tradition that Ps.-Didymus is able to counter the third of these arguments by appeal to Heb 1.3: man may be described as God's image and glory, but the term εἰκών in reference to the Son must be understood as equivalent to "the radiance of the glory of God and the express image of his *hypostasis*"[17]:

> "It is one thing for man to be an image of God, that is, for the handiwork to be an image of its maker (τὸ τεχνηθὲν τοῦ τεχνησαμένου), just as a chair[18] is an image of its carpenter…; but it is another thing to be, in likeness of form, identity of essence, and an equal lack of origin, the radiance of his glory and the personally subsistent and absolutely unerring impress of his *hypostasis*" (χαρακτῆρα ὑποστάσεως ἐνυπόστατον καὶ ἀψευδέστατον, §44).

The Eunomians' remove from the Alexandrian tradition, as well as their correct estimation of this verse as foundational thereof, is further shown by their appeal to Gn 1.26 to *disprove* the Son's status as the *Logos*. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thes.* 19 (PG 75, coll. 321d-24a), preserves the Eunomian argument that, if the Son were by nature the very Word of God, then the Father could

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[16] That the author counters specifically Anomœan, and not simply non-Nicene, arguments is clear from the terms used in 1.16.1: Καὶ *τὸ ἀσύγκριτον* δὲ καὶ μεῖζον τῷ πατρὶ διὰ *τὸ ἀγέννητον* ἀπονέμουσιν, τῷ δὲ υἱῷ *τὸ ἀνόμοιον* διὰ τὸ ἔχειν *τὸ γεννητόν,* καθέλκοντες πάλιν τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρρητοτάτης θεότητος εἰς τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἀποτελέσματα καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης ῥεύμασιν συνεξομοιοῦσθαι νομίζοντες.

[17] I leave the term ὑπόστασις transliterated here because, although in Heb 1.3 it means something closer to "being" or "existence," in the polemical circumstances of the late-fourth century, Ps.-Didymus almost certainly understands the term in its later technical sense.

[18] Or, perhaps, "chariot" (δίφρος).

not speak to him, as he does at Gn 1.26, because a word cannot be addressed to another word. The Eunomians base this argument on the more basic tenet that "like cannot be in like" (ἀδυνάτου παντάπασιν ὄντος τοῦ τὸ ὅμοιον ἐν ὁμοίῳ γίνεσθαι, *ibid.*), *e.g.* color cannot be in color, and word cannot be in word. The title "Word," argue the Eunomians, indicates, not that the Son exists by nature from the Father or is the Father's immanent Word (ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), but that the Son hears and proclaims the Father's word (*ibid.,* 325c). Although little evidence survives that would indicate how the Eunomians understood the image in man, these passages demonstrate that their arguments against the similarity or consubstantiality of the Son to the Father also denied the Son his status of *Logos* and true Image and also, presumably, his role as the prototype of the image in man.

Eunomius himself grants that the Son is the image of the Father, but qualifies this as an image of the Father's activity (ἐνέργεια) rather than his essence (οὐσία). As Eunomius argues at *Apol.* 24, the will (βούλησις) of the Father is an activity, and, since the Son exists by the will of the Father, "the Son necessarily preserves the likeness (τὴν ὁμοιότητα), not by virtue of his essence, but by virtue of his activity." A proper understanding of the term εἰκών, argues Eunomius, is to be found at Col 1.15f.: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation, because in him were created all things, both in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible." Focusing on the conjunction ὅτι, Eunomius insists that the Son is only the image of God inasmuch as all things were created in him; this constitutes a likeness, not of essence, but of the activity through which the unbegotten essence, *i.e.* the Father, creates the Son, in whom are

created all things.[19] According to Eunomius, the point of likeness between Father and Son is "the activity that is unbegottenly stored in his foreknowledge (ἐναποκειμένην ἀγεννήτως τῇ προγνώσει) before either the Son or the things created in him came into existence" (*ibid.*). This cumbersome phrase is Eunomius' attempt to explain in non-ontological terms the iconic relationship usually presumed, on the basis of Gn 5.3, to exist between Father and Son.[20] The image for Eunomius is that in the Son is visible the creative power of the Father. Paul, he says, indicates this by using the phrase "in him" rather than "through him"[21]; by adding the term "firstborn," Paul furthermore excludes the Son from the category of "unbegotten," which Eunomius understands to be the actual essence and proper name of God. The term "image," therefore, cannot be used to describe the relationship between the Unbegotten and his offspring, for, if the essence of God is to be unbegotten, then there can be no likeness with the Son. Eunomius redefines the term "image" in order to account for its scriptural use: "image" expresses the asymmetrical relationship between the name "Father," which expresses the *activity* of begetting, and the name "Son," which refers to the *essence* of the firstborn (*ibid.*). So long as defined in terms of activity, Eunomius avoids neither the term "image," nor even the epithet ὅμοιος, as at *Exp. fid.* 3.31f., where he acknowledges that the Son is

> alone like (ὅμοιον) unto the one who begot him … not as a father to a father (for there are not two fathers), nor as a son to a son (since there are not two sons), nor as unbegotten to unbegotten (for the Almighty is alone unbegotten, and the Only-begotten is alone

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[19] Vaggione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus,* p. 176, n. 145, points out that Eunomius follows an established tradition of interpreting Col 1.15 that includes Asterius (frr. 3, 90) and Arius (Ath., *Ar.* 2.63f, 3.1).

[20] *V.* Vaggione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus,* p. 249.

[21] At *Apol.* 26, however, Eunomius will say that "all things came into being *through him*" (δι' αὐτοῦ).

> begotten), but as a son to a father, as an image and seal of all the activity and power of the Almighty.

Unfortunately, the remains of Eunomius' writings are too fragmentary to indicate how, or if, he correlated the Son's role as the image of the Father's will and activity to man's creation according to the image. As already seen, the Eunomians appealed to this correlation primarily to deny a unique status to the Son, which hints that, owing to their intense focus on God and his unbegotten essence, they may have lacked a developed anthropology. At the very least, it is likely that Eunomius and his followers would not regard the image of God in man as an ontological reality when they denied the same to the Son; that is, the image in man must, as in the case of the Son, be one of activity. The Eunomian rejection of the Alexandrian exegetical tradition implies the rejection, perhaps unwitting, of the much larger theological and anthropological synthesis, of which the exegesis was but a part. Basil and Gregory will exploit this vulnerability and reassert the Alexandrian paradigm as part of their polemic against Eunomius.

Basil's Earlier Works

Despite perennial attempts to clear Basil of the taint of Origenic influence, his anthropology and theology of the image place him squarely in the Alexandrian tradition.[22] With somewhat

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[22] Apart from the two articles by Aghiorgoussis, "Applications" and "Image as 'Sign'," Basil's understanding of the image of God has been largely neglected, perhaps because the authenticity of *Struct. hom.* was for so long in doubt. Rousseau, "Human Nature," discusses the theme as it appears in *Struct. hom.* Hamman's diachronic study mentions Basil only twice (*L'image de Dieu,* pp. 235, 238f.), in passing reference to his influence on Gregory of Nyssa and, *via* Ambrose, Augustine. Unlike that of Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, Athanasius, Gregory, and Augustine, Basil's teaching on the image has not been the subject of one or more monographs.

inconsistent vocabulary, he describes the *nous/*soul/*logos* as being created in the image of God[23] and as the "true" or "inner man," which he most clearly states at *Att.* 3:

> For we ourselves are one thing, but the things that are ours are another, and the things that are about us are yet another. "We," then, are our soul and *nous,* in which (καθ' ὃν) we have been created (γεγενήμεθα) after the image of the creator (τοῦ κτίσαντος), but the body and the senses exercised through it are "ours," and money, works of art, and the rest of life's possessions are "about us."[24]

On the basis of this equation, Basil reinterprets the exhortation of Dt 15.9: "'Give heed to yourself,' that is, 'to your soul'" (*ibid.*).[25] Basil, furthermore, has inherited Philo's tendency to conflate Gn 1.27 and 2.7, as at *hom. in Ps. 48,* §8, where he explains that man is "in honor" (Ps 49.12) by virtue of being created in the image of the creator, whereby humans enjoy "the power to apprehend and understand their creator…. For 'he breathed into the face,' that is, he placed a portion of his own grace in the man so that he might know like by like."[26] In one passage, Basil preserves Philo's condensed version of Gn 1.27, in which God appears twice: "Let us be called back to the first glory of the image of God. For it says, 'God made the man after the image and

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[23] *E.g., ep.* 46.4 (ψυχὴν ἔνοικον … κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ πεποιημένην); *ep.* 233 (καλὸν μὲν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔχομεν τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος); *Grat.* 2 (PG 219.221cf., κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος ἐγενήθημεν· νοῦν καὶ λόγον συμπληροῦντα ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν ἔχομεν, δι' οὗ Θεὸν ἐγνωρίσαμεν); *Fam.* 5 (PG 31.317a, κατ' εἰκόνα ἰδίαν τὸν λόγον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ χαρίσασθαι).

[24] Rudberg, *L'homélie,* pp. 26f.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 27

[26] PG 29b.449bf.; *Cf. Fam.* 5 (PG 31.317a, Τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸν μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἔπεισεν ἐν ἀρχῇ δημιουργῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον; Τίς δὲ ὁ κατεπείξας τὸν Κτίστην καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον χοῦν λαβεῖν, καὶ τοιοῦτον ἐκ πηλοῦ κάλλος εἰδοποιῆσαι; Τίς ὁ πρὸς ἀνάγκην πείσας κατ' εἰκόνα ἰδίαν τὸν λόγον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ χαρίσασθαι…;); *hom. in Ps. 115,* §4 (PG 30.109b, ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς διαπλσθείς, λόγῳ τετίμηται, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα φορεῖν δύναται τοῦ ἐπουρανίου); *Spir.* 16.39 (Ἀνακαινίζων γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ Κύριος καί, ἣν ἀπώλεσε χάριν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφυσήματος τοῦ Θεοῦ, ταύτην πάλιν ἀποδιδούς, ἐμφυσήσας εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον τῶν μαθητῶν, τί φησι; «Λάβετε Πνεῦμα ἅγιον…»). *Cf.* also Basil's novel, almost Philonic, interpretation of Ps 33.9 (Ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶπε, καὶ ἐγενήθησαν· αὐτὸς ἐνετείλατο, καὶ ἐκτίσθησαν.), in which he distinguishes the verbs ἐγενήθησαν and ἐκτίσθησαν as referring, respectively, to the original fashioning (πλάσμα) from the earth and the second creation, *i.e.* rebirth through Christ (*hom. in Ps. 32,* §6; PG 29b.337d-40a).

likeness of God" (*Bapt.* 1.2.7).[27] Some passages hint that Basil may distinguish between image and likeness,[28] but he never reflects openly on the topic, and these passages are counterbalanced by his repetition of Origen's description of the fall as the exchange of the heavenly image with the earthly.[29] Man is, furthermore, the image of the king, as at *Lac.* 9, where Basil describes Satan's misanthropy as but an expression of his hate for God: "When he saw that the man had been created after the image and likeness of God, because he was unable to attack God, he poured out his wickedness on the image of God; just as if a man in his anger were to stone the [king's] image, because he could not stone the king himself, thereby striking the wood that holds his likeness" (τὴν μίμησιν, PG 1456c).[30] In an altogether different setting, Basil states the general principle that underlies this equation: "For the image of the king is also called 'king,'… because the honor paid to the image passes to its prototype" (*Spir.* 18.45).[31]

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[27] PG 31.1537a: εἰκόνα, γάρ φησι, καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

[28] *E.g. ep.* 233.1 (ἡ δὲ θειοτέρα καὶ ἀγαθὴ [δύναμις] πρὸς τὴν Θεοῦ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμᾶς ἀνάγουσα); *Eun.* 1.27 (Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀγαθότης τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καθόσον ἐσμὲν χωρητικοὶ, διὰ τῆς μελέτης καὶ τῆς ἀσκήσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων τῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων ὁμοιώσει προσάγει ἐν οἷς φησι· Γίνεσθε τέλειοι καθὼς καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν); *Spir.* 1.2 (ὅτι πρόκειται ἡμῖν ὁμοιωθῆναι Θεῷ, κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπου φύσει. Ὁμοίωσις δέ, οὐκ ἄνευ γνώσεως· ἡ δὲ γνῶσις, ἐκ διδαγμάτων) and 9.23 (Ἐντεῦθεν [*sc.* παρὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος] … ἡ ἐν Θεῷ διαμονή, ἡ πρὸς Θεὸν ὁμοίωσις, τὸ ἀκρότατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν, θεὸν γενέσθαι); *Att.* 7 (Rudberg, *L'homélie,* pp. 35f.; Σκόπει … πῶς μὲν πρὸς τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ὑπολισθαίνουσα πάθη τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπόλλυσι κάλλος· πῶς δὲ πάλιν, τὸ ἀπὸ κακίας αἶσχος καθηραμένη, δι' ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἀνατρέχει τοῦ κτίσαντος). To this last example, *cf. Lac.* 8 (PG 31.1453b; Ἐπονηρεύσατο ὁ διάβολος ὁρῶν … Θεὸν … πανταχόθεν τὸν παῖδα τὸν νήπιον παιδευόμενον, ἵνα εἰς Θεοῦ ὁμοιότητα ἀναδράμῃ).

[29] *hom. in Ps. 48,* §12: ἀποβαλὼν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου, [ὁ ἄνθρωπος] ἀνέλαβε τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ.

[30] Basil summarizes the idea, Μισάνθρωπος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ θεομάχος (*Lac.* 9; PG 1456b); *Cf. Mal.* 9 (PG 349c, ἐπειδὴ δὲ γέγονεν ἀποστάτης, ἐχθρὸς μὲν Θεοῦ, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπων τῶν κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγενημένων· διὰ τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι μισάνθρωπος, διότι καὶ θεομάχος· καὶ μισεῖ μὲν ἡμᾶς ὡς κτήματα τοῦ Δεσπότου, μισεῖ δὲ ὡς ὁμοιώματα τοῦ Θεοῦ).

[31] Here Basil is, of course, not describing man's relationship to God, but rather that of the Son to the Father. In *Spir.,* the point of this example is to show that the existence of the image of a king does not necessitate the existence of two kings, just as the existence of God from God (*i.e.* the Son) does not amount to the existence of two separately countable Gods. This passage took on an entirely new significance in the Iconoclastic controversy of the eighth and ninth centuries; *v.* Jo. D., *Imag.* 1.21, 35(=2.31; 3.48), 51(=2.47); 3.15, 41.

Basil's anthropology preserves, in addition to the traditional Alexandrian teaching on the image, certain Origenic hallmarks. At a most basic level, Basil has adopted Origen's tendency to use the term ἡγεμονικόν as a prosaic substitute for νοῦς: memories and our conception of God are respectively "inscribed" and "impressed … and stamped, as it were, on the *hegemonikon* of the soul" (*Att.* 7,[32] *hom. in Ps. 33,* §1); Christians "unfurl their *hegemonikon*" to receive the radiance of God's glory (*hom. in Ps. 45,* §5); the creator commanded man to preserve "the purity in his *hegemonikon*" (*Att.* 1)[33]; humans do not hear the voice of the Lord audibly, but only when God allows their *hegemonikon* to imagine it (*hom. in Ps. 28,* §3); peace, "the most perfect of the blessings" is "a certain soundness (εὐστάθεια) of the *hegemonikon*" (*hom. in Ps. 29,* §8).[34] Basil also retains Origen's emphasis on the *nous* as the means of divine vision. As has already been seen in Basil's discussion of the breath of life of Gn 2.7, Basil bases this understanding on the principle that the divine image allows man "to know like by like" (*hom. in Ps. 48,* §8), which he expresses most pithily at *Att.* 8: having previously reinterpreted the phrase, "Give heed to yourself," to mean, "Give heed to your soul," he concludes the sermon, "Give heed to yourself, so that you might give heed to God."[35] This is a fitting summary for a sermon that emphasizes the role of the *nous* in divine vision. Early in the sermon, Basil describes two ways of "giving heed": one in which the bodily eyes observe visible realities, the other in which one applies the

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[32] Rudberg, *L'homélie,* p. 36

[33] *Cf. Hex.* 3.9, where , in a rare instance of attributing the *hegemonikon* to the noetic beings of heaven, the good powers above the firmament are regarded as "worthy because of the purity of their *hegemonikon.*"

[34] The discrepancy in the frequency with which this usage appears in the *homm. in Ps.* and in the rest of Basil's corpus may suggest that Basil's exegesis of Ps may be particularly reliant upon Origen.

[35] Rudberg, *L'homélie,* p. 37

nous "by the soul's intellectual power … to the contemplation of bodiless realities" (*Att.* 2).[36] At *Att.* 6, he apostrophizes man: "You have received an intellectual soul, through which you form an idea of God (θεὸν περινοεῖς) and see by reason (λογισμῷ) the nature of the universe" (τῶν ὄντων).[37] Later, arguing that the invisible God, who is known only from his activities, cannot be apprehended with the eyes, Basil exhorts man, "Entrust your faith to your understanding (τῇ διανοίᾳ) and make a spiritual observation (κατανόησιν) about him" (§7).

The clearest marker, however, of an Origenic legacy in Basil's anthropology is that he, like Athanasius, preserves Origen's cardiocentrism. At *Prin.* 3, Basil draws the characteristically Stoic distinction between two *logoi,* the word "uttered through the voice" (διὰ τῆς φωνῆς προφερόμενος) and the "immanent" (ἐνδιάθετος) *logos,* which he also calls "mental" (ἐννοηματικός) and "which," he specifies, "exists in our hearts." Soon thereafter he refers again to "the reason that is in the heart" (ὁ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγος, *ibid.*). A somewhat more physical connection is implied when Basil opines in *ebr.* 3 that "wine fills [drunkards'] hearts with [fantasies and deceit]"; the equivalence between heart and *nous* is evident later at §7, where Basil rephrases the same idea, "wine drowns the reason (τὸν λογισμόν) and the *nous.*" In *ep.* 5, Basil comes close to equating the heart with the location of the image when he mentions "the gift that God has placed in our hearts…, I mean the prudent reason."[38]

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[36] *ibid.,* p. 25: τῇ νοερᾷ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν ἀσωμάτων. I regard that νοῦν is to be supplied for the infinitive ἐπιβάλλειν; *v.* LSJ, *s.v.* ἐπιβάλλω, II.3.

[37] In *Att.,* Basil twice refers to the "the eye of the soul," but neither instance is connected to the apprehension of divine or noetic reality. *V.* §2 (*ibid.,* p. 26; Πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ, τουτέστι· πανταχόθεν σεαυτὸν περισκόπει. Ἀκοίμητον ἔχε πρὸς τὴν σεαυτοῦ φυλακὴν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα); and §5 (*ibid.,* p. 31; σαυτῷ πρόσεχε, τουτέστιν· ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔρευναν στρέφε σου τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς).

[38] *ep.* 5.2: τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ δῶρον ὃ ἐναπέθετο ἐν τοις καρδίαις ἡμῶν…, τὸν λογισμὸν λέγω τὸν σώφρονα.

In several passages, Basil associates the heart with the *hegemonikon.* At *Att.* 1, a sermon that exegetes Dt 15.9 ("Give heed to yourself, that there never be an iniquitous word in your heart.") and opens with the proclamation that God has given us the use of speech (τοῦ λόγου τὴν χρῆσιν) so that humans might reveal the deliberations (βουλάς) of their hearts to one another, Basil states that the aforementioned command to guard the purity in the *hegemonikon* was issued by "the one who fashioned our hearts individually" and, therefore, knows that intention is the greater part of sin.[39] In the same passage, Basil goes on to describe how the movements of the reason (τῆς διανοίας), unlike those of the body, occur instantaneously (ἀχρόνως), with no effort or trouble (ἀκόπως, ἀπραγματεύτως), and therefore it is possible for someone to present a façade of sobriety and yet flee "through his reason to the place of sin in the unseen movement of his heart"[40]; in his solitude, such a one is able to "paint his pleasure clearly for himself in the hidden workshop of his heart."[41] The connection between heart and *hegemonikon* is also evident in Basil's exegesis of Ps 34.18, "The Lord is near to those that are contrite of heart" (ἐγγὺς Κύριος τοῖς συντετριμμένοις τὴν καρδίαν). At *hom. in Ps. 33,* §12, Basil defines "contrition of heart" (συντριμμὸς καρδίας) as "the destruction of human imaginations" (ὁ ἀφανισμὸς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν) and the one who has a contrite heart and has made an acceptable sacrifice of it as "the one who has despised the things of this earth (τῶν τῇδε), has devoted himself to the word of God (τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ), and hands over (ἐμπαρέχων) his *hegemonikon*

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[39] Rudberg, *L'homélie,* p. 24: Διόπερ ὁ πλάσας καταμόνας τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, εἰδῶς ὅτι τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν τῇ ὁρμῇ πληροῦται τῇ κατὰ πρόθεσιν, τὴν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καθαρότητα πρώτην ἡμῖν διετάξατο.

[40] *ibid.*: ἀπέδραμε τῇ διανοίᾳ πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἁμαρτίας τόπον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ τῆς καρδίας κινήματι.

[41] *ibid.*: ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ τῆς καρδίας ἐργαστηρίῳ ἐναργῆ τὴν ἡδονὴ ἑαυτῷ ζωγραφήσας. *Cf. Att.* 7, *hom. in Ps. 33,* §1, discussed above, in which Basil describes mental phenomena as inscribed or impressed on the *hegemonikon.*

to more divine thoughts (νοήμασιν) that are beyond man."[42] Most striking, however, is Basil's explicit statement at *hom. in Ps. 7,* §6, that the Scriptures use the term καρδία to refer to the *hegemonikon*. Interpreting Ps 7.9, "God righteously tests hearts and reins," (ἐτάζων καρδίας καὶ νεφροὺς ὁ Θεὸς δικαίως), Basil writes, "Since the Scriptures in many places substitute (παραλαμβάνει) 'heart' for the *hegemonikon,* and, in many places, 'reins,' for the appetitive part of the soul (ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς), they mean the same thing here, as well." Not only does Basil accept Origen's teaching that the Scriptures present a cardiocentric view of the *hegemonikon,* but his interpretation of the reins as the appetitive faculty of the soul constitutes a rejection of Origen's argument that the Platonic tripartite soul is incompatible with Scripture.[43]

Basil's anthropology also emphasizes certain distinctive themes that are noteworthy in comparison with Gregory's *Hom. opif.* Several of these are assembled in an especially rich passage at *Att.* 6-8 that culminates in the sermon's final maxim, "Give heed to yourself, that you may give heed to God." The first of these themes is that the *nous* is not only the *hegemonikon* and faculty for divine vision, but also the means by which man exerts an external hegemony over the world. After describing early in *Att.* 6 how man is the sole animal to be fashioned by God (θεόπλαστον), that he has been created in the image of his creator, and that he has received an intellectual soul through which to contemplate God and see the nature of the universe, Basil expands at length upon man's hegemony over the brute animals and his environment: man has

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[42] The mention of the sacrifice "not spurned by God" (οὐκ ἐξουδενωμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου) is, of course, a reference to Ps 51.17, καρδίαν συντετριμμένην … ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἐξουδενώσει.

[43] *V. Princ.* 3.4.1 and the discussion of Origen above, ch. 2. Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil's friend and fellow compiler of the *Philokalia,* also accepts the association of the kidneys with the ἐπιθυμητικόν, *v.* Gr. Naz., *or.* 40.40. Basil, however, takes the general exegetical principal from Or., *Princ.* 1.1.9: *Cor sane pro mente, id est pro intellectuali virtute, nominari in omnibus scripturis novis ac veteribus abundanter venies.*

the animals, both tame and wild, of the earth, sky, and sea as his servants; has discovered the skills (τέχνας) to found cities and manipulate his own environment; is served by earth, sea, and sky, by sun and moon; enjoys the riches of the earth and starry sky, even if he is not rich with gold. For Basil, it is man's possession of the intellectual soul in the image of God that renders him worthy to rule over this lavish kingdom and the animals that inhabit it.[44] In §7, Basil turns his attention from external to internal hegemony. The one who gives heed to himself will not only recognize that the world has been appointed for him, but will also master the irascible part of his soul (τὸν θυμόν) "like a disobedient foal that refuses the bridle (δυσήνιον), by reproving it with the stroke of the *logos* as though with the stroke of a whip" (τῇ πληγῇ τοῦ λόγου οἱονεὶ μάστιγι). Basil urges the faithful to gain control of their desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) through the *logos* and to recognize that there is a fundamental divide within the soul between a rational, ruling part and an irrational, subservient part:

> Know that the one part is a rational and intellectual aspect of the soul, and the other is irrational and beset by the passions (παθητικόν).[45] The one naturally enjoys the ability to rule, while the others (τοῖς δέ, *sc.* παθήμασιν) naturally submit to, and obey, the *logos*. Therefore, never let your *nous* be enslaved and become a servant of the passions (τῶν παθημάτων). Moreover, do not allow your passions to rebel against the *logos* and transfer power (τὸ κράτος) to themselves.

In other words, the one who is duly heedful of himself will keep the *nous* in its proper role as the *hegemonikon*.

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[44] *Cf.* the discussion below of Basil's sermon *Struct. hom.* 6, where Basil draws the conclusion that man is able to exercise hegemony over the animals precisely through his *nous, e.g.* man does not move heavy loads by his strength, but by his ingenuity.

[45] This translation of παθητικόν is justified by Basil's subsequent mention of the passions (παθήματα).

The second half of *Att.* 7 explains in greater detail how "the precise observation (κατανόησις) of yourself will offer sufficient guidance to the conception (ἔννοιαν) of God, as well." The acquisition of divine knowledge through introspection is possible because Basil accepts the idea, which Gregory will explicitly reject at *Hom. opif.* 16, that man is a microcosm: "If you give heed to yourself, you will have no need to search out the creation of the universe for traces of the creator (τὸν δημιουργόν), but rather in yourself, as in a small universe (μικρῷ τινι διακόσμῳ) you will behold the wisdom of him who created you" (τοῦ κτίσαντός σε). Basil proceeds to enumerate what can be learned of God from contemplating the nature of the soul: God, like the soul, is bodiless; because the *nous* has no prior location, but only can be said to be in a certain place because of its connection to the body, neither is God circumscribed in any place; God is invisible, just as the soul is not perceptible to bodily eyes; both God and the soul are known only through their activities (ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν). These common characteristics urge the contemplative to eschew visual observation in favor of a direct, intellectual apprehension of God (νοητὴν … περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν κατάληψιν). Basil concludes §7 with the exhortation to consider the soul as the divine craftsman's masterpiece: how the soul pervades completely and unites the disparate members of the body; how it imparts life and power to the body; how it is not confounded by the addition of new memories, but maintains them distinct; how it can recover its lost beauty and reacquire the creator's likeness (ὁμοίωσιν). The context of the passage indicates that Basil regards contemplation of these aspects of the soul as an exercise in divine contemplation, though he does not explain what characteristics of God one is to apprehend thereby.

Having contemplated how the rational soul reflects its creator, Basil advises in *Att.* 8 that one should attend to "the construction (κατασκευῆ) of the body, and marvel how the master craftsman has created (ἐδημιούργησεν) it as a fitting lodge for the rational soul" (πρέπον… καταγώγιον τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ). Basil sees this most clearly in man's unique upright posture, which reflects that his life derives from a kinship on high (ἐκ τῆς ἄνωθεν συγγενείας).[46] This position, says Basil, allows man to turn his focus from the stomach (γαστέρα) and its passions to the journey to heaven (τὴν ἄνω πορείαν). Man's construction also displays the creator's wisdom in that the most valuable senses are concentrated in the head, which enjoys the highest position in the body. Basil describes the wisdom in the specific placement of each of the senses and many of the organs, including the soft, agile nature of the tongue, "which suffices for all the needs of speech with its variety of movements."[47] Seeing the wisdom evidenced in man's construction, the self-heedful can only proclaim in the words of David, "Marvelous is the knowledge of you [that comes] from me."[48] Thus, Basil concludes his sermon with the equation of self-knowledge to divine knowledge: "Give heed to yourself, that you may give heed to God."

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[46] Basil stands in a long tradition of interpreting the significance of man's posture and will reflect at greater length on the topic at *Struct. hom.* 2.15, discussed below. *Cf.* Pl., *Ti.* 91e, where Plato describes the opposite phenomenon, *viz.* brute animals, which were formerly men, owe their prone posture to their kinship with the earth (ὑπὸ συγγενείας); Ar., *PA* 4.10, where man is upright because of the divine nature of his essence and because his primary activity is divine contemplation; and Ph., *Plant.* 17-22, where man's upright position reflects his heavenly nature. All three passages are discussed above, ch. 1. Gregory discusses this point in great detail in *Hom. opif.* 8.

[47] *Cf.* Gregory's *double-entendre* on the term λόγος at *Hom. opif.* 8, where he argues that the shape of the human mouth is so shaped to facilitate speech/rationality.

[48] Ps 139.6 (LXX): ἐθαυμαστώθη ἡ γνῶσίς σου ἐξ ἐμοῦ. The MT indicates that the phrase ἐξ ἐμοῦ is to be regarded as comparative, "[This] knowledge is too marvelous for me." It is clear from the context, however, that Basil understands this verse to speak of knowledge of God derived from self-knowledge. Basil explicitly states this interpretation of the verse at *Hex.* 9.6 and *Struct. hom.* 1.2; *v.* discussions below and n. 55.

Especially noteworthy is how Basil integrates his anthropology with his arguments against Eunomius. This is particularly evident in Basil's exegesis of Jn 1.1, which, as Basil argues at *Eun.* 2.14, the Holy Spirit perfectly formulated to anticipate and preclude Eunomian claims about the Father's begetting of the Son in time. Basil expands these arguments in his sermon on the verse, *Prin.* 1-4, where he again presents the verse as providentially included in the Scriptures as a safeguard against both the Sabellian and Anomœan heresies (§4). In §3, after discussing the difference between the various types of *logoi,* namely the human (both the spoken and the immanent, located in the heart), the angelic, and the artistic (τεχνικός), Basil argues that, when speaking of the Son as "*Logos,*" just as when referring to him as "light," "life," or "resurrection," one cannot understand these titles in their base, materialistic sense, such as visible light or the life that animates brute animals. "So also when you hear 'Logos,'" warns Basil, "guard against being brought down to lowly and humble thoughts (διανοίας) by the weakness of your reason" (διανοίας). This is a variant of Basil's argument at *Eun.* 1.7 that the terms that Christ applies to himself, such as "door," "way," "bread," "vine," "shepherd," and "light," all describe the single subject Christ, but have different meanings because they properly describe Christ's various activities, rather than his essence. In both passages, Basil remains skeptical of the abilities of human reason and speech to properly describe God. For Basil, however, this does not mean that the *Logos* defies comparison to the lowly human *logos*; to the contrary, Jn 1.1 providentially names the Son "*Logos*" in order to imply such a comparison:

> Why "*Logos*"? So that it may be shown that it came forth from the *nous*. Why "*Logos*"? Because it was born impassibly. Why "*Logos*"? Because he is the image of the one who begot him and shows completely in himself the one who begot him, without taking a

> portion from him, and yet being perfect in himself, just as our own *logos* presents a likeness (ἀπεικονίζει) of the whole of our thought. For the thought that we have conceived in our heart, these we bring forth in word (τῷ ῥήματι), and that which is spoken (τὸ λαλούμενον) is a likeness (ἀπεικόνισμα) of the thought (νοήματος) in our heart. For the *logos* is brought forth from the heart's overflow. Indeed, our heart is like a spring, while the *logos* that is brought forth is like a stream flowing from this spring. Thus, that which flows from it is as great as its original referent (τὸ πρώτως ἀναφερόμενον); and what is visible is as great as what is hidden. Therefore, he said "*Logos*" that he might present to you the impassible begetting of the Father, and teach you the divine truth (θεολογήσῃ) of the Son's perfect existence, and, through these, prove the timeless union of the Son to the Father. For even our own *logos* is an impassibly born offspring of our *nous*: for it is neither cut, nor apportioned, nor does it flow, but the *nous,* remaining whole in its own subsistence, causes the *logos* to exist (ὑφίστησι) wholly and perfectly (ἀπηρτισμένον); the *logos,* in turn, as it goes forth, contains in itself all the power of the *nous* that gave it birth.

Basil's argument is parallel to that at *Eun.* 1.15, that human notions of God, particularly Eunomius' favored epithet, ἀγέννητος, reflect, not God's essence, but rather his mode of existence.[49] The term "*Logos*" in Jn 1.1 implies an impassible birth from *nous,* perfect existence, and union with the Father, but leaves unexplained the incomprehensible essence of the *Logos*; it also implies that the *Logos* is the image of the one who begot him, but this merely replaces the title "*Logos*" with another that, again, speaks of the relationship between Father and Son, but not the essence of either. Although Basil does not appeal to man's creation after the image at Gn 1.26f., this must underlie his argument that the human *logos* comes forth from the overflow of the heart/*nous* just as the divine *Logos* is begotten from the Father; only if Basil understands the human *nous,* from which the human *logos* proceeds, as created according to the divine image, would he exempt such a psychological analogy from his censure of deceptive and imprecise

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[49] *Eun.* 1.14: οὐκ ἐν τῇ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀνερευνήσει ἡ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου ἡμῖν ἔννοια ὑποπίπτει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον… ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅπως ἐστίν.

divine titles. In addition to describing the human *logos* as the perfect offspring and image of the *nous,* Basil further emphasizes its divine resemblance by likening it to a stream flowing from a spring, a common analogy for the relationship between Father and Son.[50] It is especially noteworthy that, for Basil, the term "*Logos*" is even less susceptible to misinterpretation than the name "Son," as he concludes §3 with the argument that, had Jn 1.1 read, "In the beginning was the Son," it would connote passible human birth in time.

BASIL'S *HEXAËMERON* & SERMONS *DE STRUCTURA HOMINIS*

As the likely final works of Basil's life,[51] the direct inspiration of Gregory's *Hom. opif.,*[52] and the only direct example of Basil's theological anthropology, the end of Basil's ninth sermon on the creation and his two sermons on the creation of man deserve a more detailed treatment. In these works are found the basic elements that Gregory will rework and augment in *Hom. opif.*: a reassertion of the Alexandrian exegetical tradition, particularly the trinitarian reading of Gn 1.26,

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[50] *Cf.* Bas., *Eun.* 2.25 (κοινὴ ἡ πρόληψις πᾶσιν ὁμοίως Χριστιανοῖς ἐνυπάρχει… περὶ τοῦ φῶς εἶναι τὸν Υἱὸν γεννητὸν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωτὸς ἀπολάμψαντα, καὶ αὐτοζωὴν, καὶ αὐτοάγαθον ἐκ τῆς ζωοποιοῦ πηγῆς τῆς πατρικῆς ἀγαθότητος προελθόντα.); *Sab.* 4 (Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὁ Πατὴρ, τέλειον ἔχων τὸ *εἶναι* καὶ ἀνενδεὲς, ῥίζα καὶ πηγὴ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος); Gr. Nyss., *Maced.* 13 (πηγὴ μὲν δυνάμεώς ἐστιν ὁ πατήρ, δύναμις δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός, δυνάμεως δὲ πνεῦμα τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον).

Gregory of Nazianzus confesses in *or.* 31.31 that he had considered using a spring as an analogy for the trinity, but found it numerically problematic, and therefore concludes (§32) that the closest analogy is the Sun, its rays, and its light (*cf.* his similar rejection of the image at *Carm. dogm.* 3.60). Basil also appeals to the direct relationship of *logos* to the heart in a more mundane context, *ep.* 134 to the presbyter Paeonius, where he claims that a letter from Paeonius had revealed to him the purity of the presbyter's heart: Καὶ γὰρ ὁλκὸς μὲν ὕδατος δείκνυσι τὴν οἰκείαν πηγήν, λόγου δὲ φύσις τὴν προενεγκοῦσαν αὐτὸν καρδίαν χαρακτηρίζει.

[51] Despite attempts to revise the chronology of Basil's last years, Rousseau, *Basil of Caesarea,* p. 363, argues that "there is little compulsion to believe that [*Hex.*] was not [composed in Basil's final year]."

[52] Gregory famously announces in the letter that prefaces *Hom. opif.* that he will continue the work the Basil left undone in *Hex.* Smets and Van Esbroek, *Basile de Césarée,* pp. 87-89, have also shown convincingly that Gregory was familiar with, and relied on, *Struct. hom.* in the composition of *Hom. opif.* *Contra* von Ivanka, "Die Autorschaft," they take this, not as proof of Gregorian authorship of the sermons, but of Gregory's desire to emphasize certain themes and to tailor the work for a more élite audience.

against Eunomian tenets; an emphasis on the hegemonic function of the *nous*; and the foundational conviction that understanding of the human construction offers a path to knowledge of God.

When at *Hex.* 9.6 Basil finally arrives at his brief discussion of man and his nature, he returns to the theme of *Att.*: self-knowledge. As in that sermon, Basil bases his discussion of man's creation in *Hex.* on the premise that man's self-knowledge is but a means of divine knowledge. While self-knowledge is an especially difficult task, says Basil, "it is less likely that one would come to know God on the basis of the heavens and the earth than from our own constitution (κατασκευῆς), at least one who has examined himself."[53] This is an especially striking claim, given that the unifying theme of *Hex.* to this point has been the knowledge of God through contemplation of his creation.[54] It also noteworthy that Basil does not, as he does at *Att.* 7, repeat the commonplace description of man as a microcosm, though that may underlie his argument; rather, contemplation of the human constitution opens a better, if more difficult, path to the knowledge of God than even contemplation of the natural world. As at *Att.* 8, Basil supports his claim with Ps 139.6 (LXX), "Marvelous is the knowledge of you [that comes] from me,"[55] which he paraphrases, "By coming to understand myself, I have learned the excess of the wisdom that is in you" (τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς ἐν σοὶ σοφίας).

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[53] Basil repeats this sentiment less clearly, but with greater emphasis of the difficulty of self-knowledge, at *Struct. hom.* 1.2: εὔκολοί ἐσμεν γνῶναι οὐρανὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτούς.

[54] *Cf. Hex.* 5.2, where understanding of the creation of plants instills knowledge of the creator: Βούλομαί σοι σφοδρότερον τῆς κτίσεως ἐνιδρυνθῆναι τὸ θαῦμα, ἵν' ὅπου περ ἂν εὑρεθῇς, καὶ ὁποίῳ δήποτε γένει τῶν φυομένων παραστῇς, ἐναργῆ λαμβάνῃς τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν ὑπόμνησιν. At *Hex.* 1.1 Basil claims that Moses himself had spent forty years "in contemplation of the universe" (τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν ὄντων) prior to his vision of God. Rousseau, *Basil of Caesarea,* p. 324, lists several of the insights that Basil says man is to draw from observation of the natural world.

[55] *V.* above, n. 48.

That Basil is here concerned with the means of acquiring divine knowledge rather than self-knowledge *per se* explains why, upon citing Gn 1.26, he immediately launches into a tirade against the Jews, who would deny the existence of the trinity and claim that God was merely speaking to himself.[56] Basil's argument, however, that God is speaking to his partner in creation (τῷ κοινωνῷ τῆς δημιουργίας) is directed not only at Jewish enemies of Christ (ὦ χριστομάχε), but also at Eunomius, whom Basil dubs a Judaizer: "Listen, as well, you who hail from the new circumcision, who set forth Judaism in the guise of Christianity. To whom does he say, 'According to our image?'" Basil argues, as will Gregory at *Hom. opif.* 6, that the Anomœan position is undone by the singular image in the phrase "according to our image": "where there is one image, where is the point of unlikeness?" (τὸ ἀνόμοιον). Since God and the angels cannot have the same image, says Basil, this must refer to an image shared by Father and Son.[57] To support his claim, Basil cites the now-familiar verses of scripture that describe Christ as the living image of God: Heb 1.3, Col 1.15, Jn 10.30 and 14.9. Basil further argues that the continual play between singular and plural in the narrative of creation is intended to anticipate the objections of the Jews and, by extension, the Judaizer Eunomius. God's statement in the plural, "Let us create man in our image," is followed by the singular statement, "God made man." This return to the singular, besides precluding Greek polytheism, instructs the believer to regard the Son together with the Father (ἵνα καὶ υἱὸν νοῇς μετὰ πατρός). Although Basil does

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[56] Runia, "Where, tell me, is the Jew?," argues, *contra* Giet (*Basile de Césarée,* p. 514, n. 3), Daniélou ("Philon et Grégoire de Nysse, p. 336), and Naldini (*Basilio di Cesarea,* p. 401), that Basil's polemic is not directed at Philo specifically, but rather at a collective figure for Jewish exegesis of Gn 1.26f. and perhaps derived from representations of Jewish interpreters in Justin and Origen.

[57] *Cf.* Basil's argument that male and female are of equal value because they share the same nature and, consequently, have the same activities (*hom. in Ps. 1,* §1: Ὧν δὲ ἡ φύσις μία, τούτων καὶ ἐνέργειαι αἱ αὐταί).

not explicitly cite Philo's condensed version of Gn 1.27 (*i.e.* "God made man in the image of God"),[58] this is undoubtedly the basis of his final argument that, by phrasing the second half of Gn 1.27, "He made him in the image of God,"[59] rather than "in his own image," the scriptures "again introduce the person of the co-worker" (τοῦ συνεργοῦ τὸ πρόσωπον). Basil ends his discussion of the creation of man with the promise to take up the topic again at a later date and with a final jab at Eunomius that emphasizes that the iconic relationship between Father and Son is inseparable from that between Son and man:

> For the time being, let me say only this, that if the image is one, from where has the unbearable impiety come upon you to say that the Son in unlike (ἀνόμοιον) the Father? What ingratitude! Will you deny your Benefactor the very likeness (ὁμοιότητος) that you have received? And while you think that the gifts of his grace remain your own, will you not allow the Son to have his natural likeness (ὁμοιότητα) to the one who begot him?

The first of Basil's two sermons on the creation of man, which fulfill, in some measure, the closing promise of *Hex.,*[60] begins with the same call to self-knowledge, which, he says, the *nous* acquires only through the light of scripture (*Struct. hom.* 1.1). In a passage that presages the anatomical enquiry of *Hom. opif.,* Basil opines that, by being ignorant of their constitution (κατασκευῆς), including the most minute details (τῶν μικροτάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν), humans are ignorant of the nature and purpose of their existence (*ibid.*). Basil lists several of the topics that physicians have treated, the likes of which Gregory will discuss at much greater length in *Hom. opif.*; among these the most noteworthy are the "dwelling of a hearth of heat near (ἐπὶ) the heart"

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[58] Basil does quote the verse in this form at *Bapt.* 1.2.7, discussed above.

[59] Basil here quotes the verse in an alternate form, ἐν εἰκόνι Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν.

[60] In the extensive introduction to their edition of *Struct. hom.,* Smets and Van Esbroek have persuasively argued for the attribution of these sermons to Basil, which Rousseau, "Human Nature," p. 222, accepts with some qualification.

and the "perpetual motion of the pericardial *pneuma,*" references to the Aristotelian notion of the heart as the source of vital heat and the Stoic idea of *pneuma* as the means by which a cardiocentric *hegemonikon* interacts with the rest of the body. Because knowledge of such intricacies is acquired only with great difficulty, Basil concludes that "it is easier for us to know the heavens than ourselves," and urges his listeners "not to despise the marvel that is in you" (τοῦ ἐν σοὶ θαύματος, 1.2). The remainder of the sermon, says Basil, will consider man's greatness as described, yet again, at Ps 139.6 (LXX). Basil again paraphrases the verse, this time with special emphasis on the words, "from me": "By comprehending the skill (τέχνην) exhibited in me, the wisdom with which my body has been constructed (κατεσκευάσθη), from this small structure (κατασκευάσματος), I have apprehended the great creator" (τὸν μέγαν δημιουργὸν ἐνόησα, 1.2). Again, Basil is concerned with man, not as a microcosm,[61] but as a better means of knowing the creator than even study of the cosmos.

Basil's exegesis of Gn 1.26 in *Struct. hom.* 1 continues the double theme of divine and self-knowledge. The plural ποιήσωμεν teaches both the great honor bestowed on man through the divine counsel taken before his creation (1.3) and the proper understanding of the trinity (1.4). Basil devotes the most attention to the second of these themes, for, as he says, "the prelude of our creation (γενέσεως) is a true theology" (*ibid.*). Although Basil does not here address his comments to Eunomius or, more generally, to the Arian position, he regards Gn 1.26 as a revelation of both the Father's sovereignty and the Son's unity with the Father:

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[61] *Pace* Smets and Van Esbroeck, *Basile de Césarée,* p. 169-71, n. 2. Basil, of course, does at a later point describe man as a microcosm (μικρὸς διάκοσμος, *Struct. hom.* 2.14), but here the point is that man's construction reflects the creator, not the cosmos.

> You learned that there are two persons, the one who speaks and the one to whom his speech is addressed. Why did he not say, 'Create,' rather than, 'Let us create man?' So that you might recognize his sovereignty (τὴν δεσποτείαν), so that, in recognizing the Father, you might not reject the Son. So that you might know that Father created (ἐποίησε) through Son, and Son created at the will of the Father (ἐκτίσατο πατρῴῳ θελήματι, *ibid.*).

Since non-Nicene readings of this verse would not differ greatly from this scheme, Basil provides a Nicene corrective: man, as the common work of Father and Son, offers both a single worship and recognizes their single divinity (μὴ σχίζων τῆν προσκύνησιν, ἀλλὰ ἑνῶν τὴν θεότητα, *ibid.*). The return to the singular ἐποιήσεν in Gn 1.27 represents for Basil a safeguard against both Greek polytheism (as at *Hex.* 9.6) and Sabellianism: "[it is in the singular] so that you might unite the divinity, but not unite the *hypostases,* except in power" (*ibid.*). Preempting any Arian objections, Basil explains that believing that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each have their own proper *hypostasis* does not constitute tritheism because they share a single divinity, which he equates with a single form (μορφή) and a single sovereignty: "the sovereignty (ἀρχή) [that derives] from the Father is the same in the Son" (*ibid.*).

An undercurrent of anti-Eunomian polemic can be detected at 1.5, where Basil first considers what it means to be created "in the image of God." Basil repeats the standard rejection of an anthropomorphic image of God and urges his listeners, "Do not belittle the great God in the manner of the Jews" (ἰουδαϊκῶς). Given, however, that Philo, the Jew that Basil is most likely to have actually read, explicitly rejects such an anthropomorphic interpretation (*opif.* 69), this claim rings somewhat hollow. In this passage Basil wants primarily to combat any attempt to circumscribe God with human reason and, consequently, is likely hinting at Eunomius, whom he

has already denounced as a Judaizer at *Hex.* 9.6. The foremost accusation from the pro-Nicene side against the Eunomians was that they had confined God to the limits of human comprehension by insisting that the divine nature could be accurately described in words, especially the word ἀγέννητος.[62] Thus, Epiphanius (*Pan.* 76.4.2) claims that Aëtius, Eunomius' teacher, had stated, "I understand God most clearly, and I understand and know him to such an extent that I do not know myself more than I understand God." Similarly, Socrates (*H.e.* 4.7.13) attributes to Eunomius the claim, "God knows nothing more about his own essence than do we, nor is it better known to him and less to us." These likely polemical fabrications[63] nonetheless cohere with Basil's fundamental objection, voiced at *Eun.* 1.15 and *Prin.* 3, that human language is incapable of accurately describing the divine essence and that scriptural terms applied to God can only describe his mode of existence. This is the underlying argument at *Struct. hom.* 1.5, where Basil pairs the injunction not to "limit God with bodily notions" (ἐννοίαις) with the more general command not to "circumscribe God with your own *nous*" and to "persuade your own reason (λογισμόν) that it will not reach things infinite" (τῶν ἀπεράντων).

When Basil considers more fully how man has been "created in the image of God," he effects an unprecedented synthesis of the Alexandrian teaching that he has inherited with the Antiochene interpretation, in which the image is not an element of man's constitution, but rather

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[62] Vaggione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus,* pp. 244-47, explains Aetius and Eunomius' confidence in the accuracy of divine names, especially ἀγέννητος. *V.* also Behr, *The Nicene Faith,* 271-74.

[63] Behr, *The Nicene Faith,* p. 271, argues that Epiphanius' claim is a conclusion drawn from the premises enumerated in Aëtius' *Syntagmation* and, *ibid.,* n. 36, reviews of the arguments regarding the authenticity of the statement preserved in Socrates.

his hegemonic role *vis-à-vis* the animals.[64] Basil arrives at the traditional Alexandrian equation of the image with the *nous*/*logismos*/soul, but only by way of the Antiochene emphasis on the second half of Gn 1.26: "and let them rule over the fish." For Basil, it is self-evident that man, whose "flesh is weaker than many animals" (*Struct. hom.* 1.6), cannot exercise this sovereignty bodily. Man's sovereign faculty (τὸ ἀρχικόν), therefore, consists "in the abundance of his reason" (ἐν τῇ τοῦ λογισμοῦ περιουσίᾳ), which is inversely proportional to his bodily weakness (*ibid.*). Accordingly, Basil argues in a later passage that woman, whose physical body is weaker, is equally created in the image, because "the soul is seated within, beneath a veil, even the body, which is soft (1.18).[65] Following Origen, even so far as citing the same verse of scripture, 2Cor 4.16,[66] Basil interprets Gn 1.26 as a reference to the creation of the reason, equated to Paul's "inner man," because "man is his reason" (ὁ λογισμός, 1.7). Since Basil regards the true human as "the reasoning faculty (τὸ λογικόν) of the soul," he paraphrases Gn 1.26, "'Let us make man

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[64] *V.* McLeod, *The Image of God,* pp. 58-85. In its identification of the image as τὸ ἀρχικόν and insistence that the meaning of the first half of Gn 1.26 is explained in its second half, this passage is strikingly reminiscent of Diod., *Gen.* 1.26 (*PG* 1564c-65a). It can only be conjectured that Basil learned this interpretation from reading the two books of Diodore mentioned in *ep.* 135. On the basis of *Hex.,* esp. *Hex.* 9.1 (πάντα ὡς εἴρηται οὕτως ἐκδέχομαι), Basil has often been categorized with the Antiochene school of exegesis. Lim, "The Politics of Interpretation," has argued, however, that Basil's rejection of excessive allegorical and mythological exegesis is primarily a function of his lay audience, whom he wants to protect from wanton speculation and heresy; accordingly, says Lim, Basil's exegesis in *Hex.* displays "few of the technical methodological concerns for which the Antiochene school was most known" (p. 359), particularly the concern for etymology and ἀκολουθία. Lim, pp. 354f., regards Basil's exegesis of Gn 1.2 (*Hex.* 2.6) as a lone exception in which Basil appeals to etymological evidence that he has culled from an unnamed Syrian author, possibly Ephraem Syrus, Eusebius of Samosata, or Theophilus of Antioch (*v.* Giet, *Basile de Césarée,* p. 169, n. 3). This passage, however, is yet another exception in its concern for ἀκολουθία, *i.e.* that the first half of Gn 1.27 must be interpreted on the basis of the second half. Hildebrand, *The Trinitarian Theology,* pp. 122-39, details the inadequacy of an Antiochene label for Basil in light of the clearly Alexandrian, even Origenic, exegesis found throughout his *homm. in Ps.*

[65] Basil is somewhat inconsistent in this passage, since he does not describe the woman as "in the image" by possession of reason, but rather by her virtue: "The virtuous (ἀγαθή) woman has that which is after the image." This more closely resembles Basil's definition of the likeness as the acquisition of Christian virtue (1.16f.), although he may imply the rational image when he states that "one soul and another soul are of equal honor (ὁμότιμος); the difference [between man and woman] is in their veils."

[66] *V. hom. 1 in Gn,* §13; *cant.* prol., both discussed above, ch. 2.

after to our image,' that is, let us give him an abundance of reason" (λόγου περιουσίαν, *ibid.*). The identification of the image with the reason is further strengthened in 1.15-17, where Basil distinguishes between the image, a natural part of man's original constitution, and the likeness, the potential to become like God through the acquisition of Christian virtue: "For 'after the image,' I have the trait of being rational (τὸ λογικὸς εἶναι), but I come to be 'after the likeness,' by becoming a Christian" (1.16). In 1.8, Basil reconciles the Antiochene interpretation with the Alexandrian by allegorizing the continuation of Gn 1.26, "and let them rule," as a reference to the reason's proper rule over the passions: "'And let them rule,' not, 'Let us make man after our image, and let them be filled with anger, desire, and sorrow.' For the passions were not included in the image of God, but rather the reason is the master of the passions" (ὁ λογισμὸς τῶν παθῶν δεσπότης). So essential is sovereignty to Basil's understanding of the image that, after contrasting human slavery, which is slavery in name only, with true slavery to the passions, he paraphrases the whole of Gn 1.26 in the maxim, "Where there is the the power to rule (ἡ τοῦ ἄρχειν δύναμις), there is the image of God" (*ibid.*). Basil completes the rapprochement of the Alexandrian and Antiochene interpretations of Gn 1.26 by explaining that man rules over, not only the allegorical animals of his soul, but also the literal animals of creation, again by virtue of his reason. Basil enumerates the ingenious ways that man fools and captures whales (1.9), lions, panthers, and birds (1.10). The sermon ends with a similar list of the wild beasts that man possesses within himself and must learn to master: the barking dog of wrath, the stinging scorpion of hypocrisy, the neighing horse of lust, etc. (1.19). These two spheres of hegemony complement and reinforce one another, as Basil urges, "Rule over the evil thoughts (τῶν

λογισμῶν) within you that you might become a ruler over all creatures (τῶν ὄντων). In this way the sovereignty (ἀρχή) that has been given to us through the animals trains (ῥυθμίζει) us to rule over ourselves" (*ibid.*).

Basil's Origenic inheritance, albeit with certain correctives, is particularly evident in his second sermon on the creation of man. This sermon attempts to evoke in the believer both humility and wonder that the very hands of God have fashioned man from the lowly earth. Following Origen's favored Philonic theme, Basil accepts the distinction between the verbs ἐποίησεν from Gn 1.27 and ἔπλασεν from Gn 2.7 as representing the creation of the soul and body, respectively (*Struct. hom.* 2.3). Basil adduces Ps 119.73/Job 10.8, "Your hands have made and fashioned me," so as to attribute both creations to the hands of God: "He made the inner man, but fashioned the outer" (*ibid.*). Whereas for Origen, as well as Philo, the different mode of creation in Gn 2.7 betrays the physical body's inferiority, Basil takes the divine fashioning as the main proof that man is simultaneously nothing and something great (2.2). Like Origen, however, Basil has nothing to say of the breath of life, perhaps because he can find nothing in Origen on which to base his exegesis. This accords with the whole of his corpus, where he discusses the breath of life only once in passing, although there he does associate it with creation in the image.[67] After his discussion of the first half of Gn 2.7, "And God took dust from the earth, and God fashioned the man," Basil reverts at *Struct. hom.* 2.5 to Gn 1.28, "And God blessed them and said, 'Increase, and multiply, and fill the earth," as though continuing in his exegetical train

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[67] *V.* the discussion of *hom. in Ps. 48,* §8, above, especially n. 26. This is the only time in Basil's corpus that the verb ἐμφυσέω appears in relation to man's creation (all other instances are associated with the Spirit, *e.g. Spir.* 16.39, where he discusses Christ breathing the Spirit upon his disciples at Jn 20.22). Similarly, in Basil's writings, the noun πνοή appears nowhere in reference to Gn 2.7.

of thought from the first sermon. Basil continues this order in *Struct. hom.* 2.6-11 with discussions of Gn 1.29 and 2.2 before returning to Gn 2.7; in this second discussion of the passage (*Struct. hom.* 2.12f.), Basil equally neglects the breath of life and further develops the dual lesson of humility and wonder taught in the verse.

Basil's final reflections on Gn 2.7, with which he closes the sermon, form an *inclusio* to his discussion of the relationship between self-knowledge and divine knowledge and read like a miniature version of Gregory's *Hom. opif.* Distinguishing the superficial manner in which sculptors mold their statues from God's all pervasive "creative activity…, which penetrates deep within" (ἡ δημιουργικὴ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια… ἐπὶ τὸ βάθος χωρήσασα ἔνδοθεν), Basil declares man's inner composition as a revelation of divine wisdom: "If only I had enough leisure to show you man's construction (κατασκευήν), you would also learn from yourself the wisdom of God concerning you, that man is indeed a microcosm" (μικρὸς διάκοσμος, 2.14). For Basil, the depth of wisdom contained in man's construction accounts for the myriad studies of the human body written by physicians and athletic trainers: "Where would I find words sufficient (λόγος τοσοῦτος) for me to describe precisely all the things that are contained in the single word, "fashioned?" (*ibid.*). In lieu of a fuller treatment of the topic, Basil considers some examples of the divine wisdom that can be culled from an understanding of man's physical constitution. In 2.15 Basil reflects on man's upright posture, which, as at *Att.* 8,[68] enables man to see his kinship with the heavens (ἵνα τὴν ἄνω βλέπῃ συγγένειαν). Man's posture, furthermore, teaches him the purpose (τέλους) for which he was created, namely to see God and Christ, who are in the

[68] *V.* the discussion of this passage in the previous section above, especially at n. 46.

heavens, and to recognize his own heavenly citizenship (*ibid.*).[69] The eye, however, is Basil's primary example for the divine wisdom visible in man's construction. Basil considers the providential reasons that the eye is spherical, that there are two, not just one, and that it is guarded by eyelid, eyelashes, and brow (2.16). As at *Hex.* 9.6, Basil complains that time, not even the whole day, will not allow him to justly treat the topic and closes his sermon by asking for his congregants' prayers that he be returned to health so that he might "repay the remainder of his debt" (ἵνα … καὶ τῶν λειπομένων ἀποδώσωμεν τὸ χρέος, 2.17).[70]

Conclusion

In contrast to Eunomius' focus on pure theology, Basil's writings present a robust theological anthropology that draws from the deep well of the Alexandrian exegetical tradition. The theme of the relationship between self-knowledge and divine knowledge recurs throughout Basil's writing and culminates in the idea, propounded in both sermons on the creation of man, that investigation of the anatomical structure of man can prove a fruitful spiritual exercise. Coupled with the Alexandrian tendency to regard Gn 1.26f. as primarily a trinitarian, and secondarily an anthropological, text, Basil's sermons set the stage for the theological and anatomical

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[69] Basil ends this discussion with an interpretation of Eccl 2.14 (τοῦ σοφοῦ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἐν κεφαλῇ) that he has almost certainly derived from Or., *Dial.* 20. Like Origen, Basil regards this verse as nonsensical if understood literally and therefore interprets ἐν κεφαλῇ to mean that the wise man keeps his eyes focused on heavenly things. On the basis of 1Cor 11.3 (παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἡ κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστός ἐστι), Origen interprets the verse to mean that the wise man keeps his focus on his head, which is Christ.

[70] Smets and Van Esbroeck, *Basile de Césarée,* p. 277, n. 1, think that this refers "*sans doute*" to Basil's intention to preach on Paradise and the Fall. But the similarity of Basil's complaint here to that at *Hex.* 9.6, suggests the possibility that Basil hoped to elaborate on the point that time prevented him from treating more fully, *viz.* the wisdom evident in man's physical constitution. This unfulfilled promise, as much as *Hex.* 9.6, may have inspired Gregory to write *Hom. opif.*

investigations of Gregory's *Hom. opif.* Gregory, however, will attempt to complete not only Basil's exegesis of Gn 1.26f., but also his polemic against Eunomius. Gregory will marshal the wealth of his medical knowledge to prove that a proper understanding of man's construction corroborates Nicene trinitarian theology.

CHAPTER 4: TRADITION AND POLEMIC IN GREGORY OF NYSSA'S *DE HOMINIS OPIFICIO*

The preceding chapters have detailed the formation of an Alexandrian anthropological and theological tradition based upon the exegesis of Gn 1.26f. and the acceptance of a cardiocentric theory of the *hegemonikon.* The present chapter is devoted to a close analysis of *Hom. opif.* in light of that tradition. As will be seen, Gregory's earlier writings exhibit a less questioning acceptance of the Alexandrian tradition. In these writings, Gregory has yet to emerge from Basil's shadow and has yet to assume his brother's mantle in the fight against Eunomius. In *Hom. opif.,* however, which Gregory writes immediately after Basil's death, this is no longer the case. The anthropology, even the theology, that Gregory crafts in this treatise is shaped largely by his polemical concerns, which dictate a revision of the Alexandrian tradition. Gregory must reinterpret Gn 1.26f., particularly the term εἰκών, and reject not only cardiocentrism, but also Galenic encephalocentrism, in order to frame an anthropological corollary to his theological arguments: the uncircumscribability of the human *nous,* which bears the image of the uncircumscribable God, is proof against Eunomius' limited and comprehensible God. Seen from this vantage, Gregory's lengthy discussions of the relationship between the *nous* and human physiology appear to be less a series of digressions than an extended argument for a particular theological and anthropological synthesis. To that end, this chapter will, after an examination of Gregory's writings prior to *Hom. opif.,* consist of a close examination of Gregory's arguments in

the first, ontological half of the treatise, with occasional reference to relevant passages in the second half, where Gregory is primarily concerned with the postlapsarian human condition.[1]

COUNTERPOINT: GREGORY'S *DE VIRGINITATE* AND *ORATIO DE BEATITUDINIBUS* 6

Prior to the phenomenal outburst of writings that came in the wake of Basil's death in late 378 or early 379,[2] Gregory produced but one treatise, *Virg.,* around the year 371.[3] This treatise offers a valuable point of comparison to *Hom. opif.,* as it shows that, as few as eight years prior to the writing of *Hom. opif.,* Gregory had yet to acquire much of his medical knowledge and to form the medico-theological synthesis that characterizes the later treatise.[4] That Gregory had already acquired an interest in human physiology by 371 is clear in *Virg.* 22, where he describes basic humoral theory, which, he says, he heard explained by "a certain physician of my acquaintance."[5] The nascent stage, however, of Gregory's reflection on these ideas in *Virg.,* as

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[1] It is generally observed that *Hom. opif.* is divided into two main parts: chh. 1-16, which treat man's creation and nature, and chh. 17-29, which deal with the consequences of man's sin and his place in the world after the Fall. After ch. 17, Gregory discusses Gn 1.26f. again only in ch. 22. The survey of human anatomy in ch. 30 is often regarded as a post-script. These two main parts have also been correlated with the two sermons *Struct. hom.*

[2] *V.* Rousseau, *Basil of Caesarea,* app. iii, pp. 360-63, for a discussion of the controversy over the date of Basil's death.

[3] On the dating of the treatise, *v.* Aubineau, *Grégoire de Nysse,* pp. 81f; Silvas, *Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters,* p. 27. Several of Gregory's sermons, *e.g.* the very cardiocentric *Beat.* 6, also date from this earlier period; *v.* Daniélou, "La chronologie des œuvres," pp. 160-62.

[4] Janini Cuesta, *La Antropología y la medicina,* p. 9, attributes Gregory's study of Galen to the ten years (c. 360-70) he spent at Basil's monastery at Annesi. But Gregory's unquestioning acceptance of cardiocentrism exhibited in *Virg.* shows that this cannot be the case.

[5] This may refer to Basil of Ancyra, author of *de Vera virginitate,* which Aubineau, *Grégoire de Nysse,* pp. 137-42, has shown to be one of the most important sources for Gregory's own treatise. Silvas, *Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters,* pp. 11f., argues that Gregory heard Basil read his treatise in 360, when both accompanied Basil of Caesarea and Eustathius of Sebaste to the Council of Constantinople (*v.* Gr. Nyss., *Eun.* 1.82).

well as his close adherence to the Alexandrian tradition as exemplified by Origen, Athanasius, and, above all, Basil, is most evident in his espousal of a cardiocentric position in ch. 5:

> Once [the soul] has been freed from such [bodily] constraints [through the practice of virginity], it no longer runs the risk, through gradual acclimation to things that seem to be allowed by some law of nature, of turning from, and becoming ignorant of, pure divine pleasure, which only a pure heart, that is the *hegemonikon* within us, is naturally suited to pursue (τῆς θείας τε καὶ ἀκηράτου … ἡδονῆς, ἣν μόνην καρδίας καθαρότης τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν ἡγεμονικοῦ θηρεύειν πέφυκεν).

Gregory's cardiocentrism is further evident at *Virg.* 10: "If anyone has been so purified in the eye of his heart (τὸ τῆς καρδίας ὄμμα) that he can to some extent see that which was proclaimed by the Lord in his Beatitudes, he will despise all human speech as unable to represent that which his mind has apprehended" (εἰς τὴν τοῦ νοηθέντος παράστασιν).[6] Though the cardiocentrism is not here explicit, it is nonetheless evident from Gregory's equation of the activity of the eye of the heart, *i.e.* the vision of God, with noetic apprehension (τοῦ νοηθέντος). Like Athanasius, moreover, Gregory presumes Origen's interpretation of the sixth Beatitude, whereby the "pure heart" needed to see God is the *nous.*[7] Thus, in ch. 11, Gregory names as the very point of virginity the acquisition of the purity of heart needed to see God, which he regards as an intellectual act: "the power to comprehend that light" (ἡ δύναμις τῆς τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκείνου κατανοήσεως). Later in ch. 21 there is a further hint of cardiocentrism when Gregory, on the basis of the dominical saying at Mt 5.28 ("every man that looks at a woman in order to desire her

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[6] Incidentally, this passage also shows the belief in the inadequacy of language to describe the divine, an important part of both Basil's and Gregory's arguments against Eunomius. Sferlea, "L'infinité divine," has shown that Gregory's ideas about divine infinity do not appear for the first time in *Eun.,* but are already present in *Hom. opif.* and *Anim. et res.*

[7] Or., *Cels.* 7.33; *cf.* Ath., *Gent.* 2; *v.* the discussions of both passages above, ch. 2.

has already committed adultery with her in his heart"), identifies the heart as the source (πηγή) from which the senses flow and the part of man that is injured by sensual sin. Because the senses are centered upon the heart, Gregory even speculates that not only a visual sin such as lust, but also sin through any of the senses refers the injury back to the heart:

> If through one of the senses anyone has been bested by the pleasure that is naturally in him, he has been wounded in his heart (τὴν καρδίαν), just as the dominical saying teaches, "He who fulfills the desire of his eyes receives the harm in his heart." But I think that in that passage the Lord spoke in part about every sensory organ. Thus, in accordance with his statement, we do well to add, "Whoever hears or touches 'in order to desire' and who draws all the power that is in us into the service of pleasure has sinned 'in his heart'" (τῇ καρδίᾳ).

In *Virg.* Gregory also adheres to the traditional Alexandrian identification of the image with the *hegemonikon,* a theme that, unlike his cardiocentrism, he will maintain in *Hom. opif.* Thus, at *Virg.* 18, Gregory likens the *nous* to the master of a house who will not allow his house to be in disarray; the *nous,* says Gregory, which is "the master and manager of our tabernacle" (τὸν τοῦ σκηνώματος ἡμῶν οἰκοδεσπότην καὶ οἰκονόμον), must order and direct the soul and its faculties. By describing the human body as a "tabernacle," Gregory underlines its role in housing the divine image.[8] Elsewhere, in a lengthy digression on the image as man's inner beauty (*Virg.* 12), Gregory paraphrases Gn 1.27 so as to make the relationship between man and the divine ruler of the universe the focus of the verse: "[man] was an image and likeness, as has already been said, of the power that rules over all existing things." For Gregory, then, the newly-created man's likeness to the ruler of all (τὸν ἐξουσιάζοντα πάντων) is to be found in his free will (ἐν τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς προαιρέσεως), through which he fell and introduced the passions

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[8] *Cf.* Philo's use of the verb ἀγαλματοφορέω in *Opif.* 69. *V.* above, ch. 1, n. 64.

as accretions to his nature. Gregory describes man as having lost the image, not in an ontological sense, but by obscuring its beauty, just as rust mars the beauty of iron, or a person that has fallen in the mud becomes unrecognizable. The image, therefore, is something hidden within man and must be cleansed and revealed. When, in this context, Gregory cites Lk 17.21 as a reference to the image hidden by sin, it becomes clear that he, like Origen, Athanasius, and Basil, understands the verse to mean, "The sovereignty of God is within you."[9] It is God's kingship, *i.e.* the free will modeled upon divine sovereignty, that is hidden beneath the accretions of man's sin:

> For in this [verse], I think, the scripture shows that God's goodness (τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ θεοῦ) has not been separated from our nature, nor has it been removed far from those that choose (τῶν … προαιρουμένων) to seek him, but rather it is always in each one, unrecognized and hidden when 'it is drowned by the troubles and pleasures of this life,' but found again when we turn our reason (τὴν διάνοιαν) towards it.

Nowhere is Gregory's identification of the image as a cardiocentric *hegemonikon* clearer than in his allegorical interpretation of the parable of the lost drachma (*Virg.* 12), which, like the hegemonic interpretation of Lk 17.21, he adapts from Origen's *Hom. 13 in Gen.,* §4. The "widow" of the parable,[10] says Gregory, presents an image of the soul in search of lost virtue. Taking as a lamp the illuminating *logos,* the widowed soul must search in her own house, *i.e.* one must search within oneself, for the lost drachma, the "image of the king," which is not

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[9] Or., *Hom. 13 in Gen.,* §4; Ath., *Gent.* 30; Bas., *ep.* 8.12; Gregory himself repeats the interpretation, including the analogy of iron obscured by rust, at greater length at *Beat.* 6 (PG 44.1269b-72c), which Daniélou, "La chronologie des œuvres," dates to roughly the same time as *Virg.* By contrast, in his *Instit.* (PG 46.301d-04a; GNO 8.1, pp. 78f.), Gregory interprets "the kingdom of heaven" as the heavenly joy brought to the soul through the presence of the Holy Spirit.

[10] According to Lk 15.8 and Or., *Hom. 13 in Gen.* §4, she is only a "woman" (γυνή, *mulier*), but Gregory implies that she is a widow by interpreting her as an image of the "widowed soul" (τῇ χηρευούσῃ ψυχῇ).

completely lost, but only hidden in the the dung, *i.e.* the filth of the flesh. She calls her neighbors, *i.e.* the faculties associated with the soul (πάσαι οἱ σύνοικοι τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις), to rejoice with her when she has found and cleaned "this great image of the king,[11] which 'the fashioner of each of our individual hearts' has stamped upon our drachma from the beginning" (αὕτη ἡ μεγάλη τοῦ βασιλέως εἰκών, ἣν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνεσημήνατο ἡμῶν τῇ δραχμῇ *ὁ πλάσας κατὰ μόνας τὰς καρδίας* ἡμῶν, *Virg.* 12, citing Ps 33.15). Gregory presents this allegorical explanation in support of his description of the obscured image and his reading of Lk 17.21; thus, the search for the king's image stamped upon the heart is, for Gregory, the search for "the sovereignty of God" that is within man. Perhaps drawing on Origen,[12] Gregory has equated the Psalmist's description of the heart's creation with the bestowal of the divine image "from the beginning," *i.e.* in Gn 1.27, despite the material connotations of the verb πλάσας in Ps 33.15.

Gregory's sermon on the sixth Beatitude, which dates from the same period as *Virg.,*[13] also shows that, at this earlier stage of his career, Gregory still maintained the spiritualized Origenic cardiocentrism that he had inherited from Basil. The Origenic interpretation of Mt 5.8 forms the basis of the sermon: the heart refers to the *nous,* which, as the faculty for divine vision,

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[11] Or, perhaps, "this great image of the great king," (αὕτη ἡ μέγαλη τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως εἰκών), as preserved in mss. S (Codex Vaticanus graecus 1907) and Ω (Codex Escorialensis Ω III 14). *V.* Aubineau's *app. crit., ad loc.*

[12] *V. Comm. in Jo.* 13.167f.; there, Origen quotes Ps 33.15 immediately after quoting Gn 1.26, although it is not clear that he intends the two passages to refer to the same event.

[13] Daniélou, "La chronologie des œuvres," pp. 160-62, dates *Beat.* to the same time period as *Virg.* on the basis of shared themes, especially Gregory's interpretation of the famous cave of the platonic allegory as the present life, from which man must depart; in later works, written after his travels to Jerusalem, Gregory emphasizes the need for Christ to enter and illuminate the cave. Accounting for his exile from Nyssa in 376-78, Danielou hypothesizes (p. 162) that *Beat.* would have been written in 374-76 or 378 and prefers the latter of these dates. This later date, however, leaves a very short span of time for Gregory's medical readings to convince him of the errors of cardiocentrism.

allows man to contemplate God. Thus, Gregory equates the "pure of heart" to "the one who has been purified in the eye of his soul" (*Beat.* 6; PG 44, col. 1269c). The influence of Origen's cardiocentric exegesis becomes clear when Gregory claims that the sixth Beatitude states in loftier form what is said more plainly in Lk 17.21 ("The sovereignty of God is within you.");[14] both verses teach that "he who has cleaned his heart … sees in his own beauty the image of the divine nature" (*ibid.*). Gregory describes the life of holiness as a process of revealing this beauty by cleaning filth from the heart and, as at *Virg.* 12, likens the image to iron covered in rust, which must be polished away:

> In the same way, whenever the inner man, which the Lord calls, 'heart,' has scraped itself clean of the green filth that has grown upon its form through the mold of wickedness, it will once again assume its likeness to the archetype and will be good (ἀγαθός). For that which is like something good is necessarily good itself. Therefore, he who sees himself sees the object of his desire in himself; and, thus, he who is pure of heart becomes blessed, because, by looking towards his own purity, he sees the archetype in the image (PG 44, col. 1272af.).

The heart, then, as the seat of the *nous* and image, is the locus of self-contemplation and, therefore, of divine contemplation. If there were any doubt that "the inner man" is the *nous,* Gregory makes this clear later in the sermon, when he refers to the image as "the reason that is within you" (ὁ ἐν σοὶ λογισμός, 1272c), and again, when he states, in the parallelism of a biblical proverb, "If the pure in heart are blessed, then those that are soiled in their *nous* are necessarily pitiable" (1276c).

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[14] *V.* n. 9 above.

De Hominis Opificio

Gregory wrote *Hom. opif.* in early 379 in the months immediately following Basil's death.[15] In the prefatory letters to his brother Peter that accompanied both this work and his apology on Basil's *Hexaëmeron,* written later the same year, Gregory presents himself as the heir to Basil's legacy. Gregory famously claims in *Hom. opif.* that he has decided to complete Basil's contemplations of the creation so that his students might not appear to lack their master's glory (ὡς μὴ δοκεῖν ἐλλειπῆ τοῦ διδασκάλου τὴν δόξαν ἐν τοῖς μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ εἶναι, *praef.* 1). Gregory feels that Basil's legacy especially needs a developed anthropology and that, if his students were to fail to produce such a treatise, it would leave Basil open to the criticism that he was unwilling to instill in them a proper habit of intellectual pursuit (ἕξιν τινα κατανοητικήν, *praef.* 2). With requisite self-effacement, Gregory insists that any glory he might win through the treatise will only reflect upon Basil, while its deficiencies will rightly only confirm accusations that "the teacher's wisdom could not be contained in the smallness of our heart" (ὡς οὐ χωρήσαντες ἐν τῷ μικροφυεῖ τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν τοῦ καθηγητοῦ τὴν σοφίαν, *ibid.*).[16]

The great conundrum of Gregory's claim, of course, is that Basil had in fact delivered some form of reflection on the creation of man, which survives in his sermons *Struct. hom.,* and that Gregory certainly knew of these sermons.[17] With his medical knowledge, Gregory was

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[15] The dating of the treatise is determined by the facts that 1) Basil has already died and 2) the treatise is intended as a paschal gift for his brother Peter, who has yet to be ordained bishop of Sebaste in 380; *v.* Daniélou, "La chronologie des sermons," pp. 346f.

[16] This reference to the heart as the seat of wisdom is doubtless metaphorical and does not represent any cardiocentric view, especially in light of Gregory's arguments later in the treatise, esp. *Hom. opif.* 12-15.

[17] The correspondence in the content of *Struct. hom.* and *Hom. opif.* led von Ivanka, "Die Autorschaft," pp. 53-56, to attribute both to Gregory, one as pair of sermons delivered in church, the other a formal treatise on the same topic. On the attribution of *Struct. hom.* to Basil, *v.* above, ch. 3, nn. [52, 60].

perhaps better equipped than Basil to write an anthropological treatise to complement the *Hexaëmeron,* but it is unlikely that Gregory simply found Basil's sermons, which are, to be sure, of a much less developed quality than *Hex.,* so lacking that he decided to replace them on his own initiative. Gregory's presence at Basil's death and his subsequent sudden burst of writing hint that Basil himself requested that Gregory take up his legacy.[18] Such a request would not be unprecedented; Gregory states in *Virg.* 2 that he has agreed to write a treatise about virginity "because we must in all things obey the authority of him who has enjoined us with this duty" (διὰ τὸ δεῖν ἐν πᾶσι πείθεσθαι τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἐπιτάξαντος ἡμῖν). This is a sure reference to Basil, whom Gregory has already called "our most God-fearing bishop and father … [who] alone is able to instruct in such matters [*i.e.* of the celibate life]" (τοῦ θεοσεβεστάτου ἐπισκόπου καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν … μόνου δυνατῶς ἔχοντος τὰ τοιαῦτα παιδεύειν, *Virg. praef.*).

The most important mantle that Gregory took up from Basil was that of defender of Orthodoxy against Eunomius. As he relates in a letter to his brother Peter, Gregory had literally inherited Basil's copy of Eunomius' *Apol. apol.,* which spurred him on to write the first book of

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[18] Silvas, *Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters,* p. 40, interprets Gr. Naz., *ep.* 76, as an indication that Gregory was present at his brother's death and argues, "[Gregory's] stance as Basil's heir in doctrinal exposition is expressed so promptly, consciously and with unaffected authority that is fair (*sic*) to assume that on his death-bed Basil himself had charged his brother, whom he himself had ordained bishop, to continue his defence and promotion of sound faith…."

Eun.[19] Gregory was particularly incensed that in *Apol. apol.,* a point-by-point refutation of Basil's *Eun.,*[20] Eunomius did not restrict himself to doctrinal arguments, but resorted to *ad hominem* attacks against Basil, whom Gregory again calls "our father." Gregory's indignation led to the production, in 380, of his first two books against Eunomius,[21] a task that he claims to have undertaken, not because he is the most qualified, but because he is the proper heir of the controversy: "Since, as I say, the inheritance (τὸν κλῆρον) of the departed most fittingly belongs to me, because of both the written laws and those of nature, I therefore claim my rightful inheritance of the controversy" (οἰκειοῦμαι τὴν κληρονομίαν τοῦ λόγου, *Eun.* 1.9). Before writing *Eun.,* however, Gregory had composed *Hom. opif.* in the spring of 379. The following analysis of *Hom. opif.* will argue that in this treatise Gregory has already taken up the role of anti-Eunomian polemicist. While it may go too far to say that *Hom. opif.* was written as an anti-Eunomian treatise, there is no shortage of polemic against the Anomœans, and, as will be shown in the discussion of specific passages below, Gregory has developed his anthropology in tandem

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[19] *V. ep.* 29.4: κατ᾽ αὐτὴν τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου τὴν κοίμησιν τὸν τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγον ὑπεδεξάμην. Moore and Wilson, NPNF, ser. 2, vol. 5, p. 33, rather infelicitously translate the phrase, "I received the legacy of Eunomius' controversy"; Silvas, *Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters,* p. 207, follows suit: "I inherited the controversy of Eunomius." These translators regard the phrase τὸν τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγον as equivalent to τὸν κατὰ Εὐνομίου λόγον and perhaps construe it in light of Gregory's statement at *Eun.* 1.9 that he has claimed "the inheritance of the argument" (τὴν κληρονομίαν τοῦ λόγου). But the term λόγος in *ep.* 29 refers to his treatise, just as in the mss. *Eun.* 1 and 2 are titled, respectively, τῶν ἐκδοθέντων παρὰ Εὐνομίου δύο λόγων μετὰ τὴν κοίμησιν τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου ἀντιρρητικὸς εἰς τὸν πρῶτον λόγον and πρὸς τὸν Εὐνομίου δεύτερον λόγον (*v.* Jaeger's edition [GNO vol. 1] *ad loc.* and his comments at GNO 1.2, *prolegomena,* p. viiif.). *Cf.* Gretserus' Latin translation, *librum Eunomii accepissem* (PG 45, col. 238b), and Maraval's French translation, "J'ai reçu le traité d'Eunome" (*Grégoire de Nysse,* p. 311).

I would suggest that the peculiar mention of Basil's repose in the title of *Eun.* 1 derives from the phrasing of *ep.* 29 itself, which was, in fact, the original prefatory letter to *Eun.* 1; *v.* Silvas, *Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters,* p. 206.

[20] *V.* Vaggione, *Eunomius,* pp. 79-127, for a description of its contents.

[21] May, "Die Chronologie," p. 57.

with his theological arguments. In doing so, he again preserves the legacy of Basil, who in both *Hex.* 9.6 and *Struct. hom.* had appealed to Gn 1.27 for scriptural support against Eunomius.

THE CREATION OF THE HEGEMON: *HOM. OPIF.* 1-6

After its prefatory letter, *Hom. opif.* begins with a treatise in miniature (chh. 1-6) on man's hegemonic role *vis-à-vis* the universe. In ch. 1, Gregory describes the creation of the cosmos, which, he says, God has devised through the opposition of stasis (στάσις) and motion (κίνησις). This fundamental opposition, represented scripturally through God's first creation, "the heavens and the earth" (Gn 1.1, 2.4), begets the four elements, which represent various points on the spectrum between stasis and motion. For Gregory, the organizing principle of this grand prelude to man's appearance is the concept, frequent in Gregory's thought, of ἀκολουθία, *i.e.* that creation unfolds sequentially and arrives at a logical culmination.[22] Though Gregory does not use the term ἀκολουθία in ch. 1, its presence is felt, if not already in the descriptions of how stasis and motion generate the cosmos, in §5: "All things, therefore, had not arrived at their proper end" (πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἔφθασε τέλος). Gregory here surveys the innumerable beauties that adorned earth, sea, and sky. These had been brought to perfection, but the natural sequence still awaited its culmination: "All creation's wealth, on earth and sea, was ready, but there was no one to partake of it" (ὁ μετέχων οὐκ ἦν).

The end towards which all of creation was progressing, Gregory explains in *Hom. opif.* 2, was to be ready for the arrival of its king, man. For Gregory, man has been so created as to be

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[22] *V.* Daniélou, "Akolouthia chez Grégoire de Nysse," and Gil-Tamayo, "Akolouthia."

king from the moment of his creation (ἅμα τῇ γενέσει, 2.2), and this hegemonic nature accounts for why he was the last of God's creations: "For it would have defied expectation (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν εἰκός) for the ruler to appear before his subjects, but, once his realm had been prepared, the ruler appeared in due sequence" (ἀκόλουθον ἦν ἀναδειχθῆναι τὸν βασιλεύοντα, 2.1). Thus, God's entire work of creating the cosmos, as described in ch. 1, was but the preparation of the future king's residence (οἷόν τινα βασίλειον καταγωγὴν τῷ μέλλοντι βασιλεύειν, *ibid.*). Gregory ensures, however, that man's hegemonic role has yet a further end: the knowledge of his creator. Like Basil, who regards creation as a revelatory means for contemplating God,[23] Gregory says that God has placed man in such a richly appointed world so that, as contemplator of some of its marvels and ruler over others,[24] he might find the traces of, and come to know, the creator (τὴν σύνεσιν τοῦ χορηγοῦντος ἔχειν…, τὴν… τοῦ πεποιηκότος δύναμιν ἀνιχνεύειν, *ibid.*).[25]

As does Basil in *Struct. hom.* 1.3, Gregory observes that man's creation is unique in that it is preceded by divine deliberation (βουλή, *Hom. opif.* 3.1), whereas all other entities in Gn 1 are created by fiat. Gregory follows Basil in regarding Gn 1.26 as a dense prophecy of the entire nature and role of man, including his rule over the animals. The phrasing of the verse, says

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[23] *E.g. Hex.* 1.1, 5.2; *v.* above, ch. 3, n. 54.

[24] According to a scholion preserved in Forbes' edition, p. 122, this phrase means that man was to contemplate the celestial phenomena, but to rule over the earth.

[25] Gregory may even place greater faith in the revelatory nature of the cosmos than did his brother. Basil's *Struct. hom.* 1 opens with a reflection of the value of self-knowledge as a superior means of attaining divine knowledge even than contemplation of the natural world; he proceeds to encourage man to contemplate his *physical* constitution as a way of coming to know the creator. The basis of his argument is, of course, that man is a microcosm, and, therefore, contemplation of the cosmos is somewhat superfluous. Gregory, who later rejects the idea of man as a microcosm (*Hom. opif.* 16),[25] sees the created order as supplementary to the direct revelation of the image. To be sure, Gregory holds that man's physical constitution has a revelatory function, but, as he will make clearer in later chapters, the body does not in itself reveal God, save in its secondary reflection of the image.

Gregory, indicates "what kind [of creature man] should be, and of what archetype he should bear the image, and for what purpose (ἐπὶ τίνι) he will be created,[26] and what activity he will perform once created, and over what things he will rule" (τίνων ἡγεμονεύσει, *ibid.*). Thus, in the foresight of scripture, man "has acquired his hegemony over the universe (τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἡγεμονίαν) before he has come into being" (*ibid.*). Gregory's concern with the second half of Gn 1.26 is clearly indebted to Basil's exegesis in *Struct. hom.* 1.8-10. If Gregory stops short of interpreting the second half as explanatory of the divine image, it is to make the more general point that "let him rule, *etc.*" declares the very purpose of man's creation. Indeed, man's creation, Gregory concludes, is distinguished, not only by divine deliberation, but by being granted a physical constitution perfectly conformed to his intended role:

> Only the creation (κατασκευῇ) of man does the creator (ποιητής) of all approach with circumspection so as to prepare material for his formation (συστάσεως), to liken his form to an archetypal beauty, and, after setting forth the purpose (σκοπόν) for which he would be created (γενήσεται), to create (δημιουργῆσαι) a nature that is appropriate to him, fitting for his activities (ταῖς ἐνεργείαις), and suitable for the task set before him (τὸ προκείμενον, *Hom. opif.* 3.2).

That man's primary purpose is hegemonic is clear from the following chapter, in which Gregory describes how God has made man's nature (φύσις, here a synonym for κατασκευή), both in soul and body, "like a vessel suited to the exercise of sovereignty" (εἰς βασιλείας ἐνέργειαν, *Hom. opif.* 4). As at *Virg.* 12, Gregory locates the soul's sovereignty in in its free will: "For the soul's royal and exalted nature is self-evident … from the fact that it has no master, but

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[26] *Cf.* the similar phrase in *Hom. opif.* 16.5 and the discussion at n. 64 below.

is under its own power (ἀδέσποτον… αὐτεξούσιον) and, like an emperor,[27] is governed by its own will" (ἰδίοις θελήμασι αὐτοκρατορικῶς διοικουμένην, *ibid.*). In this context, Gregory appeals to the Alexandrian tradition whereby the man's hegemonic function derives from his iconic relationship to the divine *hegemon*: "The fact that he was created as an image of the nature that rules over the universe (τὸ τῆς δυναστευούσης τῶν πάντων φύσεως εἰκόνα γενέσθαι) means nothing else than that his nature was created royal from the very beginning" (εὐθὺς βασιλίδα, *ibid.*). Gregory follows this assertion with an analogy, drawn from the Roman imperial cult, in which images of the emperors (τῶν κρατούντων), decked in royal purple, are themselves addressed as "emperor" (βασιλεύς)[28]: "So also, man's nature, since it was being formed so as to rule over others (πρὸς ἀρχὴν τῶν ἄλλων), was erected as a living image (ἔμψυχος εἰκών), as it were, by virtue of its likeness to the king of the universe" (διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ παντὸς ὁμοιότητος, *ibid.*). Instead of the purple, the scepter, and the crown, human nature is arrayed in virtue, immortality, and righteousness, which perfect the likeness to its divine archetype. In the following chapter, Gregory furthers his point with a similar analogy in which God, like a divine artist painting with the colors of the virtues, has depicted his own sovereignty in his image, man (ἐν ἡμῖν τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχήν, *Hom. opif.* 5.1).

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[27] The word αὐτοκράτωρ was used as a common translation of Lat. *imperator* since at least the time of Plutarch (*v.* LSJ, *s.v.* αὐτοκράτωρ, I.3, and αὐτοκρατορικός). This, in combination with the subsequent analogy of the emperor (βασιλεύς; *v.* LSJ, *s.v.* βασιλεύς, III.3) and his image, justifies translating αὐτοκρατορικῶς as "like an emperor," and not simply, "self-governingly."

[28] *Cf.* Gregory of Nazianzus' comments on the use of images in the imperial cult, *or.* 4.80. Drawing mainly from passages in Ammianus, Avery, "The *Adoratio Purpurae,*" describes how, by the fourth century, the royal purple itself had become an extremely powerful symbol of imperial power and "was looked upon as a sacred object which alone conferred upon its wearer supreme sovereignty over the Roman world" (p. 78). It is not surprising, then, that an emperor's image, if clad in purple, might be regarded as a close substitute for his presence. On the usage of βασιλεύς, *v.* previous note.

Consonant with his general stance that the image in man is, properly speaking, the *nous,* Gregory states at *Hom. opif.* 5.2 that, in addition to the virtues and, above all, love (since "God is love," 1Jn 4.8), the divine likeness is preserved in mankind through the possession of *nous* and *logos*.[29] Gregory cites Jn 1.1 and 1Cor 2.16 ("we have the *nous* of Christ") to support his assertion that "divinity (ἡ θειότης) is *nous* and *logos*." Man sees in himself rational thought and intelligence (τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν), which are "a likeness of the true *nous* and *logos*" (μίμημα τοῦ ὄντως νοῦ τε καὶ λόγου). Here, Gregory comes close to admitting a psychological analogy to the Trinity. The term ἡ θειότης, in contradistinction to his subsequent description of God (the articulate ὁ θεός) as love, is applicable both to both Father and Son. As evident in his other writings against Eunomius, Gregory follows Origen's interpretation of Jn 1.1 as describing the relationship between Father and Son: "The *Logos* was in the *archē.*"[30] At *Eun.* 3.2.17, Gregory explicitly states, "[The sublime John] uses the term *archē* instead of 'Father,' 'was' instead of 'was begotten,' and *Logos* instead of 'the Son.'" At *Ref. Eun.* 22, Gregory likewise argues that, because of the second and third clauses of Jn 1.1, "the name 'God' has been invoked on both the *archē* in which the *Logos* was and the *Logos* that was in the *archē,*" that is, both *archē* and *Logos* are properly called "God." More importantly, Gregory elsewhere

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[29] Gregory feels no tension between identifying the image, on the one hand, with the *nous* and, on the other, with the virtues. Even in the earlier *Beat.* 6, he identifies the virtues as the characteristics by which divinity is seen and yet equates these to aspects of a blessed *logismos*:

Καθαρότης γάρ, ἀπάθεια, καὶ κακοῦ παντὸς ἀλλοτρίωσις ἡ θεότης ἐστίν. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ἐν σοί ἐστι, Θεὸς πάντως ἐν σοί ἐστιν. Ὅταν οὖν ἀμιγὴς πάσης κακίας, καὶ πάθους ἐλεύθερος, καὶ παντὸς κεχωρισμένος μολύσματος, ὁ ἐν σοὶ λογισμὸς ᾖ, μακάριος εἶ τῆς ὀξυωπίας, ὅτι … ἐν καθαρᾷ τῇ τῆς καρδίας αἰθρίᾳ τηλαυγῶς βλέπεις τὸ μακάριον θέαμα. Τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τί; Καθαρότης, ὁ ἁγιασμὸς, ἡ ἁπλότης, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τὰ φωτοειδῆ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀπαυγάσματα, δι' ὧν ὁ Θεὸς ὁρᾶται (PG 44, col. 1272c).

[30] *V. Comm. in Jo.* 1.17.102-05, discussed above, ch. 2. In addition to the passages cited here, *cf.* Gr. Nyss., *Eun.* 3.1.48, 3.6.21f, 3.9.31. On the problem of translating the word ἀρχή, *v.* above, ch. 2, n. 80.

correlates this divine relationship directly to that of the human *nous* and *logos*: "Just as our *logos* becomes a revealer and messenger of the movements of our *nous,* so also we declare that the true *Logos* that is in the *archē,* because he proclaims the will of his own Father, is called messenger (ἄγγελος), a title given him by virtue of his activity of announcing" (ἀγγελίας, *Eun.* 3.9.37). At *Hom. opif.* 5.2, therefore, when Gregory invokes Jn 1.1 as proof that the divinity is *nous* and *Logos* and correlates to these the human *nous* and *logos,* it is clear that he understands *logos* as the natural product of, and accompaniment to, *nous.* Gregory's citation of 1Cor 2.16 demonstrates the same relationship: Paul's followers have the *nous* of Christ (*i.e.* the Father) sending forth his *Logos* (*i.e.* speaking) in them.[31] Even though Gregory will later insist that the image is singular and, properly speaking the *nous,* he admits here some reflection in man's constitution of the relationship between Father and Son, inasmuch as man's capacity for rational discourse is the proper expression of his noetic faculty. Man's *nous,* created in the image of the Father, may be the image proper, but, just as the existence of the Father necessitates the existence of the Son, man's possession of *nous* necessarily implies the ability to speak, *logos.* Thus, in a secondary way, the Son is also reflected in man's constitution.

At the close of *Hom. opif.* 5.2 and in the subsequent chapter, Gregory further considers the iconic relationship between God and the hegemonic *nous* working through the senses. Gregory concludes his discussion of similarities between the divinity (τὸ θεῖον) and man's constitution by likening the mind's activity through the senses to God's omniscient oversight of the world: "The divinity (τὸ θεῖον) observes all things, hears all things, and investigates all

[31] As Gregory nowhere else discusses 1Cor 2.16, his interpretation of the verse must be deduced from his treatment of Jn 1.1 in this passage.

things; you also have the perception of reality (τῶν ὄντων) through the senses of sight and hearing and [you have] the mind, which searches out and investigates reality" (τὴν ζητητικήν τε καὶ διερευνητικὴν τῶν ὄντων διάνοιαν). Here, again, Gregory leaves no doubt that he understands man's ever-searching mind as the proper correlate to God, while, as in the case of the resemblance between human and divine *logos,* human sense perception bears a certain secondary likeness to God's observation of the universe.

In *Hom. opif.* 6, this focus on the *nous,* to the exclusion of the senses, as the proper point of likeness between man and God becomes central to Gregory's theological arguments. Gregory anticipates his detractors' objections that, by likening manifold human activities through the senses to God's interaction with the world, he imputes a variety of powers to the Godhead. Rejecting the possibility that God's perceptive activity could in any way be varied or diverse, Gregory argues that even humans have, not a multiple, but a single perceptive faculty that reflects the absolute unity of God: "For, even in us, the faculties (δυνάμεις) that perceive objects are not multiple (πολλαί), although we interact in many ways with (ἐφαπτόμεθα) the things in our life through the senses. For there is a single power, the very *nous* that is in us (ὁ ἐγκείμενος νοῦς), which reaches out through each of the senses and through them grasps hold of reality" (τῶν ὄντων, *Hom. opif.* 6.1). On the basis of the iconic relationship between man and God, Gregory then takes the human constitution as proof of divine reality, that is, he argues, as he will at several other points in the treatise, from anthropology to theology. Man's *nous* is singular and retains its unitary nature despite a multiplicity of activities, *ergo* God's various powers cannot imply a division of his nature (τὸ πολυμερὲς τῆς οὐσίας, 5.2). Gregory supports

his argument with the counterintuitive claim that man's varied activities are a function of being created in the image: "'He who formed the eye,' in the words of the prophet, and 'who planted the ear' has, on the basis of the models found in himself, imprinted these activities in human nature as identifying characteristics. For it says, 'Let us make man according to our image'" (*ibid.,* citing Ps 93.9, Gn 1.26). While a cursory reading of this passage might suggest that Gregory equates the image with various activities, this cannot be so, given the larger context of Gregory's argument. These activities of the singular *nous* are but points of likeness by which it can be recognized as the image of the undifferentiated divinity.

The motivation for Gregory's insistence on the singularity of the *nous* becomes evident when his citation of Gn 1.26 immediately prompts an anti-Eunomian tirade. Gregory applies his preceding arguments about the simplicity of the *nous* to the relationship between Father and Son:

> Will [the Anomœans] say that a single image can be made to resemble different forms? If the Son is by nature unlike (ἀνόμοιος) the Father, how does [the Son] form a single image of the different natures? For he who said, "Let us make … according to our image," and revealed the holy Trinity by marking it as plural (διὰ τῆς πληθυντικῆς σημασίας) would not have mentioned the image in the singular, if indeed the archetypes were unlike one another (ἀνομοίως εἶχε πρὸς ἄλληλα); nor would it be possible to produce a single likeness of two items that do not correspond with one another (τῶν ἀλλήλοις μὴ συμβαινόντων ἓν ἀνδειχθῆναι ὁμοίωμα). But if the natures were different, he would certainly have also established their images as different by creating the appropriate image for each nature. But, since the image is one, while the archetype of the image is not one, who is so foolish that he does not know that things that resemble the same thing necessarily also resemble one another? It is for this reason -- the scripture (ὁ λόγος) perhaps undermining this blasphemy at the very formation (κατασκευῇ) of human life -- that it says, "Let us make man in our image and likeness" (6.3).

There is nothing surprising in Gregory's appeal to the now traditional interpretation of the plural verb ποιήσωμεν as evidence of the Trinity. In the context of the Anomœan controversy,

however, where the plural verb could just as easily be taken as evidence of difference between Father and Son, this argument is no longer sufficient; Gregory must focus his argument on the tension between the plural subject and the singular image. For Gregory, the point of the phrase "in our image," indeed, the providential reason that it was even included in scripture, is that a singular image shared between separate archetypes, *i.e.* the Father and the Son, must imply that the two archetypes are identical in nature. Gregory's exegesis strikes a fundamental blow to Eunomius' argument that, because of the simple nature of the Godhead, the words used to describe God must reflect the reality of His nature; thus, for Eunomius, God as Father must have fatherhood, and particularly "ingenerateness," as an essential part of his nature, which could not then be shared with the Son, since the nature of sonship and fatherhood are mutually exclusive. Like Eunomius, Gregory also insists upon the simplicity of the divine nature, but appeals to the correspondingly simple nature of its image, the human *nous,* and reaches quite different conclusions: the Son is equally an archetype of the *nous* and, therefore, necessarily has the same essence as the Father. What is most striking about Gregory's manœuvre is that he establishes the likeness of Father and Son *without* appealing to the most traditional element of the Alexandrian exegesis of Gn 1.27, namely that the Son/*Logos*/Christ *is* the image of God according to which man is created. Gregory, no doubt, avoids this interpretation because of its Origenist pedigree, subordinationist undertones, and history of being used by the Arians.[32] This line of argument has

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[32] *V.* Corsini, "Plérôme humain," p. 112; Pépin, "'Image de l'image,'" p. 221; and the discussion of *Hom. opif.* 16.5 below.

been mooted as Eunomius himself applies the title "image of God" to the Son, especially with the qualification that the likeness is one of activity (ἐνέργεια), rather than essence (οὐσία).[33]

THE BODY, ROYAL SERVANT OF THE WORD: *HOM. OPIF.* 7-9

Gregory follows his treatment of the *akolouthia* of creation, which culminates in the arrival of its ruler, with an exploration of how man's body is perfectly suited both to his hegemonic role and to the rational nature by which he exercises his rule. In *Hom. opif.* 7, Gregory, like Basil (*Struct. hom.* 6-9), considers man's rule over the animals through his wiles. Whereas, for Basil, man's ingenious ways of subduing the animals are but the signs of his rational nature, Gregory places the topic within the scope of the *akolouthia* of creation by asking why man was created the weakest and least equipped of the animals. By Gregory's account, the *akolouthia* prepared creation to receive its ruler and now all but forces man to assume his hegemonic role by granting him a constitution so weak that he must rely on the physical strength of the brute animals. As Gregory aphorizes, "That which appears to be lacking in our nature is an impetus (ἀφορμή) for us to rule over our subjects" (7.2). Were man as fast as a horse or fitted with weapons such as horns or claws, he would feel no need for his subjects and would consequently neglect to rule over them; God has bestowed upon man his present weakness "in order to make his rule over them necessary" (*ibid.*). Following Basil, Gregory highlights the ways that man has through his intellect subdued the animals in order to compensate for his weaknesses. But Gregory further introduces a new observation: man's intellect also enables him to devise tools for the same

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[33] *V.* Eun., *Apol.* 24, and the discussion of non-Nicene usage of the term "image" above, ch. 3.

purpose. Man can domesticate dogs and thus create a "living knife" (ἔμψυχος μάχαιρα, 7.3), or he can contrive a knife of iron that is stronger and sharper than any horn or claw; he can make armor out of either crocodile hide or iron; he can train birds to fly on his behalf, or he can devise winged arrows that afford him the speed of a bird; man's weak legs necessitate, not only that he subjugate horses, but also that he shoe his feet. Gregory even sees both subjugated animals and technological augmentations as superior to the innate tools of the animals, since man can set them aside and leave his body free for leisure. The seeming advantages of the beasts are at the same time enslaving burdens and, as Gregory will soon explain, account for their servile minds, as well.

In ch. 8, Gregory forges a stronger link between man's royal status and rational nature as he considers the purpose of man's upright posture and agile hands. Gregory, of course, stands in a long tradition of speculation about the significance of human posture and has inherited the idea from both Philo and Basil.[34] But whereas Philo and Basil take the upright stance as reflective of man's kinship with, and expected journey towards, the heavens, Gregory regards man's upright stance and gaze heavenwards as "marks indicative of his sovereignty and royal dignity" (ἀρχικὰ … καὶ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀξίαν ἀποσημαίνοντα, 8.1). Man's posture indicates his sovereignty primarily in juxtaposition to the animals, all of whom bow before him in subservience and lean upon forefeet rather than hands,[35] but also reflects man's rational nature. The hands assist the use of speech (τῇ τοῦ λόγου χρείᾳ συνεργός ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χειρῶν ὑπουργία) to such an extent that

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[34] On this tradition, *v.* above, ch. 3, n. 46.

[35] Gregory does not account for those animals, *e.g.* other primates, that, though they do not walk upright, still have hands rather than feet for their forelimbs.

Gregory does not think it inaccurate to call the service that they offer "a characteristic property of the rational nature" (ἴδιον τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως, 8.2, *cf.* 8.8, discussed below). The hands enjoy a share of *logos,* not only in the sense that they "speak," as it were, through writing, but, more importantly for Gregory's argument, they make the production of speech possible (συνεργεῖν … τὰς χεῖρας τῇ ἐκφονήσει τοῦ λόγου, *ibid.*). Both the upright posture and the hands are examples of how the body is, for Gregory, a reflection of the rational *nous,* an "image of image" (12.11).

Throughout the treatise, Gregory makes no distinction between the *logos* as reason and *logos* as speech, nor between the corresponding senses of the adjective λογικός. For Gregory, since speech is but the expression of reason, to be rational is to be capable of speech; both distinguish man from the brute animals. Because Gregory understands the relationship between *nous* and the expressed *logos* to be analogous to that of the Father and his proper *Logos,*[36] neither does he distinguish λογικός*,* meaning "of the *Logos,*" from its more familiar psychological senses. Because of man's iconic relationship to the *Logos,* he possesses *logos* and the ability to express it through speech.[37] This complex of ideas explains why, in *Hom. opif.* 8.3-7, Gregory interrupts his explanation of how the hands aid the production of speech, or, perhaps better, "the vocalization of *logos,*" in order to situate man within the hierarchy of souls. Here, Gregory correlates the order of creation as described by Moses (plants, animals, then man) with Aristotle's taxonomy of the nutritive, perceptive, and rational souls (τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν,

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[36] *V. Ref. Eun.* 22, discussed above.

[37] On the difficulty of translating the patristic use of the term λόγος and its cognates, *v.* above, ch. 2, n. 121.

and νοῦς/τὸ λογικόν).[38] In his attempt to explain man's capacity for speech, Gregory focuses on man's role as the sole exemplar of the rational soul: "The perfect bodily life, which takes nourishment, perceives, has a share of *logos,* and is governed (διοικοῦσα) by *nous,* is seen in the rational (λογικῇ), that is human, nature" (3.4).

As in chh. 1-6, Gregory presents this hierarchy of souls as an *akolouthia* that culminates in man's creation. In his ascending taxonomy of embodied, *i.e.* non-noetic, creatures, each succeeding level requires the use of the previous: the soulless, bodily nature of the earth serves as a foundation for the nutritive soul of plants; the creation of animals must follow that of plants, since the perceptive soul relies upon, and is mixed with, the nutritive; "by the same sequence" (κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκολουθίαν), the existence of the intellectual soul presumes the presence and aid of the lower two, and, therefore, man is created last of all, "as nature proceeds in a sequential path towards perfection" (ὁδῷ τινι πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ἀκολούθως προϊούσης τῆς φύσεως, 8.5). This second *akolouthia* confirms Gregory's previous arguments. In the first, creation is oriented towards the arrival of its ruler, man, who exercises his authority by virtue of his rational *nous,* the image of God bestowed upon him; here, creation culminates in the creation of man, who possesses the highest form of soul, the rational. Because human hegemony is, for Gregory, already tantamount to human rationality, this second *akolouthia* cannot be fundamentally separate from the first. Rather, Gregory elaborates this theme to show how Moses reveals figuratively the psychology "that pagan learning imagined, though, indeed, it did not grasp it clearly" (8.4). Similarly, claims Gregory (8.5f.), this sequence was also known to Paul

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[38] *V.* Arist., *de An.* 2.2-9 (413a-414a).

and Christ, who expressed it in various triads such as body, soul, and spirit (σῶμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα, 1Thes 5.23); heart, soul, and mind (καρδία, ψυχή, διάνοια, Mk 12.30); and fleshly, soulish,[39] and spiritual inclinations (σαρκική [referring to the term σαρκινοί in 1Cor 3.3], ψυχική, πνευματική, 1Cor 2.14f.).[40] And, as Gregory elaborates in *Hom. opif.* 29.6-8, each individual human soul follows the same *akolouthia*. At conception, the full tripartite soul, like the parts of the body, has yet to develop; the nutritive and incremental soul develops first, then the perceptive, then the sequence culminates in the appearance of the rational soul.

Likewise, just as Gregory describes in ch. 4 how man's physical constitution is perfectly suited to his royal calling, so this second *akolouthia* culminates in a description of how man's body is perfectly suited to the use of *logos* (8.8). In the first instance, this requires the organs of speech to be capable of producing sound, but also that the rest of the body be so formed to that end. Here, Gregory returns to the original question of the rational nature of the hands. Though the hands have many obvious uses, Gregory claims that the service of *logos* is the preeminent reason that man has been equipped with them (πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως τοῦ λόγου χάριν προσέθηκεν αὐτὰς ἡ φύσις τῷ σώματι, *ibid.*). Without hands, Gregory claims, the human mouth would necessarily be an elongated snout with thicker, less agile lips and a tongue more suited to grazing. Because the hands leave the mouth free to serve the *logos* (εὔσχολον … τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ

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[39] This is the sense in which Gregory understands the term. In the context of the NT, however, the term ψυχικός is usually understood to refer to man in his "natural" state, as opposed to the "spiritual" state acquired through the Christian life. *V.* Schweizer's discussion of 1Cor 2.14f. in his entry *s.v.* ψυχικός in *TDNT,* vol. 9, pp. 663.

[40] Through this equation of the heart with the body and the flesh as representatives the lowly nutritive soul, Gregory may hint at his later rejection of the cardiocentric position (ch. 12). Also, the consistent identification of soul (ψυχή/ ψυχική) with the perceptive faculty bespeaks Gregory's understanding of the close symphony between the *nous*/ rational soul and the senses, just as he argues in ch. 10 that the *nous* works through the senses. The identification of the soul with the senses through which it operates, however, must be checked by Gregory's argument that, properly speaking, only the rational soul is truly the soul (ch. 15).

τοῦ λόγου), they may be considered a characteristic property of the rational nature (ἴδιον τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως, *ibid.*).

The hands, like the virtues described in ch. 5, constitute yet another of the aspects of humanity that naturally accompany the image and exemplify Gregory's later pithy description of the human constitution (φύσις) as "an image of the image" (12.11). Such traits, says Gregory in 9.1, are additional beneficences of God's generosity:

> Since, therefore, the creator (ὁ ποιήσας), by implanting in the image the likeness of his own virtues (ἀγαθῶν), has bestowed a certain godlike grace upon our form (τῷ πλάσματι),[41] he has in his generosity given the remaining virtues to human nature. But in the case of intellect and understanding (νοῦ δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως), it is not proper to say that he has *given* them, but rather that he has *given a share* (μετέδωκε) of them by adding (ἐπιβαλών) the proper ornament of his nature to the image.

God has given man these virtues, which contribute to his divine resemblance, but Gregory singles out *nous* and its characteristic activity as being imparted to man in a different manner: through participation. The virtues may reflect God in a sense, but, since the Father and source of all is himself *nous,* there can be no other *proper* ornament that would constitute the image.

But why has Gregory insisted on the term μεταδίδωμι? Besides maintaining the focus on the image proper in contradistinction to its natural accompaniments, this term subtly undermines Eunomius' argument that God's glory is incommunicable (ἀμετάδοτος). At *Ref. Eun.* 122, Gregory appeals to the authority of the prophet Joel and the apostle Peter, who cites him, "I will pour out from my spirit upon all flesh" (Jl 2.28; Acts 2.17). "If, then," counters Gregory, "he has

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[41] The theory of a double-creation that Gregory proposes in *Hom. opif.* 16 is based upon the structure of Gn 1.27 rather than the two accounts of creation in Gn 1 and 2. Consequently, it is not based on the distinction between the verbs ποιῶ and πλάττω. In general, Gregory seems less worried about the material connotations of πλάττω and its cognates.

not deprived all flesh of the communion of his own spirit (τοῦ ἰδίου πνεύματος τῆς κοινωνίας), how does he not give a share of his own (οἰκείας) glory to the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father and has everything that the Father has?" In *Hom. opif.* 9.1, God has given man a share, not merely of his glory, but of that which is most characteristic of his nature: *nous*. By insisting upon participation as the means by which man enjoys the possession of *nous,* Gregory further implies that this term is proper to humans, but inadequate to describe the communion between Father and Son. As he further argues at *Ref. Eun.* 123, Eunomius may have been inadvertently right, inasmuch as the Father has no need to impart his glory to the Son, who shares the same nature. Communication (μετάδοσις) only applies to an entity that receives something from without; the Son, however, enjoys the same glory as the Father by virtue of their shared nature and the Father's complete indwelling in him.

In concluding his argument that the human body is perfectly suited to the service of *logos,* Gregory likens the *nous* to a musician in a manner reminiscent of Athanasius (*Gent.* 31).[42] Gregory regards the vocal organs as a means that God has contrived so that the human *nous* would not be left incommunicable and isolated (ἀκοινώνητον … καὶ ἄμικτον, 9.1). Whereas, for Athanasius, the metaphor of the *nous* as musician emphasized only its *hegemony* and harmonization of the senses, Gregory extends the focus to the actual expression of thoughts, "since it could not reveal (δεικνύειν) through the bare soul the impulses of the understanding (τῆς διανοίας) to those who perceive (τοῖς … ἐπαΐουσι) through the bodily senses" (9.2). Thus, for Gregory, the *nous* plays, not the lyre of the senses, but the "ensouled instruments" of speech

[42] Discussed above, ch. 2.

and thereby "manifests its hidden thoughts" (νοήματα, *ibid.*). Following a somewhat technical account of how the organs of speech, which Gregory describes as a combination of lyre and flute, actually produce sound, Gregory concludes his argument for the body's rational nature: "Since, then, the *nous* plays within us the music of reason (μουσουργοῦντος τὸν λόγον) through this complement (κατασκευῆς) of organs, we have become rational" (λογικοί, 10.1).[43]

THE ACTIVITY AND NATURE OF THE *NOUS: HOM. OPIF.* 10F.

In *Hom. opif.* 10, Gregory turns his attention from the body's role in expressing the thoughts of the *nous* to the perceptive activity that the *nous* performs through the senses.[44] Extending Solomon's proverb that "neither eye will be satisfied with seeing, nor ear filled with hearing" (Eccl 1.8) to the relationship between the *nous* and all the senses, Gregory declares that the most remarkable aspect of the the *nous* is its infinite capacity for sensory perception and its ability to sort and keep unconfused the myriad perceptions that it receives. In an image once again reminiscent of Athanasius (*Gent.* 38, 43), Gregory likens the *nous* and its management of sensory perceptions to a many-gated city receiving visitors that it sorts to various parts of the city.[45] "The city of our *nous*" (τὴν τοῦ νοῦ πόλιν, 10.4) is able, not only to sort different

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[43] Many Greek mss. of *Hom. opif.*, as well as those of Dionysius Exiguus' the Latin translation, recognize that 10.1 is in fact the conclusion of Gregory's argument in ch. 9 and, therefore, place the beginning of ch. 10 between 10.1 and 10.2. *V.* Forbes' app. crit. *ad loc.* On the Latin version of the treatise, *v.* Forbes' introduction, pp. 99f., and, in greater detail, Levine, "Two Early Latin Versions."

[44] Wessel, "The Reception of Greek Science," details how the perceptive activity (αἴσθησις) of the *nous* forms the basis of Gregory's resolution of the mind-body problem, *i.e.* how the immaterial *nous* and immaterial body can be unified as a single organism.

[45] The close succession of such similar images (*nous* as musician, *nous* as city/ruler of a city) in both works suggests that Gregory is drawing upon Ath., *Gent.,* or, at least, the two authors draw upon a common source.

perceptions that enter by the same "gate," as it were, but also to unite like entities that enter by different "gates." Once again, however, Gregory's image has a different focus than that of Athanasius, whose comparison of the *nous* to the ruler of a city emphasizes its hegemony over the senses. By contrast, Gregory, who will argue in the next chapter that the incomprehensibility of the *nous* is an essential aspect of the image, equates the *nous* to the infinitely capacious city itself.

Gregory's treatment, in ch. 11, of the nature of the *nous* in itself reprises and expands his arguments from ch. 6. There, Gregory had argued that the multiplicity of human activities, particularly through the senses, could not be used to impute multiplicity to the divine nature, especially given that the *nous* that works through them is singular. Now basing his arguments on the *a priori* supposition that the *nous* is simple, Gregory insists that the *nous* must be an entity separate from, and beyond, the variety of the senses (11.1). And again, as in ch. 6, Gregory seizes the opportunity to make an argument against the Eunomians on the basis of Gn 1.26. The thesis of ch. 11 is that the nature of the *nous* is incomprehensible. Since, however, for Gregory, as for the whole of the Alexandrian tradition, the *nous* is the divine image in man, the question of the comprehensibility of the *nous* is tantamount to that of the comprehensibility of God himself. Exclaiming in the words of the prophets, "Who has known the *nous* of the Lord,"[46] Gregory further asks, "Who has comprehended his own *nous*?" and issues a thinly veiled challenge to the Eunomians: "Let those who regard the nature of God to be within their own comprehension say whether they have understood themselves, whether they have discovered the nature of their own

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[46] Is 40.13 (LXX); Job 15.8; Jer 23.18; also cited by Paul, Rom 11.34; 1Cor 2.16

nous" (11.2). Like Basil in *Struct. hom.* 1.5, Gregory is responding to Eunomius' claims that human language can accurately describe the essence of God.[47]

As in ch. 6, Gregory again counters Eunomius' arguments by appealing to the iconic relationship between the *nous* and God. Gregory presents the issue of the nature of the *nous* as a series of quandaries about its unity and diversity and professes to have found the solution to these quandaries in Gn 1.26:

> For the image is, properly speaking, an image as long as it is lacking in none of the aspects perceived in the archetype (τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον νοουμένων). If in any aspect it fails in its resemblance to its prototype (διαπέσῃ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον ὁμοιότητος), it is not an image in that aspect (μέρος). Therefore, since one of the aspects observed in connection with the divine nature (τῶν περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν θεωρουμένων) is the incomprehensibility of his essence (τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας), it is absolutely necessary that the image resemble the archetype in this aspect, as well. For if the nature of the image could be comprehended while the prototype was beyond comprehension, the discrepancy between the aspects observed (ἡ ἐναντιότης τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων) would expose the image's defect. But since the nature of our *nous,* which (ὅς) is in the image of the Creator (τοῦ Κτίσαντος), escapes our knowledge, it has a precise likeness to his transcendent nature (τὸ ὑπερκείμενον) and, through that which is unknowable in itself, it depicts (χαρακτηρίζων) his incomprehensible nature (*Hom. opif.* 11.3f.).

Despite Gregory's talk of "falling" (διαπέσῃ) from the resemblance, his argument that the image must be a precise likeness in order to be an image is not a reference to man's loss of the image through through the Fall; rather, he makes an ontological point about the incomprehensibility of the *nous.* If man's *nous* has truly been created according to the image of God, then it must be precisely as incomprehensible as God's nature and *vice versa.* Although Gregory casts his argument as a discussion of the nature of the human *nous,* his focus remains the nature of God, as is evident from the conclusion to the chapter. Man's experience of the incomprehensibility of

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[47] *V.* the discussion of *Struct. hom.* 1.5 above, ch. 3, esp. nn. [62f.].

his own *nous* gives him the assurance that God's nature is similarly incomprehensible, and, therefore, Eunomius' circumscribed divinity is necessarily discounted. The iconic relationship between God and man functions, as it were, as a two-way street: one may start from the nature of God and proceed to draw conclusions about man or from the nature of man to draw conclusions about God. On this basis, Gregory has crafted an anthropological argument for a theological problem.

THE LOCATION OF THE *HEGEMONIKON*: *HOM. OPIF.* 12-15

It is the anti-Eunomian polemic and interpretation of Gn 1.26 found in ch. 11 that motivates Gregory to enter the fray over the location of the *hegemonikon*. Despite several digressions, for which Gregory repeatedly apologizes, the overarching argument of *Hom. opif.* 12-15 is that the *hegemonikon* cannot be located in any part of the body. Because the *hegemonikon* is as incomprehensible as the God of which it is the image, it does not admit of circumscription. That this passage constitutes the logical conclusion of Gregory's argument in ch. 11 (*n.b.* the opening words of 12.1: Σιγάτω *τοίνυν*) shows that Gregory intends to further corroborate his argument against Eunomius. This passage is but the anthropological argument from ch. 11 writ large.

Motivated by the necessities of polemic, Gregory takes the bold step of rejecting Galen's signature theory, which by the late-fourth century had become near scientific consensus: encephalocentrism.[48] Indeed, in the late-fourth and early-fifth centuries, medical science was

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[48] Wessel, "The Reception of Greek Science," p. 26, argues that, by staking a position between Platonic dualism and Galen's materialism, Gregory is able to affirm the existence of an intelligible mind without presenting the body as a limitation upon its capacities.

moving in the opposite direction: Galen's focus on the ventricles had led to an increasing speculation on the specific mental function associated with each ventricle.[49] Gregory's rejection of this theory, however, is to some extent a logical conclusion from Galen's own theories. Galen, too, had insisted on the unknowability of the soul's essence on the basis of its likeness to the god whose essence was equally unknowable.[50] From such a position, it is a short step to extend divine uncircumscribability to the soul, although the result of such a step undermines the encephalocentric theory. In *Hom. opif.* 12.1, a passage that appears to be a summary of the Galen's arguments from *PHP* 2.4, Gregory rejects specious arguments for the location of the *hegemonikon* that are based on the centrality of the heart to the body, plausible analogies of the head as the acropolis of the body,[51] and the evidence of damage to the meninges. Gregory further rejects (12.2) typical Aristotelian and Stoic arguments based on the heart as the source of vital heat and Galen's anatomical arguments based on the meninges being the "foundation and root" (ὑποβάθραν καὶ ῥίζαν) of the senses (τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις).[52]

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[49] *V.* Rocca, *Galen on the Brain,* p. 246; Gregory's contemporary and fellow Christian, Nemesius of Emesa, is one of the first to propose ventricular location.

[50] *V.* the discussion of Galen above, ch. 2.

[51] *Cf.* esp. Galen's rejection of the analogy of the acropolis, *PHP* 2.4.17:

> οὐδὲγὰρ ὅτι καθάπερ ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῇ κεφαλῇ δίκην μεγάλου βασιλέως ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἵδρυται, διὰ τοῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ κατ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ὅτι καθάπερ τινὰς δορυφόρους ἔχει τὰς αἰσθήσεις περιῳκισμένας, οὐδ' εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο λέγοι τις, ὅπερ οὐρανὸς ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, τοῦτ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ διὰ τοῦθ', ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος οἰκός ἐστι τῶν θεῶν, οὕτω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον οἶκον εἶναι τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

with that of Gregory, *Hom. opif.* 12.1:

> Οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀφιεροῦντες τῷ λογισμῷ, ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολίν τινα τοῦ παντὸς σώματος τὴν κεφαλὴν δεδομῆσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λέγουσιν· ἐνοικεῖν δὲ ταύτῃ καθάπερ τινὰ βασιλέα τὸν νοῦν, οἷόν τισιν ἀγγελοφόροις ἢ ὑπασπισταῖς, τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον.

[52] I understand Gregory to be referring here to the more basic observation of the origin of the nerves from the brain stem, given his reference, later in the passage, to "sensitive nerve-outgrowths" (ἐκφύσεις τινὰς νευρώδεις … αἰσθητικάς) that extend from the meninges, through the spinal cord, and to the muscles. *Cf. Hom. opif.* 30.9 (ῥίζα δὲ πάντων ἀπεδείχθη τῶν κατὰ τὰ νεῦρα κινήσεων ὁ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον περιέχων νευρώδης ὑμήν).

In response to these claims, Gregory proposes a more nuanced argument in which he accepts the findings of the anatomists, but rejects these as sufficient ground for circumscribing the *hegemonikon*. Gregory accepts that the soul's rational faculty (τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς) is hindered by bodily injury, that the heart is the source of vital heat, that the meninges is the source of the nerves (*ibid.*). Indeed, in his anatomical discourse in ch. 30, Gregory subscribes almost fully to the Galenic paradigm and regards the brain as the most important contributor to life (μέγιστόν τι συντελεῖ πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος, 30.10), as shown by the results of its injury; the heart as the most important vital organ (30.19), because the source of vital heat (30.11); and the liver as the third vital organ, because the source of blood (30.12). Gregory even appears to accept that the rational soul exercises its control of the body by means of *pneuma* coursing through the nerves (30.9).[53] But he declares, "I do not regard this as proof that the bodiless nature has been enclosed in the limits of a certain place" (τοπικαῖς τισι περιγραφαῖς ἐμπεριειλῆφθαι, 12.3). As Gregory argues, the disposition of many parts of the body besides the heart or the meninges can affect the *nous*; examples include phrenitis, which affects the diaphragm (φρένες), rather than the heart; sadness, which is often attributed to the heart, but is actually due to the mouth of the stomach (12.4); and tearful laughter, which originates from the viscera (τῶν σπλάγχνων), primarily the liver (τοῦ ἥπατος, 12.5). Such affects of the body can no more be used to locate the *hegemonikon* in the diaphragm, stomach, or liver, than they can in the heart or meninges. Rather, Gregory conceives of a *nous* that is present throughout the whole body: "while these [affects] must be attributed to the various kinds of bodily structures, the *nous*

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[53] *V.* Wessel, "The Reception of Greek Science," pp. 33f.: "[Gregory wanted] to defeat those who located the *hegemonikon* in a particular place, while retaining much of the science on which their claims were based."

must be considered to be in equal contact (ὁμοτίμως … ἐφάπτεσθαι) with each of the parts of the body in accordance with the ineffable law of mixture" (κατὰ τὸν ἄφραστον τῆς ἀνακράσεως λόγον, 12.6).

This reference to the interaction of the *nous* with the body through *anakrasis* marks yet another instance in which Gregory coordinates his anthropological description with his polemical agenda. In the rest of Gregory's corpus, the term ἀνάκρασις is primarily a Christological term; along with its various cognates, it describes the relationship of Christ's divine nature to the body that he assumes and the resultant salvific effects upon human nature as it is mingled with the divine. Gregory makes frequent appeal to this process in his polemical works against Eunomius, as well as in his later writings against Apollinaris.[54] Although not from one of these polemical treatises, perhaps the most striking *comparandum* to *Hom. opif.* 12.6 is found at *Or. catech.* 16, where Gregory describes how, in the Incarnation, God is "mixed (καταμιχθέντα) with [both body and soul] -- that is with both the perceptible and intelligible aspects of the human compound (συγκρίματος) -- in that *unspeakable and ineffable intermingling*" (διὰ τῆς ἀρρήτου ἐκείνης καὶ ἀνεκφράστου συνανακράσεως). When, at *Hom. opif.* 12.6, Gregory describes the relationship of the *hegemonikon* to the body as ineffable ἀνάκρασις, he implies, beyond his argument that the human *nous* reflects a precise image of God through its uncircumscribability, that the Incarnation further provides a fitting model of how an uncircumscribable nature can be present throughout a human body. Conversely, Gregory's arguments against a circumscribed *hegemonikon* bolster

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[54] *V. Eun.* 3.1.45, 50; 3.3.34, 44-46, 51, 63, 67f.; 3.4.13, 16, 43, 46; *Ref. Eun.* 143, 175f., 179; *Apoll.* (GNO 3.1, p. 151, ll. 17f.; p. 154, l. 11f.; p. 161, l. 18; p. 172, l. 21; p. 201, l. 23; p. 207, ll. 21, 29; p. 224, l. 19; p. 228, ll. 13, 15); *Thphl.* (GNO 3.1, p. 126, l. 10).

those for the plausibility of the Incarnation. If the *nous,* despite being uncirumscribable in its likeness to God, can nonetheless permeate and animate a circumscribed body, then there is no reason that the divine *Logos* could not do the same. The lasting, salvific effects of the Incarnation are also reflected in the relationship between soul and body; as Gregory later describes at *Hom. opif.* 27.2, "through mingling" (διὰ τῆς συνανακράσεως), the soul leaves upon the body a permanent mark (σημεῖον) of familiarity that is the basis of their later reunion in the resurrection.

The extent to which Gregory's thought on the *hegemonikon* has evolved since writing *Virg.* and *Beat.* 6 is evident at *Hom. opif.* 12.7:

> Even if some should suggest in regards to this question that the scriptures testify that the *hegemonikon* is in the heart, we will not accept the argument without examination. For he who mentioned the heart also mentioned the reins when he said, "God tests the heart and the reins" (Ps 7.9). Consequently, they must enclose the intellectual element (τὸ νοερόν) either in both or in neither one.

Who are these "some" (τινες) that argue that the scriptures present a cardiocentric view of the *hegemonikon*? Primarily Origen, but also Basil, Athanasius, and even Gregory himself in his earlier treatises. With his new theory of the *hegemonikon,* Gregory boldly rejects not only the medical consensus of his day, but also the cardiocentric exegesis that had been standard in the Alexandrian tradition for roughly the previous century and a half. Moreover, Gregory's rejection of a cardiocentric interpretation of Ps 7.9 is a pointed corrective to his brother Basil's correlation of this verse to the Platonic soul divided into a *hegemonikon,* located in the heart, and appetitive faculty, located in the reins.[55] Such a radical break from both traditions is due to Gregory's

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[55] *V. Hom. in Ps. 7,* §6, discussed above, ch. 3.

increasingly sophisticated medical knowledge, which renders the cardiocentric position untenable, as well as the necessities of his polemic against Eunomius, which demand a human analogue to divine incomprehensibility.

To craft this new theory of the *hegemonikon,* Gregory must undermine the very epistemological basis of Galen's proofs of the encephalocentric *hegemonikon*: "Although I know from my studies that the activities of the *nous* (τὰς νοητικὰς ἐνεργείας) are blunted, or even cease to function at all, in certain dispositions of the body, I do not regard this as sufficient proof that the power of the *nous* is enclosed in any particular location" (*Hom. opif.* 12.8). If the state of the body, including damage to various organs either through accident or, as in the case of Galen's experiments, intentional ligation of particular arteries and nerves, does not give reliable evidence as to the location of the *hegemonikon,* then the foundation of Galen's arguments is undermined. Gregory regards that medical philosophy as a whole has made a categorical error by treating the *nous* as something physical, as though it occupied in the body an empty space that could not be shared with other matter (*cf.* his conclusion to the argument at 15.3). Returning to the image of the *nous* as a musician, Gregory counters that bodily dispositions are analogous to the state of repair of a musical instrument; even the most skilled musician cannot properly play a damaged instrument, just as the *nous* cannot properly activate damaged parts of the body and, therefore, is rendered ineffectual and inactive (ἄπρακτος καὶ ἀνενέργητος, 12.8), at least to the observing eye.

In a digression spanning 12.9-13, Gregory further emphasizes the unique role of the *nous, qua hegemonikon,* in reflecting the image of God and that of man's nature (φύσις, *i.e.* a technical

term for Gregory that indicates the lower parts of the soul, together with the body that they oversee) in presenting a secondary reflection of the image. Gregory conceives of the relationship between God and the human *nous* as analogous to that between *nous* and human nature: the *nous,* "inasmuch as it has been created after the image of the most beautiful" (κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ καλλίστου γενόμενον, 12.9), retains its beauty so long as it clings to, and partakes of, the image of its divine archetype, and, by clinging to the divinely adorned *nous,* man's nature is itself adorned with the same beauty. This hierarchy is particularly reminiscent of Philo's interpretation of Ex 7.1 ("And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, 'behold, I have given you as a god to Pharaoh.'"), whereby the *nous* serves as a god to the irrational soul and its faculties,[56] though Gregory himself does not draw this connection. Gregory likens the role of each to a mirror: the *nous* serves as a mirror of the divine beauty, while the human nature is, in one of Gregory's most memorable turns of phrase, "like a mirror of a mirror" (οἷόν τι κατόπτρου κάτοπτρον, 12.9), or, as he later states, "like an image of an image" (καθάπερ τὶς εἰκὼν εἰκόνος ἐστί, 12.11). Any disruption to this chain through which the divine beauty reaches even to man's material aspect results in a loss of the divine beauty. Gregory understands such a disruption as the failure of the *nous* to exercise its hegemony: if the *nous* turns toward, and follows, the inferior nature, it assumes the ugliness that the nature draws from matter, "so that, consequently, the image of God is no longer visibly expressed in man's material form" (ὡς μηκέτι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι καθορᾶσθαι τοῦ πλάσματος, 12.10). It is, says Gregory, as though the mirror of *nous* has turned its back on the form of the good (τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰδέαν) and, instead of reflecting the

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[56] *V. All. Leg.* 140, *Det.* 39f., *Migr.* 81-84, discussed above, ch. 1.

good (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), has now taken on the impression of formless matter (*ibid.*).[57] Thus, it is clear that, while the *nous* is the proper locus of the image, the rest of the human nature is not deprived of a secondary reflection of the image, so long as the *nous* maintains its proper focus and fulfills its role as *hegemonikon* by directing the lower elements upwards toward the divine beauty.

Gregory's description of the iconic relationship between the *nous* and the body is a corollary of his polemical concerns. Gregory uses the expression "image of the image" in a novel way so as to repurpose a phrase tarnished by Origenistic and subordinationist connotations.[58] In the Alexandrian tradition, this expression describes man's relationship to the true image, Christ;[59] Gregory, as will become clearer in *Hom. opif.* 16, avoids this designation of Christ as indefensible against the the Eunomian position. For Gregory, Gn 1.27 names man himself, not an intermediary *Logos,* the image of God, which frees him to name the body as its further image. Thus, Gregory's theories of the relationship between *nous* and the inferior nature reflect the evolution of the theological terms deemed applicable to the Son.

Moreover, this digression, as Gregory insists in 12.13, is a subsidiary argument (twice he says that it follows ἐξ ἀκολουθίας) used to make his case for an uncircumscribed *hegemonikon*.

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[57] *Hom. opif.* 12.10: οἷον γάρ τι κάτοπτρον κατὰ νώτου τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰδέαν ὁ νοῦς ποιησάμενος, ἐκβάλλει μὲν τῆς ἐλλάμψεως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὰς ἐμφάσεις, τῆς δὲ ὕλης τὴν ἀμορφίαν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναμάσσεται.

This passage has plagued the translators. Dionysius Exiguus (the Latin translation on the facing age in Forbes), Oehler (Latin translation, PG 44, col. 163a), and Moore and Wilson (English translation based on Forbes' edition in NPNF, series 2, vol. 5, p. 398), all treat the mirror (κάτοπτρον, *speculum*) as accusative and in apposition to "the idea of the good." The resulting, nonsensical translations have the idea of the good as a mirror set behind the *nous*. This ignores that Gregory has, just in the previous paragraph, compared the *nous* to a mirror that transmits the divine beauty to the nature. Thus, κάτοπτρον should be regarded as nominative and in opposition to the *nous.* LaPlace's translation (SC 1, p. 132) is, therefore, surely correct: "En effet l'esprit, comme un miroir qui ne présente à l'idée de tout bien que sa face postérieure…"

[58] *V.* Pépin, "'Image d'image,'" p. 221.

[59] *V., e.g.,* Cl., *Str.* 5.4.94.5; Or., *Or.* 22.4; Ath., *Ar.* 80; Eus., *P.e.* 7.10.11f..

Through his discussion of the chain extending from God through the *nous* to the human nature, Gregory constructs a broader framework in which to understand how damage to man's physical constitution impairs the activity of the activity of the *nous*. Damage to man's physical constitution does not injure the *nous,* but rather constitutes a rupture in the specular chain which brings divine beauty to the body:

> through [this contemplation] we learn that, in the human compound (συγκρίματι), the *nous* is governed by God (διοικεῖσθαι), and our material life is, in turn, governed by the *nous,* as long as it remains in its natural condition (ἐν τῇ φύσει). But if it should depart from its natural condition (παρατραπείη τῆς φύσεως), it is also deprived of the activity of the *nous* (12.13).

Consequently, when Gregory refers to the *nous* and, through it, the human nature, as transmitting the image of God, this must not be taken as a moral statement, but rather a simple description of the proper function of the *nous* in concert with the senses and body. That is to say, as at 11.3, Gregory is not speaking of a *nous* that diverges from the image through sin, but rather one that must be understood in analogous terms to a damaged part of the body. One might understand this by reference to that organ that Gregory regards as "a proper characteristic of *logos*": just as a withered hand can no longer express the image by properly responding to the impulses of the *hegemonikon,* so conversely can a healthy hand not express the image if the *nous* is unwilling or unable to fulfill its hegemonic function and thereby transmit the image to the subordinate nature. The only difference is the point at which the chain is broken.

That Gregory here treats the image in functional, rather than moral terms is evident from his subsequent, lengthy digression on the nature of sleep (ch. 13). As Gregory proposes in 12.14, there are various ways to confirm his argument that "the [*nous*] is powerless in the case of those

who cannot receive its activity"; of these, sleep is the prime example. Although Gregory explains in detail how the vapors released through digestion induce sleep and, under certain circumstances, yawning, he intends primarily to present sleep as a state in which "the senses lie still in the body and cease completely from their natural movement" (ἀτρεμούσης … τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ … ἀπρακτούσης, 13.3). The clinging of *nous* to nature, the very relationship that Gregory describes as "a mirror of a mirror" and "image of an image" in 12.9 and 11, is proved by the fact that the *nous* is active when the nature is awake, but motionless when the nature yields to sleep (13.5). Gregory rejects the idea that irrational dreams represent noetic activity, since he thinks "that it is necessary to attribute to the *nous* only the sensible and sound activity of the reason" (τὴν ἔμφρονά τε καὶ συνεστῶσαν τῆς διανοίας ἐνέργειαν, *ibid.*). Rather, dreams represent the activity of the more irrational form of the soul (τῷ ἀλογωτέρῳ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδει), and sleep a state in which the soul is uncoupled from the senses. In the language of the previous chapter, the nature ceases to reflect the image of the *nous*. Since the *nous* effects its mingling (συνανάκρασις) with the nature through the senses, their rest necessitates that of the *nous* as well (*ibid.*).

Sleep thus constitutes for Gregory a period in which the *nous* temporarily relinquishes its role as *hegemonikon*. With the noetic and, consequently, the perceptive faculties of the soul inactive, only the nutritive faculty is left to govern. Gregory, therefore, attributes the oddities of dreams to the liver, as representative of the nutritive soul, which retains an echo of a memory of

the activities performed by the waking *nous* and senses (13.6).[60] In 13.7, Gregory describes more fully the hegemonic inversion that occurs during sleep:

> But just as the *nous* of those who are awake and active is in command (ἐπικρατεῖ), while the senses are subservient (ὑπηρετεῖ δὲ ἡ αἴσθησις), and neither is deprived of the power to direct the body (ἡ διοικητικὴ τοῦ σώματος δύναμις),… so also during sleep sovereignty (ἡγεμονία) over these powers is somehow inverted (ἀντιμεθίσταται) in us, and, now that the more irrational element is in command (κρατοῦντος τοῦ ἀλογωτέρου), the activity of the others ceases, although it is not completely extinguished.

By the logical sequence of Gregory's argument, this reversal of the hegemonic order during sleep must be equated to his description, at 12.10, of the *nous* turning towards the lower elements of the human nature and acquiring their image in place of the divine image. Gregory describes both scenarios in terms of "interruption." At 12.10 the interruption (διασπασμός) of the connection extending from God, through the *nous,* to the nature isolates the nature, which then turns towards, and assumes the image of, lower material existence; at 13.7, Gregory notes that, despite its inactivity during sleep, the sensory faculty is not completely cut off (διασπᾶται) from the nutritive. Therefore, when Gregory writes that "the activity of [the sensory faculty] cannot shine forth (ἀναλάμπειν) when it is encumbered during sleep by the inactivity of the sensory organs" (τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, *ibid.*), or that "the *nous,* when it has been hidden during sleep by the inactivity of the senses, is unable to shine forth (ἐκλάμπειν) through them" (13.8), these are but concrete examples of the situation described in 12.10, in which "the image of God is no longer

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[60] Gregory agrees with Galen in associating the lower part of the soul, which for Galen would be the Platonic ἐπιθυμία, with the liver. This account is somewhat at odds with *Hom. opif.* 30.7-9, where the nutritive soul is correlated to the bones, the perceptive to the soft tissues, and the rational to the *pneuma* coursing through the nerves. Gregory seems to be thinking less of localization than of the instrumental use of specific organs. Alternatively, this may accord with his argument (ch. 15) that the only the rational soul is, properly speaking, the soul that is in the image. There would be no obstacle, then, to circumscribing the lower forms of soul, which are but life forces and, therefore, not in the image of the incomprehensible God.

visibly expressed in man's material form." Though not caused by damage to the body, sleep equally impairs the expression of the *nous,* as Gregory likens the situation to that of a musician who cannot play a lyre whose strings have been loosed (12.9).

Gregory clarifies how the body can affect the *nous, i.e.* how the *nous* can acquire the image of the material body, by appealing to the hallucinations effected by illness.[61] The physical condition of the body, *e.g.* profuse sweating or a distended bowel, may cause the patient to hallucinate that he is being sprinkled with water or fed by force. Similar effects of the body upon the soul are also possible, says Gregory, even apart from illness, when the rational faculty of the soul (τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, 12.15) sleeps. Gregory appeals to the testimony of other physicians to establish that the quality of visions, whether dreams or hallucinations, varies in accordance with the specific injury to the body. For Gregory, this is further evidence of the close integration between the various faculties of the soul: "From this it can be seen that, through the process of mingling (διὰ ἀνακράσεως), the soul's faculty of nutrition and growth possesses a certain seed of the noetic faculty sown in it. This [seed] is somehow made like the particular disposition of the body and, in its fantasies, conforms to the prevailing affliction" (πάθος, 13.16).

Only in ch. 14 does Gregory impute a moral dimension to this hegemonic inversion:

> In some cases, however, the *nous* becomes like a servant (ὑπηρέτης) and follows the impulses of the nature (ταῖς φυσικαῖς ὁρμαῖς). For often the nature of the body leads (καθηγεῖται) by introducing both the sensation of that which is painful and the desire for that which is pleasurable. Thus, it initiates action by creating in us either an appetite for food or the impulse for some other form of pleasure, while the *nous* receives such

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[61] Here (13.15) Gregory bases his claims on observations made while treating a friend. This is one of the few indications in the corpus of his writings that he has any practical medical experience. *V.* Janini Cuesto and Keenan.

> impulses and, through its own craftiness (περινοίαις), provides the body with the means to acquire the desired object (14.1).

Gregory insists, however, that it is only those who are of a more slavish disposition (τῶν ἀνδραποδωδέστερον διακεμένων) who allow their *nous* to be so enslaved to the senses (*ibid.*). In more perfect men, "the *nous* leads by choosing (προαιρούμενος) through reason (λόγῳ), rather than passion, what is beneficial, and the nature follows in the footsteps of its leader" (τῷ προκαθηγουμένῳ, *ibid.*). Even in a moral interpretation, then, the hegemony of the *nous* is of paramount importance. This explains why Gregory speaks of the image as something that may be obscured rather than lost. When the *nous* relinquishes its hegemonic role to the nature, it merely ceases to act on the basis of *logos*; it is not extirpated. Hence, the nature no longer reflects through its actions the rational image of the *nous*. In functional terms, this situation differs from the hegemonic inversion of sleep only in its voluntary nature; presumably, just as one can wake from sleep, the nature's reflection of the image can be restored if the *nous* reasserts its sovereignty.

Before concluding his lengthy argument for the uncircumscribable nature of the *hegemonikon,* Gregory indulges in one final digression (14.2-15.2) to affirm that only the rational soul can properly be called "soul." This is, in effect, a restatement of his previous arguments for the singularity and unity of the *nous* as the image of the singular God (ch. 6). Anticipating anyone who would interpret his discussion of the three types of soul as an admission that humans have multiple souls, Gregory explains that the perceptive and nutritive souls are only called such by an abuse of language (ἐκ καταχρήσεως, 15.1). They are but a mere

"life force" (ἐνέργεια ζωτική, 15.2), whereas "the true and perfect soul, which is intelligible (νοερά), immaterial, and mingled (καταμιγνυμένη) through the senses with the material nature, is singular by nature" (μία τῇ φύσει, 14.2).

THE IMAGE AND LIKENESS: *HOM. OPIF.* 16F., 22

In *Hom. opif.* 16, Gregory finally reflects at length on Gn 1.26, specifically the significance of the image, which he regards as the sole source of man's worth. To make this point all the starker, Gregory derides the idea that man derives any value from being a microcosm.[62] For Gregory, this is a question of the archetype of man's image: does man's worth lie "in his likeness (ὁμοιότητι) to the created universe" or "in being created in the image (κατ' εἰκόνα) of the Creator's nature" (16.1)? This choice between the created and creator bespeaks the quandary that Gregory considers the true mystery of the image: how can the created, changing, and ephemeral human nature resemble in any way the uncreated divine nature (16.3)? This quandary parallels the questions that Gregory poses to the Eunomians in 11.3 (regarding how an intelligible being such as the *nous* can be reconciled to the body's multiple functions). As in that passage, it is followed by the dictum that, if an image deviates from its prototype, it is not properly called an image (16.3). For Gregory, the truth of the image consists in maintaining two

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[62] While it is generally supposed on the basis of this passage that Gregory rejects the idea of the microcosm (*v., e.g.,* Smets and Van Esbroek, *Basile de Césarée,* pp. 169f., n. 2), he does not explicitly reject the idea here. Rather, regarding the title, "microcosm," to mean only that man is composed of the mixture of the four elements, he counters that lesser creatures, too, are so composed. Gregory's concern is the source of man's elevated honor *vis-a-vis* the rest of creation; he may, in fact, be a microcosm, but this is meaningless in comparison to the possession of the divine image. Basil's position is not far removed. Although he regards man, particularly in his physical construction, as a microcosm and means for contemplating divine handiwork, he still insists that man's glory derives from his creation in the image and the divine deliberation that preceded it (*Struct. hom.* 2.1-4).

tenets: 1) scripture is true in saying that man was created in the image, and 2) "the wretchedness of the human nature has not been made like to the blessedness of the impassible life" (16.4). The "human nature" of which Gregory speaks, of course, is the compound of the senses and the body that Gregory has so thoroughly described in the preceding chapters. Although Gregory concedes that only "Truth himself" (ἡ ὄντως Ἀλήθεια) knows exactly how man is in the image and that humans are left "searching out the truth by guesses and conjectures," the two fundamental teachings about the image only seem paradoxical. When Gregory asks rhetorically if there is any way left that man can be likened to God, the obvious and expected answer is the *nous,* which is distinct from the nature. This is so because, as Gregory relates in 27.5, the part of the soul that is like God is itself free from change and flux, which characterizes rather the lesser nature.[63]

Given that Gregory has already paired discussion of Gn 1.26 and polemic against Eunomius in chh. 6 and 11, his final attack at 16.5 comes as no surprise:

> After saying, "Let us make man in the image," and the purposes for which he says "Let us make him,"[64] the scriptures add the following saying, "And God created the man, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." Now, in the preceding arguments, it has already been said that such a saying has been uttered beforehand in order to destroy heretical impiety, so that, after being taught that the only-begotten God "made man in the image of God," we might in no way distinguish the divinity of the Father and of the Son, since the holy scriptures name each one "God," both the one who has made (τὸν … πεποιηκότα) man and the one in whose image he was created (ἐγένετο).

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[63] Τῷ τοίνυν θεοειδεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ τὸ ῥέον ἐν τῇ ἀλλοιώσει καὶ μέθιστάμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τε καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἐν τῷ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς συγκρίματι, τοῦτο προσφύεται.

[64] The mention of the purposes for creating man is a reference to the second half of Gn 1.26 ("and let them rule over the fish of the sea, *etc.*"), to which Gregory briefly alludes in 3.1 (with the same phrase ἐπὶ τίνι). Outside of *Hom. opif.*, Gregory cites the verse only once (*Hom. 4 in Eccl.,* GNO 5, p. 335), as a proof of man's free will and an argument against slavery. Thus, both the present reference and that at 3.1 likely allude to Basil's exposition of the verse at *Struct. hom.* 1.8-10.

By referring to his previous argument (at 6.3) that Gn 1.26 has been providentially included in scripture to preclude heresy, Gregory leaves no doubt that this passage is directed against the Eunomians.[65] But how has the following verse named two entities "God?" There is no doubt but that Gregory has founded his argument upon the condensed version of Gn 1.27, first promulgated by Philo and thereafter standard in the Alexandrian Christian tradition: "God made man in the image of God."

Despite this traditional exegetical turn, however, Gregory has entirely upended the traditional understanding of the passage. In light of several passages in the New Testament, especially Col 1.15, previous exegetes of the Alexandrine tradition interpreted "the image of God" to refer to the Son, such that they read Gn 1.27 to mean, "The Father made man according to the Son." Eschewing this reading, Gregory focuses on the repetition of the name "God" and handles the expression "in the image" in a more straightforward, literal sense that merely reflects the relationship between man and God.[66] The phrase, "image of God," therefore, is no longer a title for the Son, and Gregory is free to interpret the verse in reverse fashion: "The Son made man in the image of the Father," or, in his own words, "the only-begotten God 'made man in the image of God.'" This radical inversion explains why nowhere in his writings does Gregory use that otherwise common patristic circumlocution, τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ("that which is according to the

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[65] Corsini, "Plérôme humain," p. 112, argues that Gregory is trying to counter optimistic naturalism, particularly the Stoic concept of the microcosm, while securing an analogical basis for knowing God that can contend against Anomœan doctrines.

[66] Corsini, "Plérôme humain," pp. 112f., notes that Gregory was the first to understand the logical consequences of insisting on the consubstantiality and complete equality of Father and Son, *viz.* that the *Logos* can no longer be thought of as a mediator nor, consequently, as a mediating image between God and man. Thus, Gregory's application of the term "image" to man, rather than the *Logos,* is part of his rejection of Origenism.

image"), to distinguish the likeness that man possesses from the true "image," Christ.[67] Since the Son does not serve as an intermediary image between God and man, Gregory is perfectly content to speak of man possessing the image itself, as he does throughout *Hom. opif.*

As with the rejection of Galenic encephalocentrism and Alexandrian cardiocentrism, Gregory has reversed the Alexandrian interpretation of Gn 1.27 in order to suit the needs of his polemic against Eunomius. Gregory has not unwittingly strayed from an interpretation so entrenched in the preceding tradition; rather, Gregory is responding to the argumentative weakness of the traditional interpretation. By equating "the image of God" with the Son, the traditional Alexandrian interpretation stops short of naming the Son "God," even if other supplementary arguments might be adduced as a corrective. With his novel interpretation, Gregory concedes that the title "image of God," if applied to the Son, is more useful to Eunomius' arguments than his own, since it can easily be made to imply subordination and difference of essence. Gregory's recast verse explicitly names both entities "God" and thereby becomes a scriptural proof-text that both share the same essence: divinity (θεότητης). Gregory, then, views Gn 1.27 as equivalent to Jn 1.1, which, as he argues in *Ref. Eun.* 22, attributes the name, "God," to both Father and Son and thereby affirms their identical nature. Perhaps the boldest aspect of Gregory's argument is that he must disregard the established language of

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[67] The only two instances that Gregory even uses the phrase both show that he is not using it in usual Alexandrine fashion. At *Or. catech.* 8, Gregory writes that, in the resurrection, man will find his original form "if, in this life, he has preserved *that which is in the image*"; here, it is clear, τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα simply refers to the characteristic features of man's divine likeness. Likewise, at *Hom. opif.* 22.4, Gregory uses the phrase to distinguish, not man's share of the image from *the* image, Christ, but the rational soul from the lower nature, particularly the faculties that are associated with sexual differentiation and have no part in the image: "when he made *that which is in the image,* he did not add to man the power to increase and multiply at the same time." Thus, τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα here simply refers to the aspect of man that is in the image as opposed to that which is not. This interpretation is corroborated by Gregory's statement, just a few lines earlier in the same section, that God has providentially mixed a bit of the irrational (*i.e.* the division of the sexes) "into his own image" (τῇ ἰδίᾳ εἰκόνι), referring to man.

trinitarian theology; Gregory must identify the first iteration of God, which is articulate (ὁ Θεός), with the Son and the second, which is inarticulate (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ), with the Father. Under such circumstances, it appears that, in his paraphrase of the verse, Gregory wants to neutralize any potential trinitarian problems by making the articulate ὁ Θεός shorthand for ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός. Gregory does not, however, attempt to mitigate any problems resulting from his inversion of the traditional order of creation (*i.e.* that it is the Father who creates *through* the Son).[68] In the present passage, at least, Gregory ascribes no obvious role in creation to the Father other than to be the prototype for the Son's creation of man.

By reversing the creative roles of Father and Son, Gregory not only avoids the potential interpretation of the Son as the subordinate image of God, but also establishes the Father as the archetype of the *hegemonikon*. Thus, Gregory implies that the *hegemonikon,* which he has already said to be the source of human *logos* (5.2), is the natural correlate to the Father, the source of the divine *Logos.* This, too, is a function of Gregory's theological argument: he must guard against the subordinationist connotations of naming the Son as the image of God, but he must also preserve that characteristic Cappadocian doctrine of the Father's monarchy. Gregory's solution allows him unambiguously to attribute the title "God" to Father and Son alike without flattening out the hypostatic distinctions between Father and Son. Thus, the Father is neither the

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[68] Based especially on Jn 1.3: πάντα δι᾽ αὐτοῦ [*sc.* τοῦ Λόγου] ἐγένετο. In *Or. catech.* 5, Gregory observes the traditional distinction: Λόγῳ τὰ πάντα γεγενῆσθαι καὶ Σοφίᾳ παρὰ τοῦ τὸ πᾶν συστησαμένου…. τὸν Λόγον αὐτόν, δι᾽ οὗ τὰ πάντα τὴν εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι πάροδον ἔσχε. But immediately thereafter, Gregory concludes that he has proved that "the divine *Logos*" (ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος) is the creator of human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ποιητής, *ibid.*).

"sole God," as Eunomius' creed would have it, nor is he robbed of his role as the *archē* of Son and Spirit.

The attack on Eunomius, however, has been a digression, a resumé of his previous arguments. In 16.6, Gregory returns to the question from 16.2-4: how can man in his wretchedness be said to be in the image of God? Gregory resolves the problem by correlating the distinction between the hegemonic *nous* and the nature over which it rules to the structure of Gn 1.27: "The creation of that which is made in the image has come to an end, then [the scriptures] resume the account of creation and say, 'Male and female made he them.'" Gregory posits that "the creation of our nature (ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κατασκευή) is somehow twofold: that which has been made like the divine and that which has been divided according to the difference [between male and female]" (16.8).[69] Adducing Paul's dictum from Gal 3.28 that "in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female" (16.7), Gregory argues that the distinction between the sexes characterizes the nature, not the *nous,* which is the image.

Unlike Philo, however, Gregory bases his distinction between the two creations, not on the two creations of Gn 1.27 and 2.7, but rather on the two separate clauses of Gn 1.27 itself. Perhaps Gregory has been influenced by Philo's theory of a double creation, but Gregory cannot accept Philo's presentation without destroying the arguments he has already made against the encephalocentric *hegemonikon*. Philo's doctrine of double creation rests on the foundation that Gn 2.7 represents the creation of the body and the moment at which God breathed the *nous* into

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[69] Gregory's use of the term φύσις is inconsistent in this passage. It is clear from the context that, in this passage, he uses the term in the general sense of the entire human organism, rather than in the technical sense that he previously employed.

man's head. Similarly, Gregory is not teaching a temporal double-creation like Origen, for whom Gn 2.7 simply marks the moment at which souls fell into their bodies; indeed, the only time that Gregory cites Gn 2.7 in *Hom. opif.* is in a passage that argues, against Origen, that soul and body must be simultaneous creations.[70] Rather, Gregory interprets Gn 1.27 as a description of man's middling status between the divine and the irrational, only the latter of which exhibits the division of the sexes. The structure of the verse teaches not an historical sequence of creation,[71] but that "the intellectual has priority (προτερεύειν) …, while the communion and kinship with the irrational is secondary (ἐπιγεννηματικήν) for man" (16.9).[72] The lesson of this verse, says Gregory,[73] is that the superior intellectual element has dominion over the nature, although he discusses this in terms of divine goods. Gregory paraphrases Gn 1.27 as "[God] has made the human nature a partaker of every good" (παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ, 16.10). Because God is the

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[70] *Hom. opif.* 28.1. In general, Gregory follows the pattern of Athanasius and Basil, who, by rejecting Origen's psychology, are left with little to say on Gn 2.7. Although *Biblia Patristica,* vol. 5, lists forty citations of the verse in Gregory's works, the vast majority are vague allusions to the creation, particularly those that incorporate the words πλάττω or χοῦς. Aside from *Hom. opif.* 28.1, Gregory quotes the verse only three times: *Apoll.* (GNO 3.1, p. 140, l. 9) and *Eun.* 3.2.54, neither of which mentions the breath of life; and *Or. catech.* 6, where Gregory offers little reflection beyond that the inbreathing served to unite the earthly element with the divine. There are some few passages where Gregory preserves traces of the Philonic interpretation. In *Apoll.* (GNO 3.1, p. 146, l. 23), Gregory equates the breath (πνεῦμα) with the *nous,* but in an attempt to prove, against Apollinarius, that Adam was not simply "earthly" (χοϊκός, *cf.* 1Cor 15.47-49), but had spirit/*nous* from the beginning; and twice in *Beat.* Gregory appears to conflate Gn 1.27 and 2.7: ὁ πλάσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, *Beat.* 1 (PG 44, col. 1197b); κατ᾽ εἰκόνα … πεπλάσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, *Beat.* 3 (*ibid.,* col. 1228a).

[71] Ladner, "The Philosophical Anthropology," pp. 72-76 and 90, n. 141, and Behr, "The Rational Animal," p. 243, n. 26, both stress that these are not two separate creations, but rather aspects of a single, simultaneous creation.

[72] Behr, "The Rational Animal," p. 235, n. 28, rightly notes Moore and Wilson's erroneous translation of ἐπιγεννηματικήν, "a provision for reproduction" (NPNF, ser. 2, vol. 5, p. 404), which is based on Dionysius Exiguus' Latin version, *ad effectum … generationis* (Forbes, p. 201). Oehler's simple *deinde* (PG 44, col. 181c) and Laplace's "secondairement" (*Grégoire de Nysse,* p. 156) both adhere to the proper sense of the word (*v.* LSJ *s.v.*).

[73] *N.b.* the opening sentence of 16.10, "What then are we to learn through this?", followed by another characteristic digression. The answer finally comes at the end of §10 and in §11.

"fullness of goods" (πλήρωμα ἀγαθῶν), his image must also be full of all goods (*ibid.*). For Gregory, however, the preeminent good is the freedom that characterizes divine hegemony:

> Therefore, there is in us a form of every good (καλοῦ): all virtue, wisdom, and anything else that is perceived in the Almighty (πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον νοούμενον).[74] But, of all these, the foremost is to be free from compulsion (τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀνάγκης εἶναι) and not subjugated to any dominion of the nature (φυσικῇ δυναστείᾳ),[75] but freely to incline one's will towards what seems best (αὐτεξούσιον πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην).[76] For virtue is a voluntary thing that has no master (ἀδέσποτον), but that which is compelled and forced cannot be virtue (16.11).

Thus, the tension between the two clauses of Gn 1.27 refers to the hegemony that the *nous* exercises over the nature in the properly ordered human.

Even the division of the sexes, which, according to Gregory, God has contrived in foreknowledge of the Fall, is based upon the sovereignty of the *nous.* In 16.12, Gregory identifies the only point of difference between the divine archetype and the image as that of being uncreated or created and any qualities that derive therefrom, namely the propensity of the created nature to change. Like the image of Caesar on the coin of the parable (Mt 15.20; 12.16; Lk 20.24), the image of God has characteristics identical to its prototype, while the difference is in the substrate (ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, 16.13). God's foreknowledge of the Fall was but a

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[74] On the substantive use of τὸ κρεῖττον as a title for God, *v.* LSJ, *s.v.* κρεῖσσων, 2.a. *Cf.* Gr. Nyss., *Apoll.* (GNO 3.1, p. 137, l. 9); *Eun.* 1.1.98; 3.6.49; *Trin.* (GNO 3.1, p. 7, l. 27). Dionysius Exiguus (Forbes, p. 203), Oehler (PG 44, col. 184b), Moore and Wilson (NPNF, ser. 2, vol. 5, p. 404), and Laplace (*Grégoire de Nysse,* p. 157) all translate the expression πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον as though the text read simply κρεῖττον. Forbes' *app. crit.* notes no variants here.

[75] The more literal translation ("any natural dominion"), which all the translators follow (*v.* reff. in previous note), is so vague as to be meaningless. The context, *viz.* Gregory's discussion of the proper sovereignty of the *nous* over the nature, warrants taking φυσικῇ as a specific reference to the nature (φύσις).

[76] On the idiom πρός τι τὴν γνώμην ἔχειν, *v.* LSJ, s.v. γνώμη II.2.

knowledge of the tendency of man's changing substance when graced with the characteristic freedom of the divine archetype:

> Following the logical sequence of events (ἐπακολουθήσας), or rather observing beforehand by his power of foreknowledge (προκατανοήσας τῇ προγνωστικῇ δυνάμει) to what the movement of the human free will (προαιρέσεως) inclines in its self-sovereignty and free choice (κατὰ τὸ αὐτοκρατές τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον), [God], when he saw what would be, contrived in addition to the image the division into male and female, which no longer looks towards the divine archetype, but, as has been said, has been made like (προσῳκείωται) the more irrational nature (16.14).

What God actually foresees is the failure of the *hegemonikon* to maintain its focus on its archetype and its inclination towards the lower nature. Thus, God provides an aspect of humanity that has that lower nature, rather than God, as its archetype.

The actual reason for this providential contrivance, however, Gregory professes not to know. Indeed, he professes that it is unknowable apart from divine revelation and, therefore, proposes only to speculate on the reason "as in the manner of a school exercise" (ὡς ἐν γυμνασίας εἴδει, 16.15). Gregory conjectures (16.16) that Gn 1.27, because it refers only to the creation of "the human" (ἄνθρωπος), which it does not yet name "Adam," describes a universal creation of the whole human race.[77] Because God in his omniscience and foreknowledge cannot create anything undefined (*i.e.* he must know the limits of everything that he creates), the creation of the human in Gn 1.27 constitutes a collective creation (ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κατασκευῇ περιείληπται, *ibid.*) in which "the whole fullness of humanity has been encompassed as though in a single body (καθάπερ ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι … περισχεθῆναι) by God in his prescient power" (16.17).

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[77] The irony, of course, is that ἄνθρωπος is simply how the LXX renders Hebrew *'adam,* which can refer generally to "human" or specifically to the character Adam.

Expanding his previous theory of the incomprehensibility of the *hegemonikon,* Gregory argues that the universality of the *nous* supports his present hypothesis:

> For the image is not in a part of the nature, nor is the grace in any of the aspects that are observed in it. Rather, such power extends equally over all the race [of mankind]. And the proof (σημεῖον) of this is that the *nous* resides in the same manner in all. All have the have the power to reason and deliberate (τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ προβουλεύειν) and to do all other things through which the divine nature is depicted in that which has been created according to it" (*ibid.*).

Just as the *nous* is not located in any specific part of the body, so it is not limited to any particular segment of the human population. Rather, the *nous,* inasmuch as it is the image, is constitutive of humanity, and, therefore, all humans equally possess *nous*. God, for whom nothing is past or future, sees all of humanity in an eternal present, and for this reason scripture has named the whole human race as "one human." Similarly, the common human nature that unites the whole race throughout time constitutes "something of a single image of him who is" (μία τις τοῦ ὄντος εἰκών), as opposed to specific humans, who are divided by sex (16.18). God has contrived this division of the sexes, Gregory further speculates in ch. 17,[78] in foreknowledge of man's fall "from that mode in which the angels increased to fullness" (17.4): "Therefore, he fashions in the nature the device (ἐπίνοιαν) for increase that is appropriate to those that have fallen into sin, by

[78] Gregory again claims (17.2) that only divine revelation can truly explain the division of the sexes and offers his own explanation as provisional.

planting in humanity, in place of the angelic nobility, the bestial and irrational manner of succession from one another" (*ibid.*).[79]

For Gregory, the significance of this bestial and irrational element of the nature is that it is the source (τῆς ἀρχῆς, 18.1) of the irrational passions, which, like the division of the sexes, are foreign to the divine image (*ibid.*). The base passions that entered man's constitution "through the bestial manner of generation" (διὰ τῆς κτηνώδους γενέσεως, 18.2) represent a second, competing image in opposition to the divine image of the mind (τῆς διανοίας, 18.3). The *logos* struggles against the passions in a battle for hegemony, and, once a person has drawn the activity of his mind (τὴν διανοητικὴν ἐνέργειαν) to the irrational nature and has enslaved his reason to the passions (ὑπηρέτην τῶν παθῶν γενέσθαι τὸν λογισμόν), he assumes the irrational image (τὴν ἄλογον εἰκόνα) in place of the divine (*ibid.*). Indeed, the contribution of the reason worsens the passions. Human anger bears a certain kinship to the unbridled impulse of the irrational animals, but "is augmented by the alliance of the thoughts (τῶν λογισμῶν) and produces wrath, jealousy, lying, treachery, and hypocrisy: "All these are the wicked fruits of the *nous*" (18.4).[80] The reason (λογισμός), however, may regain its sovereignty (τὸ κράτος), in which case the passions can be

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[79] Behr's article, "The Rational Animal," has challenged the traditional (at least, traditional since von Balthasar, *Présence et pensée,* and Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique*) synthesis of this passage with Gregory's comments on the "garments of skin" (Gn 3.21) in *Anim. et res.* (PG 46, col. 148c). Rejecting the interpretation that the human division of the sexes constitute the garments of skin that will be cast of in the resurrection, Behr focuses on Gregory's statement that the dual-aspect of creation observed in Gn 1.27 reflects God's original intention that humans would unite both the asexual divine and the sexually-differentiated irrational natures. Behr consequently reinterprets Gregory's discussion of the angelic *versus* animalistic modes of reproduction as a reflection of which of these natures dominates rather than a comparison of asexual, angelic reproduction and sexual, animalistic reproduction. Karras, "Sex/Gender in Gregory of Nyssa's Eschatology," has challenged Behr's argument.

[80] Literally, "All these are of the wicked cultivation of the *nous*." In English, however, the literal translation of τῆς πονηρᾶς τοῦ νοῦ γεωργίας is more easily interpreted as an objective genitive, rather than the subjective genitive that Gregory intends.

turned into virtues: anger into courage, cowardice into caution, fear into obedience, hatred into the aversion of wickedness, love into "the desire for the truly good" (18.5). By "thinking on things above" (Col 3.2), in the words of Paul, one may elevate the mind and keep it from being enslaved to wickedness (ἀδούλωτον ὑπὸ κακοῦ διαφυλάσσει τὸ φρόνημα); the passions, when brought to that height, are then "conformed to the beauty of the divine image" (τῷ κατὰ τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα κάλλει συσχηματίζεται, *ibid.*). As Gregory has already noted (16.14), however, the downward tendency of the *hegemonikon* is usually too strong to resist: "For the *hegemonikon* of the soul is pulled down more by the weight of the irrational nature than is the heavy and earthly element (χοϊκόν) raised by the height of the reason" (τῆς διανοίας, 18.6). This battle over sovereignty is, again, a question of which image will be expressed, as Gregory observes that, when the *hegemonikon* that has succumbed to the weight of the irrational nature, it is as though the passions of the flesh form a "hideous mask, as it were, over the beauty of the image" (*ibid.*). Consequently, the image is usually not visible in most humans, although some, *e.g.* Moses,[81] are able through their purity to retain and display the image (18.7f.).

In ch. 22, Gregory discusses Gn 1.26f. a final time in order to explain why the resurrection has not already happened. Here Gregory reprises his theory of a universal creation of mankind from 16.16-18. These verses represent the creation of the whole of humanity, a stage in which "Adam had not yet been created" (οὔπω ἐγένετο, 22.3), a point that Gregory here bases on the Hebrew meaning of the name "Adam": "earthly" (γηϊνόν, χοϊκόν, *ibid.*). In foreknowledge of man's inclination towards the baser nature, God "mixed something of the

[81] Also, though not mentioned here, Basil, who was "formed in his soul in the image of the creator" and, therefore was able, like Moses (*cf.* Gr. Nyss., *Hex.* 1.1), properly to comprehend creation (*Hom. opif.* praef. 1).

irrational with his image," namely the division of the sexes. Gregory expands his previous exegesis of the division in Gn 1.27 (first creation in the image, then creation of male and female) to encompass the following verse; the subsequent position of Gn 1.28 ("increase and multiply and fill the earth") indicates that the faculty for increase is a subsequent addition at the level of the irrational nature.[82] Gregory corroborates his exegesis by noting that the same command has previously been given to the animals (Gn 1.24), "since, if he had bestowed upon man the power to 'increase' that is indicated through this command *before* adding to the nature the difference between male and female, we would not have needed that kind of generation through which the irrational animals are born" (22.4). Foreknowing the tendency towards the baser nature that accompanies the addition of this mode of generation, God has calibrated the timeframe of man's life and the coming resurrection to allow humanity to reach its fullness, upon which the human reproduction and the succession of time will both come to a stop, and all creation, including mankind, will be transformed "from the corruptible and earthly to the impassible and eternal" (22.5).

CONCLUSION:

By ch. 18, Gregory has made his case for the nature of the *hegemonikon,* its relationship to God and the body over which it rules, and the implications of these ideas for his polemic against Eunomius. The remainder of the treatise explores the condition of man in his fallen, impassioned state and considers other polemical agendas: the nature of life in Paradise (chh. 19f.), the

[82] This explains why Gregory several times refers to the lowest Aristotelian form of soul as both "nutritive" and "incremental" (αὐξητική δύναμις, 8.4f., 13.16).

likelihood of the resurrection (chh. 21f., 25-27), the temporality (*i.e.* non-eternality) of the cosmos and matter (chh. 23f.), and the simultaneous creation of soul and body (chh. 28f., 30.29-34). This final argument shows how fully Gregory has reappraised Origen's legacy. Gregory's reference, in 29.1, to his theory of a universal creation hints that Gregory's original motivation for crafting such a theory was to counter a theory of Origenistic double creation. Since the first creation is not really a creation at all, but simply God's foreknowledge of what would occur, the second and only actual creation must entail the simultaneous, individual creation of body and soul together. The latter parts of ch. 29 and the anatomical digression in ch. 30 both attempt to describe the growth, from seed to full maturity, of this union of soul and body.[83] As in the earlier sections of the treatise, the organizing principle of this development is *akolouthia.* The development of various anatomical structures in proper sequence is mirrored by the successive development of the nutritive, perceptive, and rational forms of the soul. Beyond that, even the image itself is obscured by lower nature and only reveals itself gradually "in a certain path and sequence" (ὁδῷ τινι καὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ, 30.30).

Gregory ends *Hom. opif.* with a resumptive discussion of the image, the ostensible focus of the work as a whole. Gregory does not, however, leave the image as he found it. In this treatise, he has constructed a novel and rather idiosyncratic theory of the nature and function of the image, particularly in its role as the *hegemonikon*. Navigating between the Scylla of trinitarian polemics and the Charybdis of Galen's medical theories, Gregory has reconciled his

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[83] *N.b.* the *inclusio* in 30.29: Τὸ γὰρ προικείμενον ἦν δεῖξαι τὴν σπερματικὴν τῆς συστάσεως ἡμῶν αἰτίαν μήτε ἀσώματον εἶναι ψυχὴν μήτε ἄψυχον σῶμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἐμψύχων τε καὶ ζώντων σωμάτων ζῶν καὶ ἔμψυχον παρὰ τὴν πρώτην ἀπογεννᾶσθαι ζῶον.

theology and anthropology so as to form a coherent argument against Eunomius. *De Hominis opificio* marks Gregory's assumption of Basil's mantle and presages his polemical efforts in the following years.

EPILOGUE

The legacy of the theological and anthropological synthesis that Gregory fashions in *Hom. opif.* is somewhat mixed. In his later writings, Gregory himself does not return to the question of the nature and location of the *hegemonikon,* even when discussing Gn 1.26f. For example, at *Or. catech.* 5 Gregory treats in summary many of the themes found in *Hom. opif.,* such as the soul's free will as the foremost characteristic of the image of God. And, despite the conviction with which Gregory had argued in *Hom. opif.,* even he found the weight of traditional, cardiocentric exegesis hard to escape. In one of his latest writings, the *Vita Mosis,* Gregory interprets Paul's "tablets … of the heart" (2Cor 3.3) as a reference to the *hegemonikon*.[1] Perhaps, with the threat of Eunomius somewhat neutralized, Gregory felt less urgently the need to insist upon his polemical revision of the Alexandrian tradition.

Nevertheless, *Hom. opif.* marks a turning point in the history of Christian theological anthropology. Origen's long shadow meant that the Alexandrian tradition as Gregory knew it resolutely endorsed cardiocentrism, despite the near universal medical consensus against it. Through his familiarity with Galen's writings and out of the need to counter Eunomius' theological arguments, Gregory was the first to reject a position that, by the late-fourth century, had to seem like ancient, hallowed doctrine. Similar rejections of cardiocentrism soon followed in Nemesius of Emesa's *De Natura Hominis,*[2] written perhaps a decade after *DHO,* and

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[1] *V. Mos.* 2.215: ὁ θεῖος Ἀπόστολος, καρδίας ὀνομάζων τὰς πλάκας, τουτέστι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς.…

[2] *E.g. Nat. hom.* 12, where he names the organ of the rational faculty (τὸ διανοητικόν) as "the middle ventricle of the brain and the psychic *pneuma* in it," and §13, where he assigns the recollective faculty (τὸ μνημονευτικόν) to "the rear ventricle of the brain, which is also called the *parencephalis* and *encranis,* and the psychic *pneuma* in it."

Theodoret of Cyrus' *Graecarum Affectionum Curatio,*[3] written in the first half of the fifth century. Perhaps Origen's waning fortunes and eventual condemnation had tainted cardiocentrism with heresy.

There was, however, one firm redoubt of cardiocentrism: the monastic tradition, where Origenism retained its influence long after its official condemnation in the mid-sixth century. Origen's anthropology undergirded many monastic spiritual teachings and practices and was, therefore, perpetuated through the ascetical writings of Evagrius Ponticus, Pseudo-Macarius, Diadochus of Photicè, and others.[4] As late as the fourteenth century, Gregory Palamas, the great defender of Hesychasm, will describe the mystic's task as gathering the *nous,* which has been scattered through the senses, back to its natural home, the heart (*Tri.* 1.2.3). When Nyssen's namesake explicitly identifies the heart as the location of the *nous,* he, like Origen and the other cardiocentrists of the Alexandrian tradition, appeals to the very language of scripture:

> Which organs does this power of [the soul], which we call "*nous,*" use to carry out its activities? … For some place it in the brain, as though in some citadel (ἐπ᾽ ἀκροπόλει τινί), while others give it the very center of the heart and the purified conveyance (ἀπειλικρινημένον ὄχημα) of the psychic *pneuma* therein. But we ourselves, although we do not regard it to be *within* as in a vessel, since it is bodiless, nor *without,* since it is united to us, know that the rational faculty (τὸ λογιστικόν) is precisely in the heart as in an instrument, not because we have learned this from any human, but from the very one who fashioned man (παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πλάσαντος τὸν ἄνθρωπον). In demonstrating that "it is not the things that enter, but those that come forth, through the mouth that defile man," he says, "For out of the heart come the thoughts" (οἱ λογισμοί, *ibid.,* citing Mt 15.11, 19).

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[3] *Affect.* 5.81; *cf.* 5.49-51, where the consistent teaching of the Scriptures and the Apostles, particularly on the soul implanted in man at Gn 2.7, serves as an argument against the manifold opinions of the Greeks on the nature and location of the soul (*v.* esp. 5.22 on the various opinions of the location of the *hegemonikon*).

[4] On this later tradition of cardiocentric spirituality, *v.* Bradshaw, "The Mind and the Heart."

Although Palamas endorses Origenic cardiocentrism, largely on the authority of Macarius, whom he cites later in the passage, he responds to the type of objections that Nyssen raises in *Hom. opif.,* namely that a spiritual reality cannot properly be located *in* an organ as in a vessel.

The persistence of cardiocentrism in these later centuries raises the question whether, in fact, two traditions coexisted in Byzantium, one cardiocentric and monastic, the other more worldly and encephalocentric, at least in an instrumental sense. *Hom. opif.* did not fall into obscurity during these years. Transmitted in many manuscripts with Basil's *Hex.,* and even translated into Slavonic in the fourteenth century,[5] it was a foundational text for the Byzantine understanding of the theological and scientific meaning of the creation. Moreover, Gregory's qualified encephalocentrism would have been far more congruent with Byzantine medicine, where the consolidated version of Galen's theories dominated until even after the fall of Constantinople.[6] Given the great respect with which both Gregory and, especially, Galen were held in Byzantium, it seems certain that a significant portion of educated society would have held to some form of encephalocentrism. It is an open question whether the monastic tradition maintained the cardiocentric position in conscious opposition to the medical tradition. A further question is whether such cardiocentrism is simply a relic of monastic spirituality divorced from its original context, or if these later writers retain the complex of associations among the *hegemonikon,* the image of God, and trinitarian theology that reach back to the beginnings of the Alexandrian tradition.

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[5] *V.* Sels, *Gregory of Nyssa,* esp. pp. 12-29.

[6] *V.* Temkin, "Byzantine Medicine," pp. 203-05.

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